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Dissertation Summary
Innovation is one act whose biggest risk comes from not doing the act. Dr.
Reithofer, the CEO of BMW AG, precisely devises an answer to the famous question as
to why his company innovates saying that: “because doing nothing was even a bigger
risk”. Companies deliberately choose to incur the risk of innovation to avoid a much
bigger risk of not doing so. The innovation process, however, continues to evolve for
businesses, calling for aggressive changes such as self-cannibalization (Sood & Tellis,
2013; Thurow, 2000), “glocalization” of operations (Svensson, 2001), and, more
importantly, pushing beyond organizational boundaries in open innovation models.
Recent models of shared value creation (Porter & Kramer, 2011), open source
technologies (Dooley & O'Sullivan, 2007), and distributed innovation (Cash, Earl, &
Morison, 2008) highlight the fact that company’s ultimate innovation outcomes depend
not only on its capability to innovate, but indeed on others’ capabilities as well.
Acknowledging the supply chain as the evolving unit of competition (Capaldo, 2007;
Ketchen & Hult, 2007), it also represents a necessary “innovation ecosystem” (Adner,
2006) that must be properly managed for reaching the desired innovation outcome.
This dissertation sheds light on several hopes and fears from supply chain
innovation in three distinct papers. Paper one introduces the concept of Process
Innovation Propagation as an appropriation technique helping to extract the most returns
out of a process innovation by exporting to supply chain partners. Paper two devises and
empirically tests knowledge properties that best lead to radical and incremental supply
chain innovative capabilities. Lastly, paper three conducts an exploratory study that
introduces factors affecting a firm’s optimum supply chain innovation strategy. The
dissertation makes a strong argument that supply chain innovation is most prominently
governed by power asymmetry that may either help or hurt innovative performance. A
more elaborate summary on each of the three papers follows.
The first paper introduces the concept of Process Innovation Propagation (PIP) as
a novel way to appropriate returns on process innovations through passing them to supply
chain partners. The transfer process depends on power advantage to persuade partners to
adopt an innovation because the propagator enjoys either: (1) market power advantage
6

through dependence asymmetry, or, (2) expert power through proficiency in one or more
areas of expertise irreplaceable by the receiver. In either case the propagator collects
innovation returns by operational improvement along the supply chain, such as process
synchronization and integration, and/or improved image and reputation as in the case of
propagating green practices and socially responsible initiatives.
The paper proceeds to develop the three overarching elements of PIP: partner
selection, innovation properties, and governance structure. PIP partners are to be selected
according to their strategic fit, which is characterized by strategic similarity,
interdependence, and incentive alignment. Two innovation properties are discussed as
relevant to PIP, including vertical transferability and the degree of technicality. Finally,
formality of the relationship and managerial attitude comprise the supply chain
governance structure, which arguably affects PIP success. The PIP novelty is threefold. It
suggests external appropriation through using other firms as opposed to solely depending
on internal capabilities. PIP also directly challenges the preclusive component of
generative appropriability (Ahuja, Morris Lampert, & Novelli, 2013). It also introduces a
new channel for collecting innovation rents through supply chain operational benefits and
market image.
Rather than appropriating returns on existing ideas, the second paper addresses
the challenge of creating new ideas in joint endeavors with supply chain partners. It takes
a capability building perspective to characterize supply chain knowledge properties that
help build collective radical and incremental innovative capabilities. Two hierarchical
component models (second order reflective-formative models) are devised for human and
organizational knowledge properties that are argued to drive supply chain radical and
incremental innovative capabilities, respectively. Being an element of any relationship,
power exercise is acknowledged for its moderating effects on each of the two links.
This paper uses a two stage PLS technique to empirically test for the hypothesized
relationships. Results show that human related diversity is an effective abstraction that
can explain supply chains’ abilities to produce radical innovations. Counter to
expectations, however, diversity in people and skills seems to create more problems of
coordination and intra-team conflicts than provide a wide spectrum of ideas helpful for
idea generation. The second order organizational construct, organizational capital
7

domination, did not succeed as a higher-level abstraction. One of its components,
however, organizational knowledge gap, significantly inhibits incremental innovative
capabilities of supply chains. Companies with discrepancies in size find coordination
problems due to conflicting procedure, governance structures, and organizational
cultures. Finally, results show that power exercise against supply chain partners will not
help incremental innovations, and significantly hurt radical ones.
After addressing hopes of appropriation and building innovative capabilities with
supply chain partners, paper 3 proceeds to deal with the main fear from supply chain
innovation, that is, loss of competitive knowledge. The risk of horizontal leakage of
knowledge (to competition) is inherent in vertical sharing (with supply chain partners). In
this context, the unintended knowledge spillover problem becomes each firm’s deliberate
choice whether to leak its partner’s knowledge to that partner’s competition. The paper
adopts a game-theoretic perspective in an exploratory study of supply chain knowledge
exchanges to address whether a firm should ‘cooperate’ by readily sharing its knowledge
and protecting that of its partner, or ‘defect’ by doing the opposite. Because each player
must choose one of two alternatives the relationship between the two players can be
modeled as a 2×2 game, in which each player chooses (simultaneously) whether to
cooperate or defect.
The paper starts by highlighting a broad class of symmetric and asymmetric 2×2
games that can model the knowledge-sharing dilemma among supply chain partners in
the context of joint innovation projects. Different firm preferences are modeled along two
dimensions: collaboration motive and power advantage. The paper continues to address
long-term relationships by investigating the effect of game repetition on firms’ choices
and outcomes using MATLAB simulation. The simulation explores the effects of firm
type, opponent type, strategy type (nice versus mean), and payoff structure on repeated
innovation interactions (or equivalently, long-term relations).
The three aforementioned papers are given in the next three sections, followed by
concluding remarks in section 5.
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PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION

CHAPTER I.

EMAN NASR

Process Innovation Propagation:

Appropriating Supply Chain Innovation Returns
ABSTRACT
This paper introduces the concept of Process Innovation Propagation (PIP) as a
power-based appropriation mechanism that departs from conventional strategies of
protective appropriation. PIP is defined as collecting returns from process innovations
through passing them over to supply chain partners. The transfer process is based on the
two mediated sources of power which pre-exist in a buyer-supplier linkage prior to joint
innovation endeavors: market and expert, and is novel in: (1) suggesting external
appropriation through using other firms as opposed to solely depending on internal
capabilities, (2) directly challenging the preclusive component of generative
appropriability, and, (3) collecting innovation rents through supply chain operational
benefits and market image. Acknowledging its significant potential as a profit-enhancing
mechanism, PIP is distinguished as a new construct and propositions regarding its
elements and antecedents are developed based on a thorough analysis and synthesis of the
literature.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Synchronizing the innovation process within supply chains serves as a key source
of competitive advantage (Cecere, O'Marah, & Preslan, 2004). Firms are accordingly
incentivized to share process innovations with supply chain partners, hoping to improve
the overall operational performance, in terms of efficiency, responsiveness and quality.
Doing so, however, may entail repercussions of intellectual property loss, through
common suppliers and divided loyalties. A corresponding dilemma, therefore, arises
regarding how to capitalize on supply chain partners to appropriate maximum value from
process innovations, with minimum loss of competitive edge. Firms realize the
importance of innovation “openness”; yet attempt to appropriate commercial returns from
their innovative efforts (Dahlander & Gann, 2010). Accordingly, in this paper we take a
step to resolving this dilemma through the concept of “process innovation propagation”
(PIP), attempting to build a comprehensive theory around it regarding its elements, and
viability conditions.
PIP is defined as a power-based appropriation mechanism for an existing process
innovation through transferring it to one or more supply chain partner(s). Firms that
propagate to suppliers process innovations, such as statistical process control, just in
time, or green initiatives, are able to reap more benefits from these innovations through
an enhanced supplier performance, be it in lead time reduction, higher quality or more
efficient production, and/ or an enhanced company image, for example by achieving a
‘green supply chain’ reputation. The concept of PIP is new in departing from the
conventional view of appropriation based on secrecy and intellectual property protection,
and promoting sharing of ideas to maximize value by considering adopting units outside
the boundaries of an organization.
The concept of PIP is relevant and timely in addressing three evolving facts: (1)
an increasing importance of innovation as a source of competitive advantage (Cefis &
Marsili, 2012; R. M. Grant, 1996); (2) a move away from the “myopia of protection” to
capitalizing on external innovation sources (Laursen & Salt, 2006); and, (3)
acknowledgement of supply chains as the new units of innovation and competition
(Adner, 2006; Ketchen & Hult, 2007; Porter & Kramer, 2011). Appropriating value from
existing innovations is of paramount importance to firms (Ahuja, Morris Lampert, &
11
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Novelli, 2013). Firstly, innovations have become a pre-requisite for existence and
success. Moreover, companies strive to maximize return on their vast, high-risk
innovation investments of technological, human, and financial resources. Firms can
appropriate “generative” value from innovations by seeking improved versions, and by
deriving related (or unrelated) inventions from existing ideas (Ahuja et al., 2013).
PIP extends the concept of generative appropriability (GA) by moving beyond the
boundaries of one firm, to acknowledge the potential of supply chain partners to
capitalize on innovations. Although PIP supports the cumulative component of GA
through expanding the scope of a process innovation, or adapting it to be implemented in
a supply chain partner firm, PIP works directly against GA’s preclusive component,
which emphasizes excluding external parties from benefiting from an innovation, through
intentionally allowing supply chain firms to profit from the propagated innovation. This
is particularly significant given the increasingly dis-integrated structures of supply
chains, rising move towards outsourcing, and more reliance on supply chain partners for
strategic activities and knowledge exchanges.
PIP depends on power advantages to secure innovation returns. Supply chain
power is the ability of a partner to induce another to do what it would otherwise not do
(Dapiran & Hogarath-Scott, 2003; Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer, 1981). Power acts as an
initiator for creating new adopters who may otherwise be resistant to changes and as a
guard against opportunistic behavior that may harm the innovation owner. Although trust
may replace power in eliminating opportunism (Ireland & Webb, 2007), it fails to
overcome organizational inertia against innovations, which may be caused by risk
aversion or simple resistance to change (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). Chain integrators, such
as Ford, Toyota, Wal-Mart and Dell, enjoy market power and/or expert power
advantage(s) that succeeds to influence suppliers to comply to directives regarding new
process adoption. By striving to maintain business with a giant integrator, or perceiving
technological lead, less-powerful suppliers conform to new processes, resulting in higher
innovation performance for integrators, suppliers, and in turn the supply chain as a whole.
Being a power-driven mechanism, PIP challenges conventional formal
appropriation means, while extending strategic, informal means. In PIP process
innovations are openly shared as opposed to licensed. Propagators acknowledge the fact
12

PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION

EMAN NASR

that formal appropriation, such as the usage of patents, generally fails with process
innovations (Teece, 1986). Protected by their power advantage, propagators readily share
their knowledge and may even invest more resources, e.g., training teams, to encourage
partners’ adoption. PIP extends strategic appropriation mechanisms by combining
secrecy and time to market, on a dyadic buyer-supplier level, as well as innovation
complexity (see section 3.4). When a power advantageous firm propagates an innovation
to a supplier, it can compel that supplier to maintain confidentiality, and negotiate
exclusive rights to the innovation for an initial period of time, securing time to market
advantage. Although PIP is expected to enhance innovation performance and profitability
of all parties involved, we here focus on PIP as an appropriation mechanism,
emphasizing appropriation to the propagator.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 relates relevant literature on
innovation appropriation. Section 3 builds the theoretical background of PIP on selecting
the right partner, and innovation, and on factors that may affect the success of PIP in
generating rents. Finally, concluding remarks are discussed in section 4.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Innovation and Appropriation
Innovation is a key form of organizational knowledge creation defined as the
“embodiment, combination or synthesis of knowledge in original, relevant, valued new
products, processes or services” (Luecke & Katz, 2003; Nonaka, 1994). The term
“innovation” tends to be quite encompassing for any organizational change that is “new”,
where the degree of newness may highly vary from new to the world to merely new (or
even perceived as new) to an adopting unit (Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Garcia & Calantone,
2002; Johannessen, Olsen, & Lumpkin, 2001). No attempt to our knowledge has been
made to indicate changes, new to an adopting unit, that would yet not qualify as
innovations (see Bantel and Jackson (1989) for a review). Several researchers have
attempted to define, describe and classify innovation; notably product versus process
(Utterback & Abernathy, 1975), radical versus incremental (Dewar & Dutton, 1986),
open versus closed (Chesbrough, 2003a, 2003b), and autonomous versus systemic
(Teece, 1996).
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Innovation has almost become the base for organizational survival (Cavusgil,
Calantone, & Zhao, 2003). Companies invest millions of dollars to come up with new
ideas to enhance their processes or products and distinguish themselves from
competition. Realizing the vast and increasing importance of innovation, companies are
willing to invest resources and incur risks, attempting to develop new products and adopt
new processes. Bearing these costs, however, managers strive to appropriate maximum
value from inventions or ideas (Teece, 1986).
Appropriation has traditionally been associated with innovation protection and
confinement. The corresponding economics of the rent view argues that by protecting
knowledge against expropriation and against imitation, firms are better able to collect
rent streams from innovations and are even more incentivized to invest further in
innovations (Liebeskind, 1996). Accordingly firms have been adopting appropriation
strategies that focus on excluding other companies from benefiting from an innovation
and confine rents from an innovation to its owner. These appropriation strategies may be
legal (formal) such as patents, trademarks, trade secrets and copyrights; or strategic
(informal) such as secrecy, sales and service efforts, lead-time (time to market), learning
and design complexity.

2.2 Formal and Informal Appropriation
The choice of formal versus informal strategies depends on several factors such as
industry, firm size, innovation type (product versus process) and the involvement of
partner(s) in the development process. In an early study it was found that both the usage
of patents as a protection mechanism and their effect on the rate of innovation depend on
the industry (Mansfield, 1986). The significant effect of industry has been confirmed in
later studies (Arundel & Kabla, 1998; Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999; Cohen, Nelson, &
Walsh, 2000). More specifically, it has been found that appropriation strategies
remarkably differ between service and manufacturing industries, as the two sectors
innovate differently (Leiponen & Byma, 2009). Formal proprietary rights also tend to be
favored by firms involved in product innovations, as process innovations, which are
likely large-scale, would enjoy the natural protection of scale economies; and are more
difficult to patent (Gooroochurn & Hanley, 2007; Teece, 1986).
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Firm size also acts as a significant differentiator for the choice of appropriation
mechanism (Holgersson, 2013). Small firms tend to prefer informal appropriation
strategies as they may lack the resources for legal innovation defense (Cohen et al.,
2000), or because they simply do not perceive formal strategies, mainly patenting, as
efficient protection for the competitiveness of innovations (Arundel, 2001). Moreover,
inter-firm cooperation drives a choice for informal appropriation, namely speed to
market, particularly when the cooperation is horizontal which is usually the case for
product innovations (Leiponen & Byma, 2009). Despite being preferred in several
situations, informal appropriation mechanisms have generally received little attention in
the literature (Leiponen & Byma, 2009).

2.3 Generative Appropriation in the Supply Chain
Appropriation, as discussed above, has been mainly concerned with its primary
dimension, defined as the individual share of the value that a firm can capture from a
given (new) invention by commercialization/ licensing (Ahuja et al., 2013; Ritala &
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). This has been extended to include a second dimension
that acknowledges value, as opposed to share, maximization from an idea or innovation.
This is referred to as “generative appropriation” (Ahuja et al., 2013). Realizing the fact
that excessive secrecy/ protection may impede value creation, firms may prefer a smaller
portion of a growing pie to a bigger part of a potentially shrinking pie (Jacobides,
Knudsen, & Augier, 2006). Knowing that bounded rationality limits the ability to predict
possible risks, firms are shying away from full protection attempts and acknowledging
the innovation potential from collaboration (Ireland & Webb, 2007; Lavie, 2006).
Accordingly, the focus is shifting to value creation, which is arguably best
achieved through supply chain partners. Supply chain firms own complementary assets
required for the commercialization of an innovation (Teece, 1986). On the one hand,
investing in appreciating complementary assets may secure future appropriation, by
stimulating a need from innovators and imitators (Jacobides et al., 2006). On the other
hand, the complete value chain represents an innovation ecosystem that may define
primary appropriation for an innovator (Adner, 2006) and create shared value (Porter &
Kramer, 2011). By combining innovative capabilities and complementary assets from the
value chain, synergies are created, allowing for future appropriation opportunities.
15
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3. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT: PROCESS INNOVATION
PROPAGATION: PIP
3.1 Foundations of PIP
Process Innovation Propagation (PIP) is defined as appropriating returns from
process innovations by exploiting power advantages to export innovations to supply
chain partners. Table I-1 distinguishes between PIP and other related constructs. Process
innovations may be well transferrable to supply chain firms, and owners of these
innovations perceive direct benefit from sharing the ideas with partners, and persuading
adoption (Aitken, Childerhouse, & Towill, 2003; Srai & Gregory, 2008; Walker, Di
Sisto, & McBain, 2008). From logistics innovations to green initiatives, propagation
creates direct economic value for the innovation owner.
Accordingly, innovation owners use their power advantage to push through
transferrable process innovations, and ripple the benefit. An innovation is defined as a
change that is new to the adopting unit. As such, a propagator necessarily lies within the
supply chain and propagates to a supply chain partner. The owner may have obtained an
existing innovation externally (from a third party) or developed it in-house. Propagating
its “Retail Link” system, Wal-Mart enjoyed a significant productivity enhancement
through the resulting order-of-magnitude supplier investments in the system (Schrage,
2002). Similarly, McDonald’s exported its green initiatives to its suppliers, creating a
“sustainability” image that has greatly benefited the company (Gunther, 2011, 2013).
Although PIP is distinct from joint R&D (see Table I-1), it entails adaptation
efforts to apply an idea to a new adopter. In other words, in PIP supply chain partners do
not collaborate to develop an innovation as in co-creation processes (including supplier
involvement/ integration in NPD), but a propagator seeking appropriation may
collaborate with the receiver to re-apply an existing innovation and adapt it to the new
unit of adoption. New adopters continue to experience implementation problems with
existing innovations, performing changes and reviews to the organizational procedures as
part of almost any innovation implementation process (R. B. Cooper & Zmud, 1990).
Implementation is in fact a managerial challenge comparable to that of initial invention
(Leonard-Barton, 1988). Accordingly, inter-firm teams work together to modify the new
16
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technology to adapt it to existing organizational structures (Majchrzak, Rice, Malhotra,
King, & Ba, 2000). Appropriate interaction between the source and receiver helps
overcome implementation issues for a smoother technological adaptation (R. B. Cooper
& Zmud, 1990). This adaptation, however, is merely regarded as a stage in the
implementation course, as opposed to being a stand-alone co-creation process, regardless
of how discontinuous it may be (R. B. Cooper & Zmud, 1990; Tyre & Orlikowski, 1994).
PIP appropriates returns on an innovation owner by providing operational benefits
and/ or enhancing the innovator’s image. Sharing process innovations, which improve
operations (flexibility, responsiveness or cost), spreads the benefits to supply chain
partners, enhancing the performance of the whole supply chain (Subramani, 2004).
Supply chains have become the actual units of competition as organizational boundaries
between supplier and buyer have blurred due to multiple functional interfaces and
relation-specific investments (Dyer, Cho, & Chu, 1998). PIP allows for harmonization of
buyer and supplier processes, which highly avoids wasting resources (Lasch & Janker,
2005). This chain-wide integration synchronizes processes throughout the chain,
improving the focal company’s overall performance (Van-der-Vaart & Van-Donk, 2008).
Moreover, a firm’s supply chain has become part of its innovation ecosystem,
where full benefits are only possible through enhancing the whole system’s performance
(Adner, 2006). This necessarily drives efforts of each firm to develop its partners’
innovation capabilites, which in turn translates into operational value for the whole chain,
including the innovator. Obtaining a satisfactory share that justifies sharing the
knowledge depends mostly on the innovator’s power advantage.
PIP can be also regarded as a very effective marketing strategy. Exporting green
practices to suppliers creates a positive “green” image for the propagator (Walker et al.,
2008). Green initiatives are extended upstream and downstream to create a “green supply
chain” reputation that ultimately leads to economic performance (Rao & Holt, 2005;
Vachon & Klassen, 2006). Moreover, firms may propagate innovations that minimize
social risks. Chain integrators are inevitably held accountable for social risks incurred by
members of their supply chains. Despite their attempts to shift blame, both Apple and
Samsung were publicly held accountable for their suppliers’ severe working conditions,
which were harsh enough to drive employee suicides (Chang, 2010; Evans, 2013; Shin,
17
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2012). Accordingly, chain integrators propagate social innovations to publicize a socially
responsible image. From there we reach the central proposition of this paper, which is:
P1: PIP enhances a firm’s profitability through appropriating value from
existing innovations.
Propagation is a power-driven process. A firm’s power is defined as its potential
influence, or capacity to affect actions of another unit (Emerson, 1962; Fidler & Johnson,
1984). Supply Chain power is, therefore, the ability of a partner to induce another to do
what it would otherwise not do (Dapiran & Hogarath-Scott, 2003; Emerson, 1962;
Pfeffer, 1981). It entails influence that can evoke desired actions from partners (Ireland &
Webb, 2007). Innovation owners with advantageous power positions can initiate the
propagation process, taking advantage of partners’ relative dependence to push through
their innovations. Enjoying some power advantage allows an innovation owner to both
persuade a partner to overcome internal resistance to change (Walker et al., 2008), and
prevent the partner from acting opportunistically by misusing/ leaking the knowledge
gained. Power can take different types and bases (French & Raven, 1968), from which
we acknowledge that the two sources of mediated inter-firm power that pre-exist in a
buyer-supplier linkage drive propagation and affect its success. These are: expert power,
and/ or market power.
Expert power refers to a firm’s perception that the innovation owner is
knowledgeable and skillful in the innovation area (Busch & Wilson, 1976). The
receiver’s perception that the innovation owner firm has greater knowledge in the salient
area of the innovation pushes through the idea, incentivizing the receiver to accept it
(Fidler & Johnson, 1984). Trusting the owner’s capability may suffice for adopting the
innovation and following its owner’s directives. Market power constitutes the
propagator’s relative advantage in replacing its partner. Replaceability refers to how
easily and costly each firm can substitute the other for market transactions (Brown,
Lusch, & Nicholson, 1995; S. K. Kim & Ping-Hung, 2003; Kumar, Scheer, &
Steenkamp, 1995). The perception that the owner may exercise its market power (e.g.,
withhold business from partner) persuades the partner to implement the required change.
Partner’s dependence on the innovation owner for knowledge and/ or market transactions
also discourages any opportunistic behavior, and allows the owner to reach favorable
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agreements on sharing benefits of the exported innovation (e.g., obtaining price
reductions from supplier cost reduction innovations).
P2: PIP is a power-driven process; the higher the power advantage of the
innovation owner (expert or market power), the higher the success of PIP.
The concept of “success” involves a fair degree of complexity making it difficult
to define (Thomas & Fernández, 2008; Wilson, Desmond, & Roberts, 1994). Successful
PIP can be regarded as the extent to which (managerial) objectives from the process are
achieved (Balachandra & Friar, 1997). This encompasses transfer success of the process
innovation, coupled with success of the innovation itself. The former is defined in terms
of “the degree of institutionalization of the practice at the recipient unit” which involves
implementing the innovation at the receiving unit, as well as internalizing it (Kostova,
1999). Success of a newly institutionalized process innovation entails achieving
performance improvement in comparison to other supplier (partner) relationships to
which no process innovation has been propagated (Corsten & Felde, 2005). Note that the
latter can be a subjective measure constituting managers’ perception of the level of
success of the new process (Janeiro, Proença, & Gonçalves, 2013). Factors affecting PIP
success can be conceptualized as moderators to the link between PIP and firm
profitability.

3.2 Classical Examples of PIP
Toyota has started with JIT as an internal process that greatly improved the
efficiency and reduced the inventory level in its operations, yet extended the system to
other members of its supply chain making the innovation a supply-chain-wide innovation
and realizing much more gains. Other companies that used to have JIT as an internal
system only, later on after the arrival of the internet and Supply Chain Planning Software,
extended JIT externally by demanding from suppliers to deliver inventory to the factory
only when it is needed for assembly, making JIT manufacturing, ordering and delivery
process even speedier, more flexible and more efficient, benefiting the initiator. In this
way Integrated Supply Networks (Demand Networks) or Electronic Supply Chains have
formed ("Summary of Just-in-time. Abstract," 2014).
Similarly, the use of House of Quality and Quality Function Deployment has been
propagated when it was first introduced in the US market as a new process innovation.
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Companies realized that not only should they be telling their manufacturers or suppliers
what quality characteristics are important to the customer to manufacture or supply them,
but also they could persuade other members of their supply chains to adopt the technique
themselves directly with customers. Kelsey-Hayes, one of Ford’s two biggest suppliers,
was one of the first to build expertise on Quality Function Deployment (QFD) which it
used in 1986 to develop a coolant sensor that fulfilled critical customer needs such as
‘‘easy-to-add coolant’’, ‘‘easy-to-identify unit’’, and ‘‘provide cap removal instructions’’
(Prasad, 1998). One year later, in 1987, Ford introduced QFD training to its employees
and started using it, easing the supplier’s job significantly (Omachonu, Ross, & Swift,
2004).
Another classical example for propagation is Boeing, which exported its
concurrent engineering initiatives to its major suppliers, Rolls Royce and General
Electric, and the process was then repeated at the next level up the supply chain,
providing the companies with quicker component manufacturing, and minimum redesign
(Backhouse & Brookes, 1996).

3.3 Partner Selection for PIP: Looking for the Strategic Fit
Exporting innovations to direct partners, such as tier-one suppliers generally
presents higher potential opportunities, for a more pronounced effect on a company’s
operations. However, partners that are more embedded in the supply chain, such as tiertwo and tier-three suppliers may also be synergetic candidates for PIP. By looking at the
supplier network for instance, tier-two and tier-three suppliers can be part of a company’s
supply base whose innovation is directly managed (Choi & Krause, 2006).
Nevertheless, in cases where lower tiers are not directly managed by the focal
company, an innovation can proceed to lower-tier suppliers by series of repeated PIP.
Network flagships in GPN (global production networks) represent such a scenario, in
which they exert pressure on smaller suppliers to adopt technological changes that
enhance efficiency/quality of processes (Ernst & Kim, 2002). The innovation
performance of “Lower tier” suppliers is managed through “Higher tier” ones that
mediate the transfer, and gradually propagate repeatedly more sophisticated technologies
(Ernst & Kim, 2002). This has additional implications on the choice of suppliers, which
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are selected based on their ability to manage the rest of the supply network and ensure its
stability in terms of synchronized processes (Bonaccorsi & Lipparini, 1994).
Another implication is the significance of ‘repeated-ness’ in PIP, so that the real
supply chain benefit is realized when the innovation is actually propagated more than
once, either sequentially or in parallel. A propagator starts by offering the innovation to
one member of the supply chain who gives it to another and the process is repeated. Firsttier suppliers, who receive an innovation from a primary propagator, act themselves as
system integrators for tier-two and tier-three suppliers passing on the idea (Charlette &
Sandra, 2000). Such an emphasis on re-iteration makes an innovation a supply-chainwide practice, extracting the most benefit out of a successful idea. Accordingly, a much
more tightly tiered structure is obtained from hierarchical supply chains, resulting from
PIP recurrence that is a series of process innovation diffusion throughout the whole
supplier network (Kogut, 2000).
In each PIP iteration a company targets the partner with the highest perceived
strategic fit. Strategic fit is an encompassing term that has been used in the literature to
refer to: (1) external fit, defined as alignment between an organization and its
environment; (2) internal fit: alignment between two internal activities of the firm: e.g.
governance structure and organizational strategy (Yin & Zajac, 2004), knowledge
elements and strategy type (Hult, Ketchen, Cavusgil, & Calantone, 2006); alignment
between sourcing strategy and dynamic capabilities (Murray, Kotabe, & Westjohn,
2009); and, (3) inter-firm fit: alignment between two or more firms (e.g. alliance firms)
(Douma, Bilderbeek, Idenburg, & Looise, 2000). Our definition of strategic fit mimics
the latter, being the matching between strategies and interests of the innovation owner
and its supply chain partner (innovation receiver) (Niederkofler, 1991). This
compatibility qualifies the establishment of a close, long-term relationship, cultivates
trust and commitment (Bronder & Pritzl, 1992), and facilitates the implementation of
agreements (Cool & Dierickx, 1993; Ellram, 1990). Based on the literature, strategic fit
in a dyad constitutes three dimensions: strategic similarity, interdependence, and
incentive alignment.

3.3.1 Strategic Similarity
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Strategic similarity refers to the consistency between the innovator’s and the
receiver’s competitive priorities. This can be conceptualized as how closely the two
companies rank the importance of the different competitive priorities (Krause, Handfield,
& Scannell, 1998). Competitive priorities that are directly tied to supply chain
performance are speed, quality, cost and flexibility1 (Hult et al., 2006). To the extent that
partners value these priorities similarly, they share strategic interests, and therefore, enjoy
a high degree of fit.
Process innovations are implemented to serve one or more of a company’s
competitive priorities. JIT, for instance, serves both cost and speed of production. To the
extent that suppliers valued cost and speed similar to the exporting firm, JIT was
propagated successfully. Aligned competitive priorities harmonize the operation of
propagated process innovations leading to the ex ante anticipated improvement.
Therefore, the PIP partner should be selected according to its strategic similarity with the
innovation owner2:
P3a: Strategic similarity between supply chain firms is positively related to PIP
success
3.3.2 Interdependence
Fit is based on mutual dependence (Ryu, So, & Koo, 2009). This is defined as
firms’ mutual need to maintain a relationship with each other to achieve their goals
(Mentzer et al., 2001). Interdependence is inherent in supply chain relationships. It
represents “a prime force in the development of supply chain solidarity” and “motivates
willingness to negotiate functional transfer, share key information, and participate in joint
operational planning” (John et al., 2001). In a similar way, this interdependence is the
main driver behind the concept of propagation. It is due to the fact that companies in a
supply chain need each other to exist and are affected by each other in their success that
propagation can help. Interdependence exists not only due to transactions that take place
between two companies but also due to complementarity in processes (Togar M.
Simatupang, Wright, & Sridharan, 2002), knowledge (Roper & Crone, 2000), resources

1

Other less common competitive priorities may include product/service technology, and environmental friendliness
(Krause et al., 1998).
2
This argument assumes that partner’s valuation of priorities can be assessed. Partner’s valuation, however, is beyond
the scope of this paper.
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(Swink & Nair, 2007) and assets (Teece, 1986) as well as complementarity between a
firm’s internal and external sourcing for R&D (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006).
Nevertheless,

interdependence

varies

in

extent.

Just

the

way

more

interdependence drives firms’ long-term relationship orientation (Ganesan, 1994), higher
degrees of interdependence would also motivate companies to propagate their
innovations through their supply chains. Higher degrees of interdependence will also
enhance the joint benefit from a propagated innovation so that how much bigger the “pie”
gets varies with how much interrelated and interdependent firms in a supply chain are.
The interdependence dimension of fit implies higher complementarity, which makes the
presence of each firm critical for the other to achieve its goals (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986;
Ryu et al., 2009).
P3b: The higher the level of interdependence between two partners, the higher
the success of PIP.
3.3.3 Incentive Alignment
Incentive alignment refers to “the degree to which chain members share costs,
risks, and benefits” and match their motives (Togar M Simatupang & Sridharan, 2005).
The existence of “matched” motives is the third integral dimension of strategic fit
(Nielsen, 2010). Some researchers, and even executives, assume wrongly that firms
naturally behave in a way that maximizes their benefit as well as that of their business
partners. Taking the example of Cisco, which Narayanan and Raman (2004) argue is the
“rule rather than an exception”, the company had to scrap about 2.5 billion dollars worth
of raw materials causing it to bear a loss of 2.69 billion dollars that quarter because its
partners did not act in a way that was in its best interest or even that of the supply chain.
Cisco had rewarded its contract manufacturers for delivering goods quickly, and those
manufacturers could negotiate lower prices from component suppliers than Cisco could,
making both, contractors and component makers, “have everything to gain and nothing to
lose by building excess inventory” without worrying about Cisco’s real needs (Narayanan
& Raman, 2004).
Although on the surface incentives might seem to be naturally aligned and
benefits shared, in real life conflicts happen, such as supplier divided loyalty. The more
inventory or transportation costs incurred by one supply chain partner, the more savings it
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can cause another. The greater a member’s share in excess supply chain profits is, the less
another would enjoy. Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) mention two ways of classifying
causes of conflict among supply chain members. The first classification was proposed by
Stern and Heskett (1969) as three types of causes: “differences between members' goals
and objectives (goal conflict), disagreements over domain of decisions and actions
(domain conflict), and differences in perceptions of reality used in joint decision making
(perceptual conflict)” (Togar M. Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). The second was
proposed by Etgar (1979) as “attitudinal and structural causes of conflict” where “the
former stems from differences in the ways chain members acquire and process
information about their chain - such as roles, expectations, perceptions, and
communications” and “the later reflects a clash of opposing interests such as goal
divergence, drive for autonomy, and competition for scarce resources” (Togar M.
Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002).
If usual supply chain relationships require a certain level of incentive alignment,
propagation in which a company would be giving away its innovation would require even
greater levels of incentive alignment. Narayanan and Raman (2004) suggest three ways
for aligning incentives of supply chain members: rewriting contracts, revealing hidden
information and developing trust.
Contracts should be designed to make sure that members of the supply chain will
act, as much as possible, according to the benefit of the chain as a whole, not according to
what would maximize individual firm’s shareholders’ value. Simatupang and Sridharan
(2002) mention three ways of aligning incentives aimed to “to personalize or internalize
responsibility for the attainment of desired overall profitability”. Each of these can be the
basis for designing supply chain contracts. The first incentive alignment method is based
on productive behavior, i.e. behavior-based, where “the steps of observable actions that
lead to a specific mutual objective, rather than the attainment of the objective itself” are
rewarded (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). The second is performance based “which
means setting performance metrics to evaluate supply chain members and rewarding
them based on outcomes of the most important activities” (Simatupang & Sridharan,
2002).
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The third is “equitable compensation” where “the participating parties jointly
agree on a single set of performance measures and on a gain sharing formula universally
perceived as equitable” (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). A successful business model
that is based on this third incentive mechanism is what is known as the “revenue chain”,
where members of the supply chain share profits. These contracts prevail in the
videocassette rental industry. Blockbuster gives its studios a share of the rental fees
instead of paying a much higher up-front price on tapes. Blockbuster can now purchase
many more tapes, meaning more potential rentals, which when combined with the
drastically lower cost, leads to significantly higher profits; “for the movie studio,
increased tape sales and the added revenue stream also result in more profit” (Cachon &
Lariviere, 2001). Given how unrealistic it is to achieve a centralized control in a supply
chain, even though it can be argued to be much more efficient, supply chain contracts
achieve channel coordination for supply chains with decentralized decision making,
through increasing the total profits, sharing risks among supply chain partners and
allowing win-win conditions for all members (Cachon & Lariviere, 2001). To the extent
to which behaviors, performances, and revenues are aligned with a partner, PIP will
benefit the propagator.
In propagation, companies have to bear some costs. Costs of transferring
knowledge and adapting and implementing a new technology can be substantial. There is
also the risk for the innovating firm, of having its knowledge leak to one or more of its
competitors; and the risk for the adopting firm of not succeeding in achieving gains from
the innovation after implementing the change. Therefore, just like the general case of
supply chain coordination, propagation requires aligning incentives through contracts to
make sure costs, benefits and risks are fairly shared (see Figure I-1).
P3c: The higher the level of incentive alignment between two partners, the higher
the success of PIP. According to P3a, P3b, and P3c:
P3d: Strategic fit between supply chain partners is positively related to PIP
success

3.4 Innovation Selection for PIP
3.4.1 Vertical Transferability of Process Innovations
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Innovation transferability, also referred to as transparency (Hamel, 1991), is
defined as the ease with which an innovation can be transferred from one domain, or unit
of adoption, to another (E. B. Grant & Gregory, 1997). An innovation is transferable to
the extent to which it lacks both specificity, and tacitness. An innovation may lie
anywhere along a continuum that ranges from non-transferability, e.g., of physical
resources, to full transferability, e.g., of financial resources (Cerrato, 2009). The literature
presents contradicting arguments on the effect of an innovation’s transferability on its
appropriability. On the one hand, transferability is paramount to intra-organizational
transfers of knowledge among functional units, subsidiaries, and management levels
(Hult, 2003), which helps smooth coordination and exchanges. On the other hand,
transferability implies easy imitation by competition, undermining the innovation’s
ability to sustain competitive advantage for its owner, and driving more need for artificial
protection (e.g., through legal mechanisms such as patents) (Barney, 1991; R. M. Grant,
1996).
Although horizontal transferability (to competitors) is undesirable for
appropriation purposes, vertical transferability (to supply chain partners), which is
challenging to achieve (Frenz & Ietto-Gillies, 2009), helps appropriation through PIP. It
is, therefore, important to explore how vertical transferability can help appropriate returns
from an innovation, without loss of competitive advantage. Accordingly, we will study,
in isolation, the effect of each of the transferability elements, namely, innovation
specificity, and tacitness, believing that each has a distinct effect on PIP success. For PIP
to be successful, a company needs to effectively transfer an innovation vertically, while
precluding horizontal diffusion.
We define innovation specificity as its boundedness to a particular domain of
adoption (or primary adopter), and lack of applicability across multiple domains. Highly
specific innovations would have little value beyond the boundary of their primary adopter
(Grover & Malhotra, 2003). Innovation specificity retards transferability, and exists
distinctively from tacitness (R. M. Grant, 1996; Helfat, 1994). Lower specificity, i.e.,
higher applicability, is desirable for an innovation to be successfully propagated to a
supply chain firm, which employs different, though related, processes and operations
compared to the propagator.
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Some non-specific process innovations may be expanded in scope, as opposed to
independently transferred, to include implementers from the supply chain, making these
innovations systemic in nature. Systemic process innovations involve more than one firm
in their implementation (Teece, 1986). Chesbrough and Teece (2002) make a distinction
between these innovations and “autonomous innovations” which can be pursued
independently. Companies have created systemic innovations whose full benefits can
only be realized through the cooperation of other members of the chain. Vendor Managed
Inventory, Vendor Financed Inventory and Dells’ direct sale model, mandate the
participation of more than one member of the supply chain. Therefore, a company that
owns such a new idea would always consider propagation and would be much more
inclined to propagate, if it chooses to implement it. On the other hand, benefits from an
“autonomous innovations” can be reaped without interaction with other supply chain
members.
P4a: The lower the specificity of the process innovation, the higher the PIP
success
The impact of tacitness on the effectiveness of PIP in appropriating innovation
returns is much less clear. Companies like to embed tacit knowledge in their
organizational structure, culture, and people, making an innovation costly to imitate by
competition. On the other hand, PIP is an inter-firm transfer process, which occurs faster
and more effectively with explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge can only be revealed
through application, making its transfer costly, slow and uncertain (R. M. Grant, 1996).
We here contend that tacitness, despite impeding the transferability of an
innovation, positively impacts the effectiveness of PIP, only if accompanied with the
required quality and extent of supply chain interactions. Tacitness of an innovation
provides a natural protection against competitors absorbing spilled over knowledge,
confining returns from a propagated innovation within the propagating chain.
To ensure successful transfer of tacit innovation from the propagating firm to its
partner, a high level of effective interactions must be employed. Effective interactions
through arm’s length relationship and continuous communication with the supply chain
partner help overcome the complexity of knowledge transfer process caused by
knowledge tacitness. Tacit innovations can only be observed through their application (R.
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M. Grant, 1996). Accordingly, frequent supply chain interactions in which the propagator
demonstrates the application of an innovation help the receiver understand and
implement the change (Wang, Tai, & Wei, 2006). The receiver can only learn a highly
tacit innovation by “doing” and “using”, i.e., personal assimilation, which is only
possible through co-location and co-presence (E. B. Grant & Gregory, 1997; Roberts,
2000).
In addition, tacit knowledge resides within individuals or “human containers” (E.
B. Grant & Gregory, 1997; R. M. Grant, 1996). The association of tacit knowledge to
human actors emphasizes the importance of effective interactions for achieving a
successful exchange. Individuals are distinguished from other resources by their ability to
learn, apply their knowledge in new domains, and make new resource combinations
(Penrose, 1959). Interactions that are characterized by strong relational ties and high
social capital are particularly effective in allowing human actors to learn and successfully
implement innovations (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). This joint collaboration of
individuals allows them to develop codes of communication and coordination that evolve
into “dynamic routines” which are hard to imitate (Helfat, 1994).
An example is the Japanese keiretsu-style supply relations, which involve large
cross-firm flows of tacit knowledge. Skills, habits, and values are blended, raising the
speed and quality of the exchange (Lincoln & Ahmadjian, 2000). The embeddedness of
the process in vertical relationships provides significant protection against (horizontal)
imitation.
P4b: The higher the tacitness of the process innovation, the higher its
inimitability and PIP success. The effect of tacitness on PIP success is moderated
by the amount and quality of interactions between the propagator and the
receiver.
3.4.2 Technical and Administrative Innovations
The distinction between technical and administrative process innovations has a
number of significant implications on PIP. Technical process innovations pertain to the
direct production process technology, and basic work activities, while administrative
innovations involve organizational and managerial processes such as planning,
controlling and coordinating functions, mainly residing in the organization’s social
system (Damanpour & Evan, 1984; Knight, 1967). Adoptions of the two types are
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influenced by different sets of variables, which suggests considering this classification
when constructing innovation related theories (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981). According
to the organizational lag model (Evan, 1966), a discrepancy exists within organizations
between the rates of adoption of technical and administrative innovations (Damanpour &
Evan, 1984). This “lag” may be explained by the general, possibly faulty, perception that
technical innovations are relatively more advantageous than administrative innovations,
with the latter being more complex (Damanpour & Evan, 1984).
Technical innovations tend to be propagated through supply chains based on
expert power, and administrative ones based on market power. On the one hand,
specialization of tasks coupled with deeper expertise motivates the development of
technical innovations (Damanpour, 1987). Firms that are highly specialized possess
technical knowledge that can be translated into relevant innovations, which will be
propagated based on receiver’s perception of propagator’s expertise and superiority in the
relevant area.
On the other hand, chain integrators, which enjoy market power advantage, focus
more on administrative innovations for coordinating the chain. These firms are “low
professional districts, which have tighter coupling and a dominant administrative core”
(Daft, 1978). Integrators are better off initiating administrative innovations since they
come from the relevant (coordination and management) task domain (Zmud, 1982).
Placing a primary focus on administrative innovations, integrators perceive more direct
and pronounced benefit from propagating administrative innovations compared to
technical ones (D. Kim, Cavusgil, & Calantone, 2006). These innovations are difficult if
not impossible to protect by patent, making PIP a sound appropriation mechanism
(Teece, 1980). Examples include JIT and TQM, which have been initiated by chain
integrators and propagated for an overall chain performance (J. Cooper, 1998).
Companies are further motivated to propagate these innovations, as they observe a
substantial administrative inertia suffered by smaller sized companies, signaling a
potential for supply chain improvement.
Furthermore, administrative innovations prosper within a formal, centralized,
mechanistic environment, which tends to be the one for larger powerful firms, while
technical innovations appear more in de-centralized, organic environments, which mostly
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characterize smaller firms with lower market power (J. Cooper, 1998). Formal exercise,
enabled by propagator’s market power advantage, provides the mechanistic governance
structure which helps reinforce receiver’s implementation of administrative innovations
(Damanpour, 1991).
The orientation of a chain’s integrator towards administrative innovations may
prevent a required balance of the two innovation types. Based on Evan’s theory (1966)
and Daft’s (1978) refinement on technical innovations trickling down an organizational
hierarchy and technical ones trickling up, we similarly expect administrative innovations
to be propagated upstream (from more powerful buyers) and technical innovations to be
propagated downstream (from knowledgeable and specialized suppliers). Given that
administrative innovations often affect the technical core, innovators that are active in
propagating administrative innovations may trigger technical innovations upstream a
chain, rippling the effect both ways. More specifically, integrators with a network
orientation focusing on the overall performance of the chain would propagate managerial
systems enabling the development and propagation of technical innovations elsewhere
along the chain (Figure I-2). This builds on the dual core model’s assertion that adoption
of administrative innovations tends to trigger the adoption of subsequent technical
innovations more readily than the reverse (Daft, 1978). Propagating administrative
innovations upstream may motivate smaller suppliers to innovate more in technical areas
where they specialize. This can maximize the ripple effect by having each of the two
types of innovations originate at both ends of the chain and propagate accordingly,
especially given the synergetic interaction and total effect on performance (Han,
Namwoon, & Srivastava, 1998).
P4c: Technical innovations are propagated downstream through expert power,
and administrative innovations are propagated upstream through market power.
P4d: Maintaining a balance between propagating technical and administrative
innovations leads to a superior supply chain performance

3.5 PIP and Governance Structure
3.5.1 Governance Formality
Supply chain governance is the mechanism through which a buyer-supplier
interaction is coordinated. There are generally two types of governance: formal
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(contractual) governance and informal (relational) governance. Formal contracts are used
to specify parties’ promises, obligations, actions, or even resolution process in cases of
dispute (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). They hold each of the parties involved legally
responsible for carrying out the terms specified. Alternatively, governance can emerge
naturally from the values and casually agreed-upon processes found in social
relationships (Poppo & Zenger, 2002).
An argument exists in the literature as to whether the two governance mechanisms
are substitutes or complements (Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). Since
this debate is beyond the scope of this paper, we will adopt a moderate view that allows
both to co-exist in a dyadic relationship and assumes that each transaction is dominated
by one or the other. Accordingly, governance formality is the extent to which a buyersupplier PIP interaction is dominated by formal contracts as opposed to informal
arrangements (Stock, Greis, & Kasarda, 2000).
The effectiveness of governance formality in PIP success depends on the
radicalness of the innovation, as well as the type of power driving the process (Figure I3). Formal governance is effective when propagating incremental innovations.
Incremental innovations require a structured approach and clear roadmap for explicating
the exact process and structure to follow (Ettlie, Bridges, & O'Keefe, 1984). In this case,
formal contracts act as a more efficient coordination mechanism that provides clearly
specified guidelines and detailed procedures associated with incremental innovations
(Lumineau & Henderson, 2012). Incremental innovations involve a low degree of
uncertainty to which formal governance mechanisms have proved more effective
(Wathne & Heide, 2004). Moreover, incremental innovations primarily depend on
organizational knowledge and traditional structural arrangements (Ettlie et al., 1984).
Accordingly, contracts can better explicate terms regarding this type of knowledge,
which is associated with documentation, procedures and well-established systems.
Formal

contracts

are

particularly

effective

at

handling

“organizational

role

responsibilities” (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002).
The situation is, however, reversed in the case of radical innovations. Radical
innovations require flexibility, which is absent in formal governance structures, but
readily allowed in relational governance (Boyle, Dwyer, Robicheaux, & Simpson, 1992;
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Noordewier, John, & Nevin, 1990). They entail a substantial level of environmental,
technological, and outcome uncertainty, with which formal governance fails (Germain,
1996; Leifer, O'Connor, & Rice, 2001; Sorescu, Chandy, & Prabhu, 2003). Dyadic
relationships characterized by uncertain conditions require the employment of
governance structures that allow for flexible adaptation to changing circumstances
(Wathne & Heide, 2004). These changing circumstances necessitate responsiveness,
which is readily enabled by relational governance as it is easily modified and adapted
(Hoyt & Huq, 2000; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).
Radical innovations primarily depend on the human factor (human knowledge)
(Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). Projects involving heavy human interactions are better
coordinated by relational governance as it provides the flexibility, participation and
solidarity required in human interactions (Lumineau & Henderson, 2012). Radical
innovations may require more adjustments when propagated to a different company.
Adjustments require more human capital input, i.e., interaction, less specification in
contracts, and therefore, more reliance on relational governance. Formal contracts will
tend to limit the amount of knowledge that people contribute as they will tend to provide
the minimum specified by the contract as opposed to invest more had the governance
been informal, as reliance on contracts can “discourage either party to move beyond
contracts” (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002). We, therefore, assert that:
P5a: Formal governance is more effective compared to informal when
propagating incremental process innovations
P5b: Informal governance is more effective compared to formal when
propagating radical process innovations
As discussed in section 3.1, innovations are propagated based on either market or
expert power. Innovations propagated based on expertise depend more on the human
factor, and involve a high degree of uncertainty, technicality, and adaptation, which is
best dealt with through flexible governance structures (i.e., relational). To successfully
transfer human knowledge, these changes would require more joint involvement by
members, which is more effective on relational bases, where individuals get to frequently
interact, discuss, and coordinate efforts, adapting changes to the adopting unit. On the
other hand, innovations propagated based on market power involve higher degree of
coercion (e.g., threat of punishment to withhold business from non complying partners),
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which encompasses formal exercise. When the propagator chooses to take advantage of
market power, it resorts to contracts to fully specify terms of compliance and
consequences of non-compliance, relying more on contractual means for getting the
partner to conform.
P5c: Relational governance is more effective than formal governance for PIP
driven by expert power
P5d: Formal governance is more effective than relational governance for PIP
driven by market power
3.5.2 Management Attitude
Management innovation attitude refers to the extent to which managers favor
change, are open to novel experiences and stimuli, and readily recognize the potential in
new ideas (Damanpour, 1991; Pennings & Smidts, 2000). Management attitude has been
established as a main determinant of innovation adoption and success, specifically
process innovations (Zmud, 1982), and a function of management team’s ages, diversity,
educational backgrounds, and risk aversion (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Gupta, Raj, &
Wilemon, 1986). This human component of organizations determines independent
innovation strategies and adoption decisions (Pierce & Delbecq, 1977; Rosenbloom &
Abernathy, 1982). Employees with attitude favoring innovation adoption will implement
innovations merely by being offered the knowledge, while those with attitudes resisting
change require a directive from a powerful source before adopting (Leonard-Barton &
Deschamps, 1988). These arguments have significant implications for propagations based
on expert and market power.
In cases of propagation based on expert power, managers with positive attitudes
toward change will value the knowledge offered from a propagator and will tend to
readily accept new ideas (Zhou, Gao, Yang, & Zhou, 2005). Propagation in this case is
based on the perception of the superior knowledge abilities of the innovation owner, and
orientation to keep up with a higher innovative performance. A strong orientation to
change coupled with managerial support is particularly important during instances of
knowledge exchanges involving high degree of human interaction for effective
coordination and conflict resolution among individuals (Damanpour, 1991).
In the case of propagation based on market power, however, managers are driven
to acceptance based on willingness to maintain business with a highly powerful player, as
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opposed to a self-motivated approach to preserve an innovative stance. In this case,
regardless of the managerial attitude, managers will accept the innovation coming from a
powerful partner. Supply chain market power corresponds to centralization of control, in
a single organizational setting, in moderating the relation between managerial attitude
and adoption. This centralization of power, equivalently control, “accelerates” the
positive impact of managerial attitude on process innovation adoption (Dewar & Dutton,
1986).
P5e: Managerial attitude of the receiving firm affects the effectiveness of PIP
driven by expert power more than that driven by market power
Table I-2 illustrates elements of PIP through an example of McDonald’s
corporation.

4. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces the concept of Process Innovation Propagation (PIP) as a
power-based appropriation mechanism that departs from conventional strategies of
innovation appropriation. PIP is defined as collecting returns from process innovations
through passing them over to supply chain partners. The transfer process is based on two
sources of power: market and expert, and is novel in: (1) suggesting external
appropriation through using other firms as opposed to solely depending on internal
capabilities; (2) challenging the preclusive component of generative appropriability; and,
(3) indirectly collecting innovation rents through operational benefits and market image.
Acknowledging its significant potential as a profit-enhancing mechanism, PIP is
distinguished as a new construct, and propositions regarding its elements and antecedents
are developed based on a thorough analysis and synthesis of the literature.
Appropriation through PIP is particularly important given the rising
acknowledgement of supply chains as the new units of competition, failure of traditional
formal appropriation mechanisms with process innovations, the increasing trend towards
dis-integrated structures of supply chains, and reliance on supply chain partners in
strategic endeavors including innovation. PIP is an appropriation mechanism that highly
enhances profitability of firms through collecting rents on costly and valuable
innovations and ideas. This is accomplished by capitalizing on the potential of supply
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chain partners as units of adoption that can re-apply existing process innovations. The
propagator incentivizes new units of adoption through its power advantage(s), and gains
an improved operational performance of the supply chain and/ or enhanced market
image.
We develop propositions based on a thorough review, analysis and synthesis of
the literature regarding elements of propagation, namely, partner selection, innovation
selection, and governance structure that maximize appropriation through PIP. We assert
that the highest potential arises from partners that employ a strategic fit with the
propagating company (innovation owner). This departs from conventional literature on
supplier selection based on its innovation properties, to selection based on potential from
joint work and sharing of innovations. Partners must be selected based on similarities of
their strategic priorities with the focal firm, total interdependence and incentive
alignment.
Properties of an innovation also have direct implications on selecting the right
process change to propagate. Innovations characterized by high degree of transferability
might not necessarily be effective in appropriating returns through PIP. Companies
should pay more attention to specific elements of transferability, namely specificity and
tacitness, realizing that although both contribute similarly to transferability, we argue that
tacitness helps PIP appropriation while specificity hurts it. Moreover, the theory
presented herein explains the observed bias toward propagating administrative
innovations over technical ones, in attempt to promote a balance of both types for a
superior supply chain performance. Integrators must therefore pay more attention to the
diffusion of technical innovations from smaller, more knowledgeable suppliers, possibly
by propagating the right administrative (managerial) innovations that can put a technical
innovation process in place.
Finally, we also address the proper governance elements for effective PIP
depending on the radicalness of innovation as well as the driving power source. More
specifically, we argue that the higher the radicalness of the innovation, the higher the
effectiveness of relational governance over formal one. This also implies that more
radical innovations employing a high degree of knowledge, i.e., expert driven, are better
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governed informally, while incremental innovations with less uncertainty can be formally
governed.
This research can be extended along several dimensions. Firstly, a theory could be
constructed for propagating product innovations. Product innovations require a different
treatment in a supply chain context where the innovator will demand newly innovated
component parts or downstream manufactured goods for its product innovation. The
theory could also be explored from the perspective of the receiving company, i.e.
investigating the factors that affect acceptance of a propagation request from one’s supply
chain member. Moreover, several external and contextual factors can be studied, given
that knowledge transfer is greatly affected by such factors as the business environment,
product market conditions, cultural issues and organizational distance. The (quite
common) case of symmetric power in propagation can also be examined. Studies can
examine how propagation can occur in balanced power relationships. Finally, both theory
expansion to a network level of analysis (considering a triad or more of exchanges) and
contraction to a fully integrated supply chain (intra-organizational flows) are fruitful for
further research.
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5. TABLES
Table I-1
Distinguishing PIP from Other constructs
Criterion
Definition

Directionality

Main driver

Motivation
Initiation/ initial
development of
innovation
Management
Attitude
Approach
Activity
Intellectual
Property
Aim

PIP
Appropriating returns from process
innovations through passing them over
to supply chain partners.
Giver (owner) and taker (receiver)
Giver is defined as the first firm to
adopt an innovation in the chain, may
or may not have developed it
Giver’s power: persuades successful
transfer and adoption

Supplier Development
Any activity initiated by a buying
organization to improve the
performance of its suppliers
Giver and taker
Giver is defined as the resource
owner

Taker’s power (giver’s dependence
on taker): persuades giver’s
investments; otherwise supplier may
be replaced
Desire to improve supply chain
Desire to improve supplier’s
performance
performance
At the supply chain giver (innovation
At the supply chain receiver; change
owner)
specific to supplier, more than likely
developed there
Not necessarily needed as the process
Not relevant as innovation may be in
may be driven by market power
solution to problem
Proactive by giver
Mostly reactive, in response to
supplier problems
Expanding the scope of an innovation
Includes initiatives such as
across the supply chain
evaluation/ auditing/ problem solving
Not important as the process is based
Not relevant as IP may not be
on sharing
involved
Appropriating value from an innovation Improving performance of a (usually
mis-performing) supplier

Innovation Diffusion
Adoption of an innovation that is
out there by individuals in the
relevant population
Only receiver to an existing
innovation

Joint R&D3
Collaboration between two or more
firms, horizontal or vertical, to develop
an innovation that has not existed before
Non-directional: no source or destination,
but a collaborative, joint work

Environmental change including Complementarity of knowledge, mutual
pace of technological change and dependence, high development costs and
strength of competition
risks
Desire to improve own
performance
Could be anywhere outside the
chain, market, or industry

Desire to spread costs and risks of the
innovation development
Joint initiation by two firms (in a chain in
the case of vertical R&D)

Required: management must
place emphasis on innovation
Proactive by Receiver

Required: management must place
emphasis on innovation
Proactive by both firms

Customizing an innovation that
may be out of the whole industry
IP preserved to innovation’s first
developer
Keep up to environmental
changes

Creating a new innovation, usually new
to the world
IP is shared among developers
Creating an innovation

3

Note that joint R&D includes supplier integration/ involvement in new product development (NPD) as the former encompasses any active participation in innovation
development, while not necessarily implying that both partners derive immediate commercial benefits from the venture (Tether, 2002). This process is also referred to as codevelopment, co-creation, and innovation cooperation (Fliess & Becker, 2006)

37

PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION

EMAN NASR

Table I-2
An Illustration of PIP Elements: The Case of McDonald's4
PIP Element
Drive

PIP Element
Expert-Power
Driven
Market-Power
Driven

Appropriation

Operational
Benefits

Enhanced
Reputation

Partner
strategic fit

Strategic
Similarity

Interdependence

Incentive
Alignment

Illustration
Suppliers provide ideas on technical issues such as the baking
process for sandwich buns based on their expertise
McDonald’s propagates new process ideas based on its size
and market power to make sure there is a consistency of taste,
quality and process nationally and internationally. Different
suppliers accept in attempt to keep business with
McDonald’s.
McDonald’s perceives a win-win situation from propagation.
Suppliers enjoy operational benefits from innovations such as
green building design that reduces power consumption.
Savings that flow to suppliers’ bottom line allow McDonald’s
to negotiate price reductions.
McDonald’s has been very successful in promoting and
establishing a green image for both operating on green
standards and dealing with green suppliers.
McDonald’s propagates to suppliers with years of
partnerships, some exceeding 50 years. The company shares
with these suppliers the same values, plans, objectives, and
visions. Companies even share planning meeting and perform
together their quarter reviews.
Innovation partners share a high degree of interdependence
with McDonald’s which spends more than $30 billion dollars
on its supply chain, 80 % of which are with 16 multinational
partners, making interdependence very strong.
Although McDonald’s suppliers deal with competition, the
company works on being the preferred partner to those with
whom ideas are shared, to ensure that incentives are aligned.

Biodiesel Process Innovation
McDonald’s receives the Biodiesel innovation persuaded by the expert
power of Neutral Group in the oil conversion process. It them propagated
the innovation to its supplier (upstream), e.g. Del Monte Foods, helped
by its size and market power.

Used cooking oil has now an extra value as an input to the conversion
process. The more conversion, the more value for McDonald’s scrap oil.

Biodiesel translates into less oil scrapped, as well as 80% reduction in
carbon dioxide emission ("McDonald’s UAE Gives Cooking Oil 2nd Life
as Biodiesel," 2013), giving McDonald’s a responsible and sustainable
image that increases with every supplier using the process.
Del Monte Foods is a McDonald’s “long-time partner and supplier” for
years ("McDonald’s UAE Gives Cooking Oil 2nd Life as Biodiesel,"
2013). In addition to a vast amount of business between the two
companies, they also share similar sustainable strategies, with
McDonald’s well-established "Global Best Practices" in Sustainable
Supply and Green Initiatives ("Best Practices: About McDonalds.com,"
2014), and Del Monte’s formalized sustainable goals ("Del Monte Foods
formalizes environmental sustainability goals," 2010).

4

The information in this table was compiled based on interviews with Rob Dick, Senior Director, National Supply Chain at McDonald's Restaurants of Canada Limited; and Ala
Mohammad, Senior Director Supply Chain & Quality Systems Management at McDonald's Asia Pacific Middle East & Africa.
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Table I-2 (continued)
An Illustration of PIP Elements: The Case of McDonald’s
Innovation
Properties

Vertical
transferability

Technicality of
Innovation

Governance
structure

Formality

Managerial
attitude

McDonald’s depends on vertical transferability to roll out
ideas to different suppliers and standardize processes.
These include green building design, green trucks,
loading/ unloading dock design, which are all readily
implementable across different businesses.
McDonald’s propagates management innovations such as
teaching suppliers succession plans, how to build lead
managers, innovation management process (e.g. how to
conduct ideation sessions)
Technical ideas originate from suppliers who have the
expertise on issues such as: baking process, packaging,
food storage, … etc.
Most changes require a substantial degree of adaptation,
and therefore little documentation is used, making
innovation interaction more informal. Suppliers do expect
to keep secrets and confidentiality based on McDonald’s
market power, and willingness for repeated business.
McDonald’s maintains innovation transactions with
suppliers of innovative attitude

Being a transportation innovation, the Biodiesel employs a great deal
of transferability, facilitating its propagation.

Biodiesel relates to a support activity of transportation, as opposed to
being part of the core production process. It was therefore, propagated
successfully upstream to McDonald’s suppliers.

Seeing Biodiesel as a “groundbreaking initiative” ("McDonald’s UAE
Gives Cooking Oil 2nd Life as Biodiesel," 2013), McDonald’s has
collaborated with Del Monte Foods in a very friendly, relational
manner, taking the process transformation gradually and relying on
encouragement and convincing in contrast to detailed contracts.
McDonald’s propagated the Biodiesel innovation to Del Monte, which
is a food industry leader in innovative processing, distribution, and
marketing practices ("Del Monte Foods Turns to Dog Owners to
Unleash Innovation," 2008).

39

PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION

EMAN NASR

6. FIGURES
Figure I-1
The Effect of Partner Selection on PIP Success
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Figure I-2
The Effect of Innovation Selection on PIP Success
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Figure I-3
The effect of Governance Structure on PIP Success

42

PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION

EMAN NASR

REFERENCES
Adner, R. (2006). Match Your Innovation Strategy to Your Innovation Ecosystem.
Harvard Business Review, 84(4), 98-107.
Ahuja, G., Morris Lampert, C., & Novelli, E. (2013). The Second Face of
Appropriability: Generative Appropriability and Its Determinants. Academy of
Management Review, 38(2), 248-269. doi: 10.5465/amr.2010.0290
Aitken, J., Childerhouse, P., & Towill, D. (2003). The impact of product life cycle on
supply chain strategy. International Journal of Production Economics, 85(2),
127-140. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0925-5273(03)00105-1
Arundel, A. (2001). The relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy for appropriation.
Research Policy, 30(4), 611-624. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S00487333(00)00100-1
Arundel, A., & Kabla, I. (1998). What percentage of innovations are patented? empirical
estimates for European firms. Research Policy, 27(2), 127-141.
Backhouse, C. J., & Brookes, N. J. (1996). Concurrent Engineering: What's Working
Where. Hampshire, England: Gower Publishing Ltd.
Balachandra, R., & Friar, J. H. (1997). Factors for success in R&D projects and new
product innovation: a contextual framework. Engineering Management, IEEE
Transactions on, 44(3), 276-287.
Bantel, K. A., & Jackson, S. E. (1989). Top management and innovations in banking:
Does the composition of the top team make a difference? Strategic Management
Journal, 10(S1), 107-124.
Barney, J. (1991). Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage. Journal of
Management, 17(1), 99-120. doi: 10.1177/014920639101700108
Best Practices: About McDonalds.com. (2014).
Retrieved May, 2014, from
http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/sustainability/signature_programs/best_pra
ctices.html
Bonaccorsi, A., & Lipparini, A. (1994). Strategic partnerships in new product
development: An Italian case study. Journal of Product Innovation Management,
11(2), 134-145. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0737-6782(94)90061-2
Boyle, B., Dwyer, F. R., Robicheaux, R. A., & Simpson, J. T. (1992). Influence
Strategies in Marketing Channels: Measures and Use in Different Relationship
Structures. Journal of Marketing Research (JMR), 29(4), 462-473.
Bronder, C., & Pritzl, R. (1992). Developing strategic alliances: A conceptual framework
for successful co-operation. European Management Journal, 10(4), 412-421. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0263-2373(92)90005-O
Brouwer, E., & Kleinknecht, A. (1999). Innovative output, and a firm's propensity to
patent.: An exploration of CIS micro data. Research Policy, 28(6), 615-624. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(99)00003-7
Brown, J. R., Lusch, R. F., & Nicholson, C. Y. (1995). Power and relationship
commitment: Their impact on marketing channel member performance. Journal
of Retailing, 71(4), 363.
Busch, P., & Wilson, D. T. (1976). An Experimental Analysis of a Salesman's Expert and
Referent Bases of Social Power in the Buyer-Seller Dyad. Journal of Marketing
Research (JMR), 13(1), 3-11.
43

PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION

EMAN NASR

Cachon, G., & Lariviere, M. (2001). Turning the supply chain into a revenue chain.
Harvard business review, 79(3), 20–21.
Cassiman, B., & Veugelers, R. (2006). In Search of Complementarity in Innovation
Strategy: Internal R&D and External Knowledge Acquisition. Management
Science, 52(1), 68-82.
Cavusgil, S., Calantone, R., & Zhao, Y. (2003). Tacit knowledge transfer and firm
innovation capability. Journal of business & industrial marketing, 18(1), 6-21.
Cecere, L., O'Marah, K., & Preslan, L. (2004). Driven by demand. Supply Chain
Management Review, 8, 15-16.
Cefis, E., & Marsili, O. (2012). Going, going, gone. Exit forms and the innovative
capabilities
of
firms.
Research
Policy,
41(5),
795-807.
doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.01.006
Cerrato, D. (2009). Does innovation lead to global orientation? Empirical evidence from
a sample of Italian firms. European Management Journal, 27(5), 305-315. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2009.03.001
Chang, G. G. (2010). Suicides At Apple Supplier In China. Forbes.
Charlette, A. G., & Sandra, R. (2000). Suppliers and environmental innovation The
automotive paint process. International Journal of Operations & Production
Management, 20(2), 166.
Chesbrough, H. (2003a). Open innovation: The new imperative for creating and profiting
from technology: Harvard Business Press.
Chesbrough, H. (2003b). The era of open innovation. MIT Sloan Management Review,
44(3), 35-41.
Chesbrough, H. W., & Teece, D. J. (2002). Organizing for Innovation: When Is Virtual
Virtuous? Harvard business review, 80(8), 127-135.
Choi, T. Y., & Krause, D. R. (2006). The supply base and its complexity: Implications
for transaction costs, risks, responsiveness, and innovation. Journal of Operations
Management, 24(5), 637-652.
Cohen, W. M., Nelson, R. R., & Walsh, J. P. (2000). Protecting their intellectual assets:
Appropriability conditions and why US manufacturing firms patent (or not):
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cool, K., & Dierickx, I. (1993). Rivalry, Strategic Groups and Firm Profitability.
Strategic Management Journal, 14(1), 47-59.
Cooper, J. (1998). A multidimensional approach to the adoption of innovation.
Management Decision, 36(8), 493-502.
Cooper, R. B., & Zmud, R. W. (1990). Information Technology Implementation
Research: A Technological Diffusion Approach. Management Science, 36(2),
123-139.
Corsten, D., & Felde, J. (2005). Exploring the performance effects of key-supplier
collaboration. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics
Management, 35(6), 445-461. doi: 10.1108/09600030510611666
Daft, R. L. (1978). A Dual-Core Model of Organizational Innovation. Academy of
Management Journal, 21(2), 193-210. doi: 10.2307/255754
Dahlander, L., & Gann, D. M. (2010). How open is innovation? Research Policy, 39(6),
699-709. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2010.01.013

44

PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION

EMAN NASR

Damanpour, F. (1987). The Adoption of Technological, Administrative, and Ancillary
Innovations: Impact of Organizational Factors. Journal of Management, 13(4),
675.
Damanpour, F. (1991). Organizational Innovation: A Meta-Analysis of Effects of
Determinants and Moderators. Academy of Management Journal, 34(3), 555-590.
doi: 10.2307/256406
Damanpour, F., & Evan, W. M. (1984). Organizational Innovation and Performance: The
Problem of "Organizational Lag". Administrative Science Quarterly, 29(3), 392409.
Dapiran, G. P., & Hogarath-Scott, S. (2003). Are co-operation and trust being confused
with power? An analysis of food retailing in Australia and the UK. International
Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 31(5), 256-267.
Del Monte Foods formalizes environmental sustainability goals. (2010). Retrieved May,
2014, from http://www.reliableplant.com/Read/25837/del-monte-environmentalsustainability
Del Monte Foods Turns to Dog Owners to Unleash Innovation. (2008). from
http://www.classmatandread.net/565media/DelMonte.pdf
Dewar, R. D., & Dutton, J. E. (1986). The Adoption of Radical and Incremental
Innovations: An Empirical Analysis. Management Science, 32(11), 1422-1433.
Douma, M. U., Bilderbeek, J., Idenburg, P. J., & Looise, J. K. (2000). Strategic
Alliances: Managing the Dynamics of Fit. Long Range Planning, 33(4), 579-598.
Dyer, J., Cho, D., & Chu, W. (1998). Strategic supplier segmentation: the next" best
practice" in supply chain management. California Management Review Reprint
Series, 40(2).
Ellram, L. M. (1990). The supplier selection decision in strategic partnerships. Journal of
Purchasing & Materials Management, 26(4).
Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power-Dependence Relations. American Sociological Review,
27(1), 31-41.
Ernst, D., & Kim, L. (2002). Global production networks, knowledge diffusion, and local
capability formation. Research Policy, 31(8-9), 1417-1429. doi: 10.1016/S00487333(02)00072-0
Etgar, M. (1979). Sources and types of intrachannel conflict. Journal of Retailing, 55(1),
61-78.
Ettlie, J. E., Bridges, W. P., & O'Keefe, R. D. (1984). Organization Strategy and
Structural Difference for Radical Versus Incremental Innovation. Management
Science, 30(6), 682-695.
Evan, W. M. (1966). Organizational Lag. Human Organization, 25(1), 51-53.
Evans, J. (2013). Apple, Google, Samsung supplier Biel Crystal worker rights violations
claimed.
Retrieved
from
http://blogs.computerworld.com/smartphones/23199/apple-google-samsungsupplier-biel-crystal-worker-rights-violations-claimed
Fidler, L. A., & Johnson, J. D. (1984). Communication and Innovation Implementation.
Academy
of
Management
Review,
9(4),
704-711.
doi:
10.5465/AMR.1984.4277422

45

PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION

EMAN NASR

Fliess, S., & Becker, U. (2006). Supplier integration—Controlling of co-development
processes. Industrial Marketing Management, 35(1), 28-44. doi:
10.1016/j.indmarman.2005.07.004
French, J. R. P., & Raven, B. H. (1968). Bases of Social Power. In D. Cartwright & A. F.
Zander (Eds.), Group Dynamics: Research and Theory (Third Edition ed.). New
York: Harper and Row.
Frenz, M., & Ietto-Gillies, G. (2009). The impact on innovation performance of different
sources of knowledge: Evidence from the UK Community Innovation Survey.
Research
Policy,
38(7),
1125-1135.
doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2009.05.002
Ganesan, S. (1994). Determinants of long-term orientation in buyer-seller relationships.
The Journal of Marketing, 58, 1-19.
Garcia, R., & Calantone, R. (2002). A critical look at technological innovation typology
and innovativeness terminology: a literature review. The Journal of Product
Innovation Management, 19, 110-132.
Germain, R. (1996). The role of context and structure in radical and incremental logistics
innovation adoption. Journal of Business Research, 35(2), 117-127. doi:
10.1016/0148-2963(95)00053-4
Gooroochurn, N., & Hanley, A. (2007). A tale of two literatures: Transaction costs and
property rights in innovation outsourcing. Research Policy, 36(10), 1483-1495.
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2007.07.001
Grant, E. B., & Gregory, M. J. (1997). Tacit knowledge, the life cycle and international
manufacturing transfer. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, 9(2),
149-161. doi: Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1997,
pp. 149–162
Grant, R. M. (1996). Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm. Strategic
Management Journal, 17, 109-122.
Grover, V., & Malhotra, M. K. (2003). Transaction cost framework in operations and
supply chain management research: theory and measurement. Journal of
Operations Management, 21(4), 457-473. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S02726963(03)00040-8
Gunther, M. (2011). How McDonald's is Mainstreaming Sustainability. GreenBiz.com.
Gunther, M. (2013). Coffee and the consumer: can McDonald's mainstream
sustainability? the Guardian.
Gupta, A. K., Raj, S. P., & Wilemon, D. (1986). A Model for Studying R&D--Marketing
Interface in the Product Innovation Process. Journal of Marketing, 50(2), 7-17.
Hamel, G. (1991). Competition for Competence and Inter-partner Learning Within
International Strategic Alliances. Strategic Management Journal, 12, 83-103.
Han, J. K., Namwoon, K., & Srivastava, R. K. (1998). Market Orientation and
Organizational Performance: Is Innovation a Missing Link? The Journal of
Marketing, 62(4), 30-45.
Handfield, R. B., & Bechtel, C. (2002). The role of trust and relationship structure in
improving supply chain responsiveness. Industrial Marketing Management, 31(4),
367-382.
Helfat, C. E. (1994). Firm-Specificity in Corporate Applied R&D. Organization science,
5(2), 173-184.
46

PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION

EMAN NASR

Holgersson, M. (2013). Patent management in entrepreneurial SMEs: a literature review
and an empirical study of innovation appropriation, patent propensity, and
motives. R&D Management, 43(1), 21-36.
Hoyt, J., & Huq, F. (2000). From arms-length to collaborative relationships in the supply
chain: an evolutionary process. International Journal of Physical Distribution &
Logistics Management, 30(9), 750-764.
Hult, G. T. M. (2003). An Integration of Thoughts on Knowledge Management. Decision
Sciences, 34(2), 189.
Hult, G. T. M., Ketchen, J. D. J., Cavusgil, S. T., & Calantone, R. J. (2006). Knowledge
as a strategic resource in supply chains. Journal of Operations Management,
24(5), 458-475. doi: 10.1016/j.jom.2005.11.009
Ireland, R. D., & Webb, J. W. (2007). A multi-theoretic perspective on trust and power in
strategic supply chains. Journal of Operations Management, 25(2), 482-497. doi:
10.1016/j.jom.2006.05.004
Jacobides, M. G., Knudsen, T., & Augier, M. (2006). Benefiting from innovation: Value
creation, value appropriation and the role of industry architectures. Research
Policy, 35(8), 1200-1221.
Janeiro, P., Proença, I., & Gonçalves, V. d. C. (2013). Open innovation: Factors
explaining universities as service firm innovation sources. Journal of Business
Research, 66(10), 2017-2023. doi: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2013.02.027
Jemison, D. B., & Sitkin, S. B. (1986). Corporate Acquisitions: A Process Perspective.
Academy
of
Management
Review,
11(1),
145-163.
doi:
10.5465/AMR.1986.4282648
Johannessen, J.-A., Olsen, B., & Lumpkin, G. T. (2001). Innovation as newness: what is
new, how new, and new to whom? European Journal of Innovation Management,
4(1), 20.
Ketchen, D. J., & Hult, G. T. M. (2007). Bridging organization theory and supply chain
management: The case of best value supply chains. Journal of Operations
Management, 25(2), 573-580.
Kim, D., Cavusgil, S. T., & Calantone, R. J. (2006). Information system innovations and
supply chain management: channel relationships and firm performance. Journal
of the Academy of Marketing Science, 34(1), 40.
Kim, S. K., & Ping-Hung, H. (2003). Interdependence and Its Consequences in
Distributor-Supplier Relationships: A Distributor Perspective Through Response
Surface Approach. Journal of Marketing Research (JMR), 40(1), 101-112.
Kimberly, J. R., & Evanisko, M. J. (1981). Organizational Innovation: The Influence of
Individual, Organizational, and Contextual Factors on Hospital Adoption of
Technological and Administrative Innovations. The Academy of Management
Journal, 24(4), 689-713.
Knight, K. E. (1967). A Descriptive Model of the Intra-Firm Innovation Process. Journal
of Business, 40(4), 478-196.
Kogut, B. (2000). The Network as Knowledge: Generative Rules and the Emergence of
Structure. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3), 405.
Kostova, T. (1999). Transnational Transfer of Strategic Organizational Practices: A
Contextual Perspective. Academy of Management Review, 24(2), 308-324. doi:
10.5465/AMR.1999.1893938
47

PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION

EMAN NASR

Krause, D. R., Handfield, R. B., & Scannell, T. V. (1998). An empirical investigation of
supplier development: reactive and strategic processes. Journal of Operations
Management, 17(1), 39-58. doi: 10.1016/s0272-6963(98)00030-8
Kumar, N., Scheer, L. K., & Steenkamp, J.-B. E. M. (1995). The Effects of Perceived
Interdependence on Dealer Attitudes. Journal of Marketing Research (JMR),
32(3), 348-356.
Lasch, R., & Janker, C. G. (2005). Supplier selection and controlling using multivariate
analysis. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management,
35(6), 409-425.
Laursen, K., & Salt, A. (2006). My Precious Technology: The Role of Legal
Appropriability Strategy in Shaping Innovative Performance. Tanaka Business
School.
Lavie, D. (2006). The Competitive Advantage of Interconnected Firms: An Extension of
the Resource-based View. Academy of Management Review, 31(3), 638-658. doi:
10.5465/amr.2006.21318922
Leifer, R., O'Connor, G. C., & Rice, M. (2001). Implementing radical innovation in
mature firms: The role of hubs. The Academy of Management Executive, 15(3),
102.
Leiponen, A., & Byma, J. (2009). If you cannot block, you better run: Small firms,
cooperative innovation, and appropriation strategies. Research Policy, 38(9),
1478-1488. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2009.06.003
Leonard-Barton, D. (1988). Implementation as mutual adaptation of technology and
organization.
Research
Policy,
17(5),
251-267.
doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0048-7333(88)90006-6
Leonard-Barton, D., & Deschamps, I. (1988). Managerial Influence in the
Implementation of New Technology. Management Science, 34(10), 1252-1265.
Liebeskind, J. P. (1996). Knowledge, strategy and the theory of the firm. Knowledge and
strategy, 197-220.
Lincoln, J. R., & Ahmadjian, C. (2000). Shukko (Employee Transfers) and Tacit
Knowledge Exchange in Japanese Supply Networks: The
Electronics Industry Case. Paper presented at the Academy of Management Proceedings.
Liu, Y., Luo, Y., & Liu, T. (2009). Governing buyer–supplier relationships through
transactional and relational mechanisms: Evidence from China. Journal of
Operations Management, 27(4), 294-309. doi: 10.1016/j.jom.2008.09.004
Luecke, R., & Katz, R. (2003). Harvard business essentials: managing creativity and
innovation: Harvard Business School Pr.
Lumineau, F., & Henderson, J. E. (2012). The influence of relational experience and
contractual governance on the negotiation strategy in buyer–supplier disputes.
Journal
of
Operations
Management,
30(5),
382-395.
doi:
10.1016/j.jom.2012.03.005
Majchrzak, A., Rice, R. E., Malhotra, A., King, N., & Ba, S. (2000). Technology
Adaptation: The Case of a Computer-Supported Inter-Organizational Virtual
Team. MIS quarterly, 24(4).
Mansfield, E. (1986). Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study. Management Science,
32(2), 173-181.

48

PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION

EMAN NASR

McDonald’s UAE Gives Cooking Oil 2nd Life as Biodiesel. (2013). Retrieved May,
2014, from http://ens-newswire.com/2013/07/01/mcdonalds-uae-gives-cookingoil-2nd-life-as-biodiesel/
Mentzer, J. T., DeWitt, W., Keebler, J. S., Soonhoong, M., Nix, N. W., Smith, C. D., &
Zacharia, Z. G. (2001). Defining Supply chain Management. Journal of Business
Logistics, 22(2), 1-25.
Murray, J. Y., Kotabe, M., & Westjohn, S. A. (2009). Global Sourcing Strategy and
Performance of Knowledge-Intensive Business Services: A Two-Stage Strategic
Fit Model. Journal of International Marketing, 17(4), 90-105. doi:
10.1509/jimk.17.4.90
Narayanan, V., & Raman, A. (2004). Aligning incentives in supply chains. Harvard
business review, 82(11), 94.
Niederkofler, M. (1991). The evolution of strategic alliances: Opportunities for
managerial influence. Journal of Business Venturing, 6(4), 237-257. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0883-9026(91)90018-9
Nielsen, B. B. (2010). Strategic fit, contractual, and procedural governance in alliances.
Journal
of
Business
Research,
63(7),
682-689.
doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.05.001
Nonaka, I. (1994). A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation.
Organization Science, 5(1), 14-37.
Noordewier, T. G., John, G., & Nevin, J. R. (1990). Performance outcomes of purchasing
arrangements in industrial buyer-vendor relationships. Journal of Marketing,
54(4), 80-93.
Omachonu, V., Ross, J., & Swift, J. (2004). Principles of total quality: CRC.
Pennings, J. M. E., & Smidts, A. (2000). Assessing the Construct Validity of Risk
Attitude. Management Science, 46(10), 1337.
Penrose, E. T. (1959). The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. London: Basil Blackwell.
Pfeffer, J. (1981). Power in organizations. Marshfield, MA: Pitman.
Pierce, J. L., & Delbecq, A. L. (1977). Organization Structure, Individual Attitudes and
Innovation. Academy of Management Review, 2(1), 27-37. doi:
10.5465/AMR.1977.4409154
Poppo, L., & Zenger, T. (2002). Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance
Function as Substitutes or Complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23(8),
707. doi: 10.1002/smj.249
Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. (2011). Creating Shared Value. Harvard Business
Review, 89(1/2), 62-77.
Prasad, B. (1998). Review of QFD and related deployment techniques. Journal of
manufacturing Systems, 17(3), 221-234.
Rao, P., & Holt, D. (2005). Do green supply chains lead to competitiveness and economic
performance? International Journal of Operations & Production Management,
25(9), 898-916.
Ritala, P., & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, P. (2009). What's in it for me? Creating and
appropriating value in innovation-related coopetition. Technovation, 29(12), 819828. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.technovation.2009.07.002
Roberts, J. (2000). From Know-how to Show-how? Questioning the Role of Information
and Communication Technologies in Knowledge Transfer. Technology Analysis
49

PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION

EMAN NASR

& Strategic Management, 12(4), 429-443. doi: Technology Analysis & Strategic
Management, Vol. 12, No. 4, December 2000, pp. 429-443
Roper, S., & Crone, M. (2000). Knowledge complementarity and co-ordination in the
local supply chain: some empirical evidence. Northern Ireland Economic
Research Centre.
Rosenbloom, R. S., & Abernathy, W. J. (1982). The climate for innovation in industry :
The role of management attitudes and practices in consumer electronics. Research
Policy, 11(4), 209-225.
Ryu, I., So, S., & Koo, C. (2009). The role of partnership in supply chain performance.
Industrial Management & Data Systems, 109(4), 496-514.
Schrage, M. (2002). Wal-Mart Trumps Moore's Law-Information technology matters-When it delivers" everyday low prices.". MIT Technology Review, 105, 21-23.
Shin, S. (2012). Samsung Says China Suppliers Violated Overtime Regulations.
Bloomberg.
Simatupang, T. M., & Sridharan, R. (2002). The collaborative supply chain: a scheme for
information sharing and incentive alignment. The International Journal of
Logistics Management, 13(1), 15-30.
Simatupang, T. M., & Sridharan, R. (2005). The collaboration index: a measure for
supply chain collaboration. International Journal of Physical Distribution &
Logistics Management, 35(1), 44-62.
Simatupang, T. M., Wright, A. C., & Sridharan, R. (2002). The knowledge of
coordination for supply chain integration. Business Process Management Journal,
8(3), 289-308. doi: 10.1108/14637150210428989
Sorescu, A. B., Chandy, R. K., & Prabhu, J. C. (2003). Sources and Financial
Consequences of Radical Innovation: Insights from Pharmaceuticals. Journal of
Marketing, 67(4), 82-102.
Srai, J. S., & Gregory, M. (2008). A supply network configuration perspective on
international supply chain development. International Journal of Operations &
Production Management, 28(5), 386-411. doi: 10.1108/01443570810867178
Stern, L. W., & Heskett, J. L. (1969). Conflict Management in Interorganizational
Relations: A Conceptual Framework. In L. W. Stern (Ed.), Distribution Channels:
Behavioral Dimensions, Boston (pp. 288-305). Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company.
Stock, G. N., Greis, N. P., & Kasarda, J. D. (2000). Enterprise logistics and supply chain
structure: the role of fit. Journal of Operations Management, 18(5), 531-548.
Subramani, M. (2004). How do suppliers benefit from information technology use in
supply chain relationships? Mis Quarterly, 28(1), 45-73.
Subramaniam, M., & Youndt, M. A. (2005). The Influence of Intellectual Capital on the
Types of Innovative Capabilities. Academy of Management Journal, 48(3), 450463. doi: 10.5465/amj.2005.17407911
Summary
of
Just-in-time.
Abstract.
(2014).
2014,
from
http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/methods_jit.html
Swink, M., & Nair, A. (2007). Capturing the competitive advantages of AMT: Design–
manufacturing integration as a complementary asset. Journal of Operations
Management, 25(3), 736-754.

50

PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION

EMAN NASR

Teece, D. J. (1980). The Diffusion of an Administrative Innovation. Management
Science, 26(5), 464-470.
Teece, D. J. (1986). Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration,
collaboration, licensing and public policy. Research Policy, 15(6), 285-305.
Teece, D. J. (1996). Firm organization, industrial structure, and technological innovation.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 31(2), 193-224. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(96)00895-5
Tether, B. S. (2002). Who co-operates for innovation, and why: An empirical analysis.
Research Policy, 31(6), 21.
Thomas, G., & Fernández, W. (2008). Success in IT projects: A matter of definition?
International Journal of Project Management, 26(7), 733-742. doi:
10.1016/j.ijproman.2008.06.003
Tyre, M. J., & Orlikowski, W. J. (1994). Windows of Opportunity: Temporal Patterns of
Technological Adaptation in Organizations. Organization Science, 5(1), 98-118.
Utterback, J. M., & Abernathy, W. J. (1975). A dynamic model of process and product
innovation. Omega, 3(6), 639-656.
Vachon, S., & Klassen, R. D. (2006). Extending green practices across the supply chain:
The impact of upstream and downstream integration. International Journal of
Operations & Production Management, 26(7), 795-821.
Van-der-Vaart, T., & Van-Donk, D. P. (2008). A critical review of survey-based research
in supply chain integration. International Journal of Production Economics,
111(1), 42-55. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2006.10.011
Walker, H., Di Sisto, L., & McBain, D. (2008). Drivers and barriers to environmental
supply chain management practices: Lessons from the public and private sectors.
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 14(1), 69-85. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2008.01.007
Wang, E. T. G., Tai, J. C. F., & Wei, H.-L. (2006). A Virtual Integration Theory of
Improved Supply-Chain Performance. Journal of Management Information
Systems, 23(2), 41-64.
Wathne, K. H., & Heide, J. B. (2004). Relationship Governance in a Supply Chain
Network. Journal of Marketing, 68(1), 73-89.
Wilson, F., Desmond, J., & Roberts, T. (1994). Success and Failure of MRP II
Implementation. British Journal of Management, 5(3), 221.
Wuyts, S., & Geyskens, I. (2005). The Formation of Buyer—Supplier Relationships:
Detailed Contract Drafting and Close Partner Selection. Journal of Marketing,
69(4), 103-117. doi: 10.1509/jmkg.2005.69.4.103
Yin, X., & Zajac, E. J. (2004). The Strategy/ Governance Structure Fit Relationship:
Theory and Evidence in Franchising Arrangements. Strategic Management
Journal, 25(4), 365-383.
Zhou, K. Z., Gao, G. Y., Yang, Z., & Zhou, N. (2005). Developing strategic orientation
in China: antecedents and consequences of market and innovation orientations.
Journal of Business Research, 58(8), 1049-1058.
Zmud, R. W. (1982). Diffusion of Modern Software Practices: Influence of
Centralization and Formalization. Management Science, 28(12), 1421-1431.

51

CHARACTERIZING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL PROPERTIES

EMAN NASR

CHAPTER II. Characterizing Intellectual Capital Properties
that Drive Innovativeness of Supply Chains With Power
Differences
ABSTRACT
How can supply chain firms’ knowledge be combined to maximize their abilities
to produce radical and incremental innovations? This paper attempts to answer this
question by formulating properties of knowledge that are most relevant to radical and
incremental innovative capabilities. We use an intellectual capital lens, classifying
knowledge into human, organizational, and social, to create hierarchical component
models that portray characteristics of each knowledge type on the level of a supply chain
dyad. Hypotheses are developed and tested using a survey, which is administered to a
population of supply chain managers in Canada. The paper provides several significant
insights, advising managers regarding partner selection, team composition, and
governance mechanisms. It also contributes by presenting novel ways for data collection,
and a two-stage analysis technique using PLS.
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1. INTRODUCTION
After establishing the knowledge-innovation link within firms (Cassiman &
Veugelers, 2006; Peri, 2005), researchers have gone a step further to explore types of
knowledge that have particular relevance to each type of innovative capabilities.
Subramaniam and Youndt (2005) establish the associations between human capital and
radical innovative capability; and between organizational capital and incremental
innovative capability. Nevertheless, with a vastly growing recognition of buyer-supplier
interaction as a necessity for innovation generation (Roy, Sivakumar, & Wilkinson,
2004), the extension of firm-level knowledge-innovation theories to the supply chain
level of analysis still lags behind (Hult, Ketchen, Cavusgil, & Calantone, 2006).
Accordingly, we present and empirically test a knowledge-innovation theory for the
supply chain, taking into consideration the most pronounced governor of the exchange
relationship, that is, buyer-supplier power differences.
Little is known about the intangible success factors of supply chain innovation,
such as knowledge resources (Craighead, Hult, & Ketchen, 2009; Hult et al., 2006).
Witnessing below-expected outcomes from joint innovation projects, companies strive
for a sustainable solution to the problem by taking a capability-building perspective and
cultivating joint innovative capabilities with supply chain partners. It, therefore, becomes
imperative to determine firms’ knowledge properties that lead to more effective supply
chain innovative capabilities, both radical and incremental. By presenting and testing
hypotheses regarding chains’ knowledge properties and innovative capabilities, we
attempt to fill the scarcity in the literature on this important subject, as well as answer
calls about using the supply chain as the new unit of analysis (Capaldo, 2007;
Christopher & Ryals, 1999; Harvey, 2000; Sharifi, Ismail, & Reid, 2006; Straub, Rai, &
Klein, 2004), and the actual level where resources and capabilities reside (Barney &
Mackey, 2005; Gulati, 1999; Ketchen & Hult, 2007).
Intellectual capital encompasses knowledge that is valuable and useful for a firm5
(Edvinsson & Sullivan, 1996). In a supply chain context, it has been defined as “credible
information and/or experience, held by individuals and/or residing in the infrastructure of
5

Based on this definition, and as is custom in the literature, knowledge and intellectual capital terms will be used
interchangeably (Bontis, 1998, 1999; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Stewart & Ruckdeschel, 1998).
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the firm, which can be converted into supply chain value” (Craighead et al., 2009). In
pursuing our objectives, we follow Subramaniam and Youndt’s (2005) intellectual capital
lens, building on the prominent taxonomy that classifies intellectual capital into human,
organizational, and social to devise our hypotheses.
This study aims to characterize properties of each intellectual capital element
required by supply chain firms to achieve high radical and incremental innovative
capabilities. We introduce three characterizations for intellectual capital elements,
namely: dominant organizational capital, human capital related diversity and social
capital valuation, as properties that affect supply chain innovative capabilities. The
former two are argued to direct incremental and radical innovative capabilities in supply
chains, respectively. Building on the reciprocity rule borrowed from the social exchange
theory (Blau, 1964), we further argue that social capital valuation drives both capabilities
in supply chains.
Being a focal element of interdependent supply chain relationships (Dapiran &
Hogarath-Scott, 2003), inter-firm power complicates the effect of human and
organizational capital elements on innovative capabilities. The pronounced effect of
power exercise has ranged from driving suppliers to invest billions of dollars in
innovations (Schrage, 2002) to drive supplier bankruptcy from failure to comply with
innovation directives (Brown, Gabrielsen, & Pope, 2003; Turnbull, Oliver, & Wilkinson,
1992). This highlights a huge disparity in the innovation outcomes from exercising power
with partners.
Driven by its Extended Enterprise, Chrysler has achieved considerable success
through its Supplier Cost Reduction Effort (SCORE) program to drive mutually
beneficial cost reduction and product improvements (Maloni & Benton, 2000). On the
other hand, Wal-Mart threatens its suppliers to pull its orders from them if they do not
meet its standards (Aston, 2009). It remains unclear why the two opposing strategies have
worked successfully in these two cases. Nevertheless, GM exploits its power against its
suppliers similar to Wal-Mart, dictating nonnegotiable cost reductions to suppliers
(Maloni & Benton, 2000). Yet, many argue that the benefits were overshadowed by
supplier resentment and a lack of synergistic improvement (Maloni & Benton, 2000),
questioning success of the movement.
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Accordingly, two seemingly contradictory hypotheses are examined: (1) power
exercise helps because it drives propagation of existing technologies through the supply
chain and, (2) power exercise hurts because it suppresses the creative abilities of less
powerful chain members. We administer a survey to a population of purchasing managers
in Canada using multiple novel data collection techniques, and test our model using PLS,
which is the recommended approach for formative hierarchical component models.
This chapter is arranged as follows. The next section will review the relevant
literature highlighting gaps, which this chapter attempts to fill. In section 3 hypotheses
are developed and the proposed model is presented. Section 4 will explain the survey
methodology used including population, sample and instruments used. Sections 5 and 6
offer the results and their discussion, respectively, followed by conclusions in section 7.
Finally limitations and future research directions are given in sections 8 and 9,
respectively.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Intellectual Capital and Innovative Capabilities
2.1.1 Intra-firm Intellectual Capital
After Sveiby’s work on “Knowledge-based” assets ("The Know-how company",
1986, "The New Annual Report", 1988, and "The Invisible Balance Sheet", 1989), Tom
Stewart initiated the term Intellectual Capital as the real “New Wealth of Organizations”
(Stewart, 1991; Sveiby, 1997). Intellectual Capital (IC) is a highly strategic, intangible
asset that companies increasingly create and nurture. It has been defined in several ways
throughout the literature, notably as “knowledge that can be converted into value”
(Edvinsson & Sullivan, 1996), “the sum of all knowledge firms utilize for competitive
advantage” (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005), and, “the sum total of the useful knowledge
of an organization's employees and customers” (The human resources glossary : the
complete desk reference for HR executives, managers and practitioners, 1998).
Financially, it is sometimes regarded as the difference between book value and market
value ("A Viking with a Compass," 1998).
IC is, in fact, a major source of competitive advantage and a distinguishing
feature among firms (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Ulrich (1998) gives six reasons for the
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criticality of firms’ IC; most importantly, being a firm’s only appreciable asset that is
receiving a mis-focused treatment from managers and is sometimes even ignored. IC is
rapidly becoming a very important measure of the company's future performance (Roos
& Roos, 1997). It is more strategic in firms and industries for which innovation is
particularly important.
One common view classifies IC into: Human Capital (HC), Organizational
Capital (OC), also referred to as structural capital, and Social Capital (SC), also referred
to as relational capital. HC constitutes individuals’ abilities, skills and other knowledge,
which they can utilize in attaining the firm’s objectives (Schultz, 1961). OC is defined as
knowledge owned by organizations residing within its documents, structures and systems,
independent from individuals (Albino, Garavelli, & Schiuma, 1998; Youndt,
Subramaniam, & Snell, 2004). Lastly, SC is the goodwill that is engendered in the
structure and content of relations among individuals, including trust, cooperative norms,
and associations within groups (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Knack & Keefer, 1997).
This classification is particularly significant within the context of innovation as
each of the three types differently affects radical and incremental innovative capabilities
in organizations. The former capability is defined as the firm’s ability to develop changes
that can be considered as fundamental and revolutionary (Dewar & Dutton, 1986), while
the latter represents a firm’s ability to produce simple improvements and adjustments to
current products or processes (Dewar & Dutton, 1986).
A link has been established in the literature on the particular (positive) association
between HC and radical innovative capabilities, and between OC and incremental
innovative capabilities in firms (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). Firms institutionalize
their knowledge in the form of OC to be extended, deepened and strengthened, for
example by making improvements and developing related patents (Martin & Mitchell,
1998; Stuart & Podolny, 1996; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). On the other hand,
creativity, brightness and the ability to question prevailing norms come from employees’
constituting a company’s HC (Snell & Dean Jr, 1992; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005;
Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Relational capital, however, has been found to facilitate the
two aforementioned links by providing relationships and networks that improve the
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leverage of codified knowledge, encourage more sharing of knowledge, and enable more
acceptance for radical changes (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005).
2.1.2 Inter-firm Intellectual Capital
Contending that supply chains are the new units of competition (Capaldo, 2007;
Christopher & Ryals, 1999; Harvey, 2000; Ketchen & Hult, 2007; Sharifi et al., 2006;
Straub et al., 2004), it becomes imperative to consider the effective combination of IC
elements of supply chain teams. Buyers and suppliers that individually possess human,
organizational and social capital may not witness the expected success when
collaborating on joint innovation projects (Devaraj, Krajewski, & Wei, 2007). This
implies that it is not the mere existence of knowledge that can make inter-firm teams
more effective, but it is the properties of the teams’ knowledge that drive innovation
outcomes. Outcomes falling below expectations may be attributed to knowledge
properties, such as overlap and redundancy, conflicting cultures and norms or from an
undesirable level of differences in knowledge stocks. Accordingly, we need to investigate
properties of knowledge that allow buyers and suppliers to innovate effectively.
On the one hand, access to valuable complementary knowledge is one of the most
cited incentives for companies to work jointly. The fact that synergies arise from
complementarity in resources is well grounded in the Economic Theory of
Complementarities (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). Knowledge complementarity is “that
which occurs when two firms have non-overlapping or different knowledge bases that
might be combined and integrated to create value that did not exist in either firm before”
(Fang, 2011). Similarly, complementary IC is “related but not the same” and is highly
synergetic (Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005). The importance of complementarity of
resources (including IC) for synergy creation is highly recognized in literature streams on
acquisitions and alliances (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001). An underlying
notion is that of super-modularity in which the “whole is more than the sum of its parts”
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). This literature stream argues that lack of complementarity
implies knowledge overlap and redundancy (Fang, 2011).
An opposing argument, however, calls for knowledge overlap as a requirement
for effective communication and exchange of knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).
Firms with similar knowledge bases find it cognitively easier to absorb and utilize each
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other’s knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Complementarity makes it even more
challenging to combine and integrate knowledge sets (Harrison et al., 2001). In some
cases, complementarity could even motivate partners to create barriers preventing their
knowledge from being transferred and hindering innovation (Larsson, Bengtsson,
Henriksson, & Sparks, 1998). Empirically, technological overlap is found to be a
significant criterion in alliance partner selection decision (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman,
1998). Knowledge relatedness among firms is argued to be positively associated with
knowledge acquisition and transfer (Inkpen, 2000; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Von-Hippel,
1994).
In this paper, we argue that distinguishing between organizational and human
knowledge helps resolve the opposing streams on similarity/ complementarity of
knowledge. More specifically, similarity of OC is key to provide a homogenous,
dominant pool of knowledge to build on for incremental innovations. However, in the
case of HC, breadth and diversity of knowledge is required to reach out for radical
innovations, in which case complementarity is needed.
2.1.3 Reciprocity and Social Capital Valuation
Within a firm, social capital facilitates the translation of each of organizational
and human capital into innovative capabilities (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). This,
however, may not be attainable across firms’ boundaries, namely in buyer supplier
innovation endeavors. Firms may resist being carried away by the relational ties, fearing
opportunistic partners who may exploit “good partners” through skill acquisition (Hamel,
1991), excessive spillovers to competition (J. Dyer, Cho, & Chu, 1998), and even by
becoming direct competitors (Arruñada & Vázquez, 2006). These actions present a major
threat of losing competitive advantage as soon as knowledge crosses a firm’s own
boundaries. This risk is known as the “relational risk”, defined as the probability that the
partner does not comply with the spirit of cooperation and acts opportunistically in
misusing the acquired knowledge (Das & Teng, 1998).
The social resolution to this “boundary paradox” (Quintas, Lefrere, & Jones,
1997) is addressed by the Social Exchange Theory’s most common exchange rule,
reciprocity. Firms may readily provide knowledge and act in kind for the immediate
benefit of a partner, only in expectation to be reciprocated fairly (Molm, 1994).
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Reciprocation is a direct consequence of high valuation of social capital, as companies
place more emphasis on the mutual valuation of the relationship than risks of losing
competitive knowledge.
Reciprocity, also known as Norms of Reciprocity, depends on two interrelated
minimal rules: (1) individuals should assist those who have assisted them; and (2)
individuals should not injure/deprive those who have assisted them (Gouldner, 1960). In
our context, this means that a good act of being open in sharing competitive knowledge is
met by (1) partner’s openness in knowledge sharing; and, (2) partner refraining from
knowledge abuse by intended spillover to competition. “Reciprocal exchange” is a
process of "gift-giving" (Molm, 2003). Reciprocation is the only way for ready
knowledge sharing and is only allowed because of social capital valuation. Accordingly,
even though the interdependence reduces risk and encourages cooperation (Molm, 1994),
great uncertainties that surround outcomes of knowledge exchanges are only addressed
by social capital valuation based on norms of reciprocity (Cook & Rice, 2006).
To sum up, reciprocity norms suggest that companies do not act solely on the
basis of traditional economic factors, but they may in fact place economic valuation on
social factors including repeated exchanges, future obligations and the belief that each
party will fulfill its obligations (Zhao, Huo, Flynn, & Yeung, 2008). In this paper, we
develop this claim to investigate the effect of social capital valuation on a supply chain’s
innovative capabilities.

2.2. Inter-firm Power
2.2.1 Background on Inter-firm Power
Power existence is defined as a potential influence, or the capacity to affect
actions of another unit (Emerson, 1962; Fidler & Johnson, 1984). Supply Chain power is,
therefore, the ability of a partner to induce another to do what it would otherwise not do
(Dapiran & Hogarath-Scott, 2003; Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer, 1981). Being a potential
influence, power does exist even if not observed (Emerson, 1962). Kim (2000), for
instance, distinguishes between inter-firm power structure and the actual use of influence
strategies. Supply chain exchanges, including joint innovation projects, are based on
interdependence among partners, which may entail asymmetric power that interferes with
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the effectiveness of outcomes. Power is an element of any relationship (Dapiran &
Hogarath-Scott, 2003) and is, therefore, worth studying in a supply chain context.
Even though power can take different forms and can have several bases (French
& Raven, 1968), the exercised/ unexercised classification (referred to as mediated/ nonmediated) is the most common in the literature that has gained consistent empirical
support (Ke, Liu, Wei, Gu, & Chen, 2009). Exercised power, namely reward, coercive,
and legal, involves the actual influence that a source applies on a target. The three
different manifestations of power observed among firms are: (1) reward power involving
provision or promise of rewards, (2) coercive power involving provision or threat of
punishments, and, (3) legal power involving resorting to contractual agreements (Benton
& Maloni, 2005; Fidler & Johnson, 1984; Ke et al., 2009; Maloni & Benton, 2000). This
exercised/ unexercised classification is regarded as the most appropriate dichotomization
specifically for a supply chain environment (Benton & Maloni, 2005).
The primary source that gives a firm power advantage over its partner is
interdependence asymmetry. Channel members are inherently dependent on each other.
Asymmetry occurs, however, when there is a discrepancy between each firm’s
dependence on its partner. Dependence is the extent to which it is necessary for a firm to
maintain a particular channel relationship to achieve desired targets and is usually
measured in terms of replaceability of a partner (S. K. Kim & Ping-Hung, 2003).
Interdependence asymmetry takes into account two facts (1) dependence is mutual and
has to be addressed from two sides of a dyad/ linkage; (2) what primarily matters in a
dependence relation is the relative or net dependence or the discrepancy between each
side’s dependence on the other. Power is indicated as the primary consequence of
interdependence asymmetry (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). A firm can find it necessary
to keep relationships with a particular partner for a variety of reasons including process
dependence, knowledge dependence, or unavailability of substitutes.
2.2.2 Consequences of Power in Supply Chains
Power plays a prominent role in motivating decisions in supply chains (Brewer &
Speh, 2000). It allows firms to gain favorable terms in supply chain exchanges (Crook &
Combs, 2007). Firms use their relative bargaining power against supply chain partners in
two ways: appropriation and propagation. The former effect is generally perceived as
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negative, being biased toward the more powerful partner, while the second is perceived
as positive, taking a leadership position for promoting innovations.
Appropriation involves obtaining larger proportion of supply chain profits. A
partner with a favorable “product category commitment ratio”, used to measure the
balance of power among supply chain partners, can extract additional financial returns at
the expense of the other partners (Brewer & Speh, 2000). Revenue sharing contract
parameters, for instance, depend on the relative contractual power of the supply chain
actors (Giannoccaro & Pontrandolfo, 2004). Benefit extraction can also take the form of
shifting activities or costs to partners. In VMI (Vendor-Managed Inventories) tasks
related to monitoring and controlling inventories are shifted to suppliers; and in quick
response programs suppliers are burdened with more frequent deliveries and higher
inventory holding costs (Subramani, 2004).
From a different perspective, power allows firms to act as innovation leaders
inducing partners to adopt/ develop technologies. The ripple effect of innovations on the
whole supply chain drives partners to influence each other to innovate (see chapter 2).
Research supports the effect of inter-firm influence strategies and technological adoption
(Hausman & Stock, 2003). For instance, bargaining power explains the ability of highvolume buying firms to mandate the use of Electronic Commerce on suppliers (Min &
Galle, 1999; Riggins & Mukhopadhyay, 1994).
The giant retailer, Wal-Mart, threatens to pull its orders from suppliers if they do
not innovate to meet with its new “green” standards (Aston, 2009). The company’s
investments in technological systems resulted in an “order of magnitude impact” on its
suppliers’ innovations (Schrage, 2002). On another frontier, automotive manufacturers
oblige suppliers to continuously innovate for annual price reductions (B. Kim, 2000;
Liker & Choi, 2004; Maloni & Benton, 2000). Exploiting its power, GM dictates
nonnegotiable cost reductions on its suppliers driving several process innovations (B.
Kim, 2000). Some scholars, however, still argue that benefits from influence-based
innovations are always biased in favor of the more powerful network leaders (Cachon &
Lariviere, 2005; Dwyer & Walker Jr, 1981; Mitra & Singhal, 2008).
From the above, we notice that arguments are scattered in the literature about both
the positive and negative effects of power on innovations. It is still unclear whether
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power exercise would help provide leadership and direction for promoting innovations, or
would kill creativity and flexibility required for more effective innovations. We here
attempt to reconcile these disagreements by distinguishing types of innovations, namely
radical versus incremental, for which power exercise would pay off. Theoretical
development of hypotheses is shown next.

3. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Dominant Organizational Capital and Incremental Innovation
Organizational Capital is knowledge that is owned by organizations, independent
from individuals (Albino et al., 1998). Organizations can both own knowledge and be
knowledge actors, which are entities that possess, acquire, and exchange knowledge
(Albino et al., 1998). Organizational capital is the institutionalized knowledge and
codified experience residing within databases, patents, manuals, structures, systems, and
processes, away from individuals working therein (Youndt et al., 2004). Firms preserve
knowledge over time while “individuals come and go” (Daft & Weick, 1984).
Within one firm, the stock of institutionalized knowledge is generally
homogenous, providing direction for structured recurrent activities that deepen existing
knowledge, and enabling the firm to reinforce it in further incremental innovations
(Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). In a dyad, however, two such
stocks exist simultaneously and may not necessarily be homogenous to one another. The
two knowledge profiles (OC) may indeed conflict. For instance, firms may be patenting
in different fields, using different technologies and systems, following different
organizational structures, or adopting different innovation processes. In this case, each
firm attempts to direct incremental innovation activities to its own structure, extend its
own stock of knowledge, and perform what has proved to be successful for its own cause
(Katila, 2002; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). In doing so a firm aims to enhance its
existing competence and capabilities (as opposed to destroying it) (Henderson & Clark,
1990). When this is done simultaneously by several firms in a collaboration, it may
jeopardize the existence of a clear and unified direction required for incremental
innovations. Accordingly, the joint ability of the firms to produce incremental
innovations may be adversely affected.
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Why then would firms in a dyad not learn from each other? By decoupling
organizational knowledge from human knowledge, the concept of organizational learning
becomes moot6. Organizations do learn, but “only through individuals who learn” (Senge,
1990: 139). Organizational learning is usually thought of as a metaphor originating from
individual learning, as organizations cannot learn independent of all individuals (Kim,
1993). Although organizations do possess memories that may exist independent from
people, learning itself is not an independent trait of organizations (Hedberg, 1981).
Accordingly, it is safe to argue that organizational knowledge, when decoupled from
individuals, is idiosyncratic in nature and resists changes. For instance, when Standard
Operating Procedures are institutionalized, they become more difficult to change,
delaying the search for new procedures (Kim, 1993). Routines cause resistance to change,
giving stability and rigidity to processes, and it is individuals (managers) that attempt to
alter these routines. Institutionalized knowledge, i.e., OC, facilitates and smoothens
regular changes and improvements, while resisting changes based on opposing stocks of
knowledge coming from other firms (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Routines tend to be
persistent and inflexible to adaptation to other firms’ knowledge (Teece et al., 1997), as
OC intensifies organizational inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984).
Similarly, in a buyer-supplier innovation interaction, each firm’s OC resists the
other’s opposing stock of knowledge. The level of resistance will correspond to the
difference in types of firms’ OC stocks (e.g., difference in organizational cultures), and
strengths of each organization’s OC (e.g., strength of each organizational culture). Strong
organizational cultures are more difficult to change. The conflict between comparably
strong OC stocks, such as cultures, impedes the effective transfer and sharing of
knowledge (Lyles & Salk, 1996). Such conflicts are particularly escalated among
businesses with comparable sizes. Examples include Daimler-Chrysler’s “merger of
equals” which failed due to conflicting organizational cultures, where Germans failed to
smoothly dominate because of the comparable strength of the two cultures (Weber &
Camerer, 2003). These cross-cultural conflicts, known as “acculturative stress”, hinder

6

Note that there is a distinction between organizational learning and organizational adaptation, as change does not
necessarily imply learning (Hedberg, 1981; Fiol and Lyles, 1985). Learning may include simple adaptation, while
encompassing much more, such as understanding of causal relationships.
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effective knowledge transfer (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). The higher the level of OC
in a firm, the more difficult it is to disrupt it, while the smaller the stock, the easier the
adaptation (Gatignon, Tushman, Smith, & Anderson, 2002).
Firms with comparable stock levels face conflicts of conventions, with no clear
character of a dominant style that can guide incremental innovations. The existence of a
dominant style of OC allows smooth inter-firm communication and effective
development of incremental innovations. We call this Dominant OC, which is defined as
the prevalence of a particular profile of institutionalized knowledge, i.e. type of
processes, patent fields, documentation style, … etc. in a multi-firm pool of OC. In a
supply chain linkage with a buyer and supplier working jointly, a single OC profile must
dominate to provide a consistent direction for further incremental innovations. This can
result from: (1) dominant OC content: similarity in the type of OC stocks in the two
firms, and/ or, (2) dominant OC magnitude: gap in the quantity of OC stocks (i.e., one
OC stock is much larger than the other).
Dominant OC content results from similarity in firms’ OC stocks. OC similarity
between two organizations, also known as knowledge symmetry/ relatedness/ overlap,
facilitates inter-firm communication and two-way learning, and allows each of the firms
to absorb new external knowledge from the other (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane &
Lubatkin, 1998). OC similarity entails cultural proximity, related patent fields, and
common innovation processes between companies. Cultural proximity achieves
organizational fit, reduces equivocality, and allows easier and more effective
collaboration (Albino et al., 1998; Knoben & Oerlemans, 2006; Lui & Ngo, 2005). The
presence of similar patent fields unifies the direction for extending and growing existing
innovations. Lastly, organizations with common innovation processes find fewer
conflicts in procedures, routines, and practices that may stand in the way of simple
changes. Firms coming from detached knowledge realms employ diverging innovation
“recipes” or “routines” impeding collaboration (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). Knowledge
overlap with a buyer/ supplier firm, therefore, enables a firm to reinforce its in-house
skills by absorbing this similar further external knowledge (Mowery et al., 1998).
A gap in OC magnitudes, i.e., difference in OC strengths, may also lead to a
dominant organizational knowledge stock. Ahuja and Katila (2001) contend that smaller
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relative size of knowledge bases (i.e. higher gaps) is required in joint innovations to
minimize: (1) the relative amount of resources devoted for integrating the two knowledge
bases; and, (2) modifications to existing routines and changes to organizational functions.
A higher gap in organizational stocks allows a larger stock firm to take the lead and
provide direction for further incremental innovations, while making minor modifications
to the smaller stock firm. Well-established firms with deeper history have more complex
organizational knowledge which is difficult to change, while smaller firms with simple
knowledge structures can easily acquire new knowledge from other firms in joint
ventures (Lyles & Salk, 1996). When the knowledge bases (to be combined) are
relatively equal in size, however, it becomes more difficult to determine which of the two
bases to build on or extend. Both stocks, in this case, have equal strength and would
struggle, trying to reinforce themselves.
Overall, the key driver that enhances incremental innovation capability is the
presence of dominant organizational capital (Figure II-1), which may come from two
sources. In the first case, OC similarity minimizes conflict as to what knowledge will be
extended or deepened through upcoming innovations. And in the second case,
domination of quantity allows the higher stock of OC to lead the innovation process.
H1: The greater the Dominant Organizational Capital (DOC) in a supply chain,
the higher the supply chain’s incremental innovative capability7

3.2 Human Capital Related Diversity and Radical Innovation
HC constituting knowledge residing within and utilized by individuals, comprises
the basis for radical innovativeness within firms (Schultz, 1961; Subramaniam & Youndt,
2005). This stems from the fact that radical innovations are triggered by tacit knowledge,
which resides within individuals (Grant, 1996; Cowan et al., 2004, Hall and Andriani,
2003 and Mascitelli, 2000; Castiaux, 2007). What individuals accumulate below their
level of consciousness allows them to go beyond details and specifics, recognizing
interrelationships and discovering missing links forming the bases of breakthrough
innovations (Mascitelli, 2000). OC is by definition mostly codified and explicit

7

We will adopt Benton and Maloni’s (2005) definition of a supply chain as a link between a firm and one of its first
tier suppliers. This represents a building block, which is easily extendible throughout a supply chain (Benton & Maloni,
2005).
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(documentation style, patents ... etc.) with sparse tacit content required for the undefined
and uncertain context of creative processes (Polanyi, 1958; Castiaux, 2007).
In an inter-firm collaboration, transfer of tacit knowledge is mainly due to contact
between individuals (Castiaux, 2007). Individuals are distinguished from other resources
by their ability to learn, apply their knowledge in new domains, and make new resource
combinations; which all lead to radical innovations

8

(Penrose, 1959). From an

exploration/ exploitation perspective, Popadiuk and Choo (2006) argue that:
“Tacit knowledge (residing in individuals) … is closely related to knowledge exploration
(for radical innovation) while explicit knowledge (residing in organizations) is more
concerned with knowledge exploitation (for incremental innovations)”.

Involving explorative activities, radical innovations require a diversity of skills to
provide breadth for the exploration process. It is this breadth of knowledge that allows
novel ideas and concepts to be cultivated, by departing from existing skills and making
new associations and linkages (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990;
March, 1991). Radical innovations also involve an uncertain setting, which requires
diverse knowledge for a more robust learning basis (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).
Employees who spawn a diversity of knowledge and carry a wide variety of experience
present an invaluable resource that can stimulate innovative idea generation (Chen &
Huang, 2009; McDermott, 1999).
Excessive diversity, however, comes at a disadvantage. Human knowledge that is
too diverse may result in “unwieldy and impractical” outcomes (Taylor & Greve, 2006).
On one hand, high levels of diversity in teams carry a great potential for team conflict
(Taylor & Greve, 2006). Employees that are too diverse may face internal
communication problems, impeding effective teamwork (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). This
raises questions regarding how diverse HC should be for effective radical innovation
outcomes. We here assert that HC related diversity, acts as the key determinant of radical
innovativeness for supply chains (Figure II-1).
Skill relatedness has been defined in the literature as a property of industries that
describes skill linkages among different industries (Farjoun, 1998; Neffke & Henning,
2013). Two industries are said to be skill-related to the extent to which they share skill

8

See more on the resistance of institutionalized knowledge to learning and radical changes in section 3.1.
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profiles (Farjoun, 1998). Similarly, we here define skill relatedness as a property of a skill
set. Two or more skills are related to the extent to which they are simultaneously used in
a variety of products and services: the higher the co-existence of certain skill
combinations in the production of various products and services, the higher the level of
these skills’ relatedness. Related skills, as defined above, may be highly different. Think
for instance about accounting and marketing professions present in multiple types of
businesses. Differences in skills can be characterized through indices like the Standard
Occupational Classification (SOC) code, which classifies workers into occupational
categories.
Relatedness in human capital helps minimize the disadvantages of excessive
(unrelated) diversity, which include: team conflicts (Taylor & Greve, 2006),
communication problems (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), and reaching “unwieldy and
impractical” outcomes (Taylor & Greve, 2006). Skills that are relatedly diverse have a
higher probability of success in joint research (Sinha & Cusumano, 1991). This is
particularly true for the case when the expected benefits and risks are high, i.e. radical
innovations (Sinha & Cusumano, 1991). The value of a resource is enhanced by the copresence of related resources. While radical innovations require transferring/applying
skills in new domains and contexts, the value of the skill transferred may be lost due to
absence of other skills that enhance its value (Farjoun, 1994). Related resources are
mutually supportive, creating super-additive value synergies from their usage across
different domains and contexts (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995; Tanriverdi & Venkatraman,
2005). The combination of unrelated resources may potentially produce radical
innovations, but the speed and ease of their creation are much lower than with the case of
related resources due to the lack of necessary absorptive capacity (Makri, Hitt, & Lane,
2010).
HC related diversity is obtained: (1) quantitatively, through a bigger pool of HC,
and/or, (2) qualitatively, through complementarity in the HC pool. HC complementarity
is defined in the literature as knowledge that is related but different (Tanriverdi &
Venkatraman, 2005). Complementarity in supply chain firms’ HC bases implies a nonoverlapping character of knowledge that allows integration to create value that had not
existed in either firm before (Fang, 2011; Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). Alternatively, lack
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of complementarity can imply redundancy, which causes inefficiencies and conflicts
(Fang, 2011).
Larger teams are by definition more diverse making team size another source of
HC related diversity (Carpenter, 2002). Getting together more people to work on
innovation projects presents an invaluable resource (McDermott, 1999). A team’s size is
proportional to the amount of resources contributing to an innovative output (Hambrick
& D'Aveni, 1992). A higher input of human capital implies a wider spectrum of
knowledge and a greater opportunity for radical innovations (van-den-Bergh, 2008).
More “creators” provides knowledge diversity required for radical innovations (West &
Anderson, 1996). This would lead to a more effective exploration process and,
accordingly, a higher output of radical innovations. A higher level of HC implies skilled
and creative employees, who would likely question prevailing systems and attempt to
change them significantly (Snell & Dean Jr, 1992; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). In the
highly creative environment of radically innovative teams, unique individual stocks of
knowledge, obtained from a greater HC pool, carries particular importance (Taylor &
Greve, 2006).
Note that in the case of management teams, bigger size may entail conflicts
(Amason & Sapienza, 1997). Nevertheless, this view does not find consensus as some
scholars have empirically found that larger top management teams perform better
(Haleblian & Finikelstein, 1993; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992). It is imperative to note,
however, that decision-making teams are beyond the scope of this discussion, since we
only focus on innovation teams. Empirical studies have found innovation teams to be
more effective when larger, especially that innovation is arguably a process characterized
by conflict in attempting to adapt changes to organizations (Curral, Forrester, Dawson, &
West, 2001; Dailey, 1978; West et al., 2003).
H2: The greater the HC Related Diversity (HRD) in a supply chain, the higher
the chain’s radical innovative capability.

3.3 The Moderating Role of Power Exercise
Little is known about whether influence strategies positively or negatively affect
innovativeness of businesses (Hausman & Stock, 2003). Supply chain firms may resort to
influence strategies, coercive, reward or legal, attempting to affect partners’ innovation
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performance. Wal-Mart, for instance, pushes its suppliers to invest in new technologies
like RFID and green initiatives by threatening to withhold business from non-conformers
(Aston, 2009). This study argues that power exercise will be effective when the direction
and source of lead for the innovation process is clearly defined, i.e. in the case of
incremental innovation, while it would be ineffective in the case of the more uncertain
radical innovation, when higher flexibility and creativity is needed.
Power exercise stimulates actions directly by decoupling emotional attachments
(Ireland, Hitt, & Webb, 2005; Ireland & Webb, 2007). It provides the high level of
reinforcement needed for organizational capital to translate into incremental innovative
capability. When exercised, power can overcome both active and passive resistance of
firms to implement innovations (Fidler & Johnson, 1984). It is therefore effective when it
comes to adopting existing technologies or expanding their scope (Maute & Locander,
1994). Firms exercise power to induce partners to follow their lead in innovation projects.
In the case of incremental innovations, compliance is required to unite firms along a
single direction for extending a specific dominant knowledge profile. Influence strategies
ensure that the less powerful firm abides by the dominant firm’s directives (Ke et al.,
2009). Power exercise is, therefore, expected to have both a direct and moderating
positive effect on incremental innovative ability:
H3a: Power exercise positively affects a supply chain’s incremental innovative
capability
H3b: Power exercise positively moderates the relationship between DOC and
incremental innovative capability of a supply chain
On the other hand, power may inhibit the ability of individuals to produce radical
innovations. Depriving individuals from taking part in the decision making by exercising
power impairs their creativity and their willingness to make fruitful suggestions (Fidler &
Johnson, 1984). This can result in negative attitudinal orientations further dampening
radical innovative capability. In developing radical innovations, it is difficult to evaluate
or monitor innovation efforts. It is, therefore, imperative for participating individuals to
have the willingness to be effectively involved. Power exercise typically results in low
involvement levels as (less powerful) firms perform in a minimally acceptable manner for
which punishment is avoided or reward is present (Fidler & Johnson, 1984).
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The control induced by exercising power adversely affects creativity and
flexibility needed for radical innovative capability. New ideas and knowledge requires
not only creative and highly skilled employees but also flexibility in adapting and
implementing (March, 1991). Flexibility has been cited as a necessary requirement for
radical innovations. Companies pursuing high level of innovations are in fact decreasing
their hierarchical control (Kanter, 1989). The substantial level of control and direction
employed by use of influential strategies between linkage firms will largely diminish
people’s flexibility, deterring the overall human capital from being translated into radical
innovations. Radical innovation is facilitated by the flexibility following from a lack of
enduring relations between firms (Bart, 1999). Strategic commitments caused by a
powerful firm’s influence will make the weaker firm more rigid and less flexible,
standing in the way of breakthrough innovativeness.
Moreover, negative feelings are generated and autonomy is lost from forced
compliance, again, adversely affecting radical innovations (Ke et al., 2009). As one firm
complies with directives from another under power influence, it foregoes the opportunity
to demonstrate its competence (Ke et al., 2009). This means that power exercise inhibits
radical innovative capability and dampens the effect of competence HRD may have on
the capability (Figure II-1).
H4a: Power exercise negatively affects a supply chain’s radical innovative
capability
H4b: Power exercise negatively moderates the relationship between HRD and a
supply chain’s radical innovative capability
Although Wal-Mart, which had changed supply chain process almost radically,
may seem like a counter example to our argument, a closer look will actually show the
opposite. On one hand, Farrell (2003) argues that the retailer’s real gains were obtained
only by redefining and enhancing relationships with suppliers as opposed to exercising
power. Suppliers that witnessed excessive usage of power such as Vlastic have declared
bankruptcy, indicating failure of the forceful strategy in radical changes (Crook &
Combs, 2007). This situation of suppliers having little choice but to comply with
retailer’s innovations, is completely different from joint work on the actual creation and
development of innovations. No studies, to our knowledge, have investigated the actual
effect on joint innovation capability, as an outcome, of a Wal-Mart-supplier dyad. Studies
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do argue, however, that the outcomes of Wal-Mart’s power has been unequal returns on
ideas and resources, biased against suppliers; and that win-win collaborations exist
between Wal-Mart and firms with comparable-power such as Procter and Gamble, where
no excessive power can be exercised on either side (Corsten & Kumar, 2005). Success of
the partnership has been specifically attributed to the lack of relative power between the
two players (Tang, 1999). Another study found that the less the market-share of WalMart’s suppliers (i.e., more chance of power exercise), the higher the failure rate of these
suppliers (Bloom & Perry, 2001). Finally, scholars have further argued that Wal-Mart’s
innovations are all about cost reduction, which may have in fact impeded product and
quality related innovations manufacturers wished for (Bianco et al., 2003). Evidence has
thus indicated that Wal-Mart’s forceful strategies fail in joint radical innovation
endeavors.

3.4 Social Capital Valuation
A discussion on intellectual capital is not complete without considering its third
element, social capital. The effect of supply chain social capital on innovation outcomes
can be attributed to the value firms place on their relational ties. Companies that highly
value inter-firm social capital and the importance of relational ties are better able to
collaborate for both the effective creation and implementation of innovations. Studies
confirm significant financial value from perceived buyer-supplier trust, not only through
transaction cost reduction, but also from enhanced sharing and collaboration, which
directly translates into higher innovative abilities (J. H. Dyer & Chu, 2003).
Social elements are “externalities” described as goods and commodities with real,
practical economic value (Arrow, 1974). This “calculus-based” view of trust ensures
tangible, economic outcomes from creating and sustaining the relationship relative to the
costs of severing it (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Accordingly, companies that adopt this
view comply with implicit knowledge sharing rules, including ready provision and
secrecy, ensured by the expected rewards of being trusting and trustworthy (and possibly
avoiding “threats” of violating trust) (Ba, Whinston, & Zhang, 2003).
The effect of social capital valuation on innovation can be attributed to the “best
known” exchange rule borrowed from the social exchange theory: reciprocity or payment
in kind (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). According to that rule, “voluntary actions of
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individuals … are motivated by the returns they are expected to bring and typically do in
fact bring from others” (Blau, 1964). In a buyer-supplier knowledge exchange, social
capital valuation by one party drives more sharing of knowledge, i.e. providing benefit to
the other, in attempt to invoke reciprocation from the other and provision of knowledge
in return (Blau, 1964; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). Accordingly, high
valuation by both parties builds up a larger shared “knowledge repository” retrievable by
all members to jointly produce radical and incremental innovations (Cress & Martin,
2006). As participating firms allocate and share adequate resources, the endeavor will
more likely succeed (Samaddar & Kadiyala, 2006).
Social capital economically incentivizes companies that value it to allocate more
knowledge to the dyadic pool and to behave honestly by refraining from opportunism (Ba
et al., 2003). The mere valuation of social capital elements such as mutual trust and
respect reflects on the effective sharing of ideas and exchanges of knowledge, boosting
both radical and incremental innovation capabilities (Figure II-1):
H5a: Social capital valuation positively affects a supply chain’s incremental
innovative capability
H5b: Social capital valuation positively affects a supply chain’s radical
innovative capability

4. METHODOLOGY
4.1 Method Overview
To test the hypotheses above we used a self-administered web-based survey for
being a more efficient and cost effective method (Braunscheidel & Suresh, 2009). The
survey targeted a population of purchasing managers in Canada. The purchasing manager
role necessitates extensive dealing with suppliers and hence fair knowledge about
supplier innovation relations, making the position a conventional choice for target
respondents in similar studies (Braunscheidel & Suresh, 2009; Choi & Hartley, 1996;
Johnston, McCutcheon, Stuart, & Kerwood, 2004). Respondents were all contacted by
email, with a brief introduction and link to the formal invitation/consent letter that
proceeds to the survey (invitation letter is given in Appendix II-A).
We used two sources of motivation for managers to increase participation. First,
we informed them that the study is funded and supported by Social Sciences and
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Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). Secondly, they were promised a copy of the
results upon study completion (see invitation/ information letter in Appendix II-A).
Mentioning the funding by a federal research agency, along with associating the research
to a credible academic institution provided legitimacy to the research and diverted fears
of potential harm from the survey website, in the way of computer viruses (Braunscheidel
& Suresh, 2009).

4.2 Survey Design and Measurements
The survey was designed to start with simple and straightforward questions that
introduce the topic (R&D, competition, industry … etc.). Questions perceived as more
difficult followed in a logical order (independent variables, dependent variables,
moderator), in line with survey design recommendations (N. K. Malhotra, 2006). Less
important, more descriptive questions including ones about company age, respondent
tenure, and company size were placed at the end (Leung, 2001; Taylor-Powell &
Marshall, 1996). A short introduction was provided asking respondents to identify one
supplier of their choice as follows:
“To complete this survey, please identify a supplier that you are knowledgeable about
and with whom there has been some recent joint work (or attempt for joint work) on
product or process improvements. This can include, but is not limited to, product
enhancements, new product development, cost reduction techniques such as setup time
reduction, waste minimization or other process improvements.”

All reflective (first order) measurements for this study are borrowed from the
literature (see Table II-1) and have been adapted to the current study’s buyer-supplier
context and dyadic level of analysis. Subramaniam and Youndt (2005) offer measurement
scales for innovative capabilities, organizational capital and human capital. Scales for
innovative capabilities were reworded to ask about the entire dyad. The stems for items
of organizational capital and human capital were adapted to ask about similarity in the
former and complementarity for the latter.
Power exercise items are well anchored in the literature (Handley & Benton Jr,
2012a, 2012b). The legal power options were adjusted to reflect the directionality of legal
power exercise. Relative coercive power, and relative reward power were calculated from
difference scores among parallel items as in Kumar et al. (1995). Similarly, total scores
(such as total social capital valuation, and total R&D) were calculated for parallel items
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to reflect their total value for the buyer-supplier level (i.e., dyadic level), similar to total
interdependence calculation by Kumar and colleagues in the mentioned paper.
Buyer-supplier size difference was used as a proxy for organizational capital gap.
This is based on the fact that larger firms have higher organizational capital compared to
smaller ones. Larger firms enjoy more patent count due to their financial resources and
higher R&D expenditures; while smaller firms patent with a much lower propensity
(Arundel & Kabla, 1998; Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Scherer,
1983). Moreover, larger firms employ more rigid structures and codified rules
(administrative complexities) compared to smaller counterparts (Greiner, 1972; Miller,
1987a, 1987b; Sharma, 1999). Their organizational cultures are also stronger and better
established (Barney, 1986).
Finally, control variables were added to the survey questionnaire as appropriate
(Table II-2). All measurement items for multi-item constructs are given in Appendix II-B.

4.3 Pre-Test and Pilot Study
The survey instrument was run by senior professors of Operations Management
and Marketing to make any suggestions for changes that may enhance clarity,
comprehensibility, and/ or comprehensiveness of answers. A draft questionnaire was pretested with three subject matter experts in purchasing, coming from three distinct
industries (plastic packaging manufacturing, automotive, and display technology) to
maximize the breadth of improvements. These managers were interviewed, asked to take
the survey, and encouraged to suggest any improvements or changes they deem
appropriate.
A number of changes were made to improve the quality of the questionnaire.
These included clarifying the level of inquiry, i.e., whether respondents answer questions
based on a particular project or general relationship; and answer based on the level of the
plant, subsidiary or whole company. Wording was further simplified to avoid unintended
meanings. Finally, one question was rewritten for being perceived as double-barreled.

4.4 Sampling
To maximize sample size, a combined approach was used to collect three subsamples from a population of purchasing managers in Canada. The first one was to
74

CHARACTERIZING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL PROPERTIES

EMAN NASR

contact supply chain consulting companies, motivating their interest about the research,
asking them to share their client list, and promising a copy of study findings upon
completion. A search was done on supply chain consulting companies in Canada, which
were contacted by email accordingly. One company responded with interest, and shared
its list of contacts.
In the second approach, we used LinkedIn’s InMail service to contact subject
matter experts. LinkedIn is evolving as a venue to reach appropriate professional in
supply chain management research (Moori, Pescarmona, & Kimura, 2013; Weinstein,
Jin, & Barrett, 2013). We performed an advanced search for (current) titles of
“Purchasing Managers” located in Canada. Other relevant titles that appeared in the
search results, such as “Senior Buyer” and “Supplier Quality Manager”, were also
contacted. To help eliminate non-response bias, we restricted search results to
respondents not connected to the sender (i.e., not in the sender’s network. In LinkedIn,
this is described as “3rd and everyone else”. What LinkedIn considers to be 1st and 2nd
connections were excluded for being connected directly or indirectly to the sender).
Finally, a snowballing approach was used, contacting our three pilot study
companies, asking them to recommend five contacts deemed appropriate for taking the
survey, and the process was repeated with each of their contacts that showed interest and
took the survey. Both techniques of resorting to personal contacts and combining
multiple approaches for maximizing sample size have been used in high quality survey
research and studies on supply chain management (Cousins & Menguc, 2006; Lovelace,
Shapiro, & Weingart, 2001; Tatikonda & Montoya-Weiss, 2001). We obtained a total of
145 responses. Descriptive statistics are shown in Appendix II-C.

4.5 Usable Sample
List-wise deletion was used to eliminate cases with excessive and non-replaceable
missing data, with the former being defined as: more than two missing items in multiitem questions; and the latter as one or more missing stand-alone question (such as team
size). From the total sample, 22 responses were eliminated for excessive missing data
(more than two blank questions/ items). Responses with a missing stand-alone question
(i.e., one that does not belong to a multi-item construct) were also eliminated for not
being eligible for estimation. This resulted in 105 usable responses, 19 of which have one
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or two missing items of multi-item constructs. Given a maximum of 8 arrows directed
into our endogenous variables (see Figure II-4), our usable sample size exceeds the
“conservative” rule of 10:1 ratio (10 samples for each arrow directed to a dependent
variable), with much more liberal statisticians satisfied with 2:1 ratio, and a mid-position
of 5:1 ratio (Falk & Miller, 1992). PLS has been consistently used for comparable and
much lower sample sizes, as small as 50 (Klein, 2007; Morgan, Kaleka, & Gooner, 2007;
Rosenzweig, 2009; Sawhney, 2013).
To estimate missing items, we performed case mean substitution (across items
and within the individual), as opposed to total mean substitution for being generally more
recommended (Roth, Switzer, & Switzer, 1999). Moreover, to our knowledge, there is no
evidence/ argument that has been made of the former decreasing variability (Tsikriktsis,
2005). It does, however, assume equal means and standard deviations between predictors
and missing variables (Tsikriktsis, 2005). A total of 26 items were estimated using the
mean substitution imputation approach. The missing item count falls well short of the
rule of thumb cutoff of 10%, deeming the estimation appropriate ((26*100/46*105) =
0.54%)9 (Ettlie, Perotti, Joseph, & Cotteleer, 2005; Power & Terziovski; Rosenzweig,
2009).

4.6 Analysis
Three of our constructs, namely power exercise, HC related diversity and
dominant OC are formative combinations of first order reflective constructs, i.e., second
order constructs of type II (reflective first order-formative second order) (Hair, Hult,
Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). Hierarchical component models provide higher levels of
abstraction that help achieve more theoretical parsimony and less model complexity
(Akter, D'Ambra, & Ray, 2011; Edwards, 2001; Vinzi, Chin, Henseler, & Wang, 2010;
Wetzels, Odekerken-Schröder, & van Oppen, 2009). According to our cases of formative
(second order) constructs, PLS-SEM is the recommended analysis method, given that it
completely avoids the identification problem with formative models (Akter et al., 2011;
Chin, 1998a; Gefen, Rigdon, & Straub, 2011; Wetzels et al., 2009). We, therefore,
perform PLS analysis, using SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005).

9

Note that the maximum percentage of missing responses per item is 3.4 %.

76

CHARACTERIZING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL PROPERTIES

EMAN NASR

To test the model, a PLS two-stage approach was adopted. There are three ways
to deal with second order constructs. The first one is the repeated indicator approach
(Ringle, Sarstedt, & Straub, 2012; Wetzels et al., 2009). This is not recommended in our
model because the number of indicators should be similar across all first order constructs
making up the second order one (Hair et al., 2014). In each of ‘HC Related Diversity’ and
‘Dominant OC’ their component first order constructs have different numbers of
indicators (one versus four), which can lead to significant biases (Becker, Klein, &
Wetzels, 2012). The second method is known as the hybrid approach (Wilson &
Henseler, 2007). In this method, indicators of each first order construct are split between
itself and the second order construct. Such an operation is not applicable to our model as
some of our first order constructs have a single indicator (namely team size and
organizational size gap), defying the possibility of splitting.
Lastly, the third method and the one that is used in this study is the two-stage
approach. In stage one the structural model is analyzed and latent variable scores
estimated without the presence of second order constructs. Latent variable scores are
obtained from this analysis and subsequently used as indicators in a second higher-order
structural model analysis (stage two) as shown in Figure II-2 (Becker et al., 2012;
Ciavolino & Nitti, 2009). The first stage PLS path analysis provides latent variables
scores for lower-order latent variables, which can be used in a second stage as manifest
variables for the higher-order latent variables (Wetzels et al., 2009). In other words, a
second-order factor is measured using the scores of its first-order factors (Luo, Li, Zhang,
& Shim, 2010). One limitation of this method is the fact that it does not account for the
whole model when estimating latent variable scores in the first stage.

5. RESULTS
5.1 Stage One
Stage one model constitutes a decomposed version of the main effects
hypothesized in section 3 (i.e. without the presence of second order constructs) as shown
in Figure II-3. The decomposed model is used for factor analysis of first order (reflective)
constructs, and for obtaining latent variable scores that will be used as indicators for
second order constructs in stage two. Items that did not load well on the intended scales
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(less than 0.65 loading) were dropped prior to further analysis, leading to our final outer
model as shown in Table II-3. Researchers have commonly used lower cutoffs for item
loadings (Brah, Wong, & Rao, 2000; Falk & Miller, 1992; Flynn, Huo, & Zhao, 2010; Li,
Liu, Li, & Wu, 2008; Oke, Burke, & Myers, 2007; Park, Hartley, & Wilson, 2001;
Samson & Terziovski, 1999).
Our lowest factor loading was HCC2, with a lower loading of 0.43, which we
kept to avoid having a single item latent variable (Human Capital Complementarity); a
practice that has consistently been recommended against (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988;
Peter, 1981; Shore & Tetrick, 1991; Zaichkowsky, 1985). This can be justified by the
high composite reliability score of the underlying latent variable (0.714), and by the fact
that knowledge complementarity measures are less established in the literature, leading to
lower acceptable loading cutoffs (as low as 0.4), and Cronbach alpha (as low as 0.5)
(Nunnally, 1967). Cronbach alpha for the rest of the constructs met the “practical lower
bound” of 0.6, as indicated in several research papers (Flynn, Schroeder, & Sakakibara,
1994; M. K. Malhotra & Grover, 1998; Narasimhan & Jayaram, 1998; Prater & Ghosh,
2006), including ones using existing measures (Vaidyanathan & Devaraj, 2008).
To consider the reliability and validity of our measurements we used several
approaches that test for indicator reliability, composite reliability, convergent and
discriminant validity. All results well exceeded recommended cutoffs, confirming the
reliability and validity of all our measures (see Table II-8 for a summary).

5.2 Stage Two: Structural Model
The structural model was assessed by a PLS analysis and a subsequent
bootstrapping technique. The former provides path coefficients (Figure II-4 and Table II10), R square values, and communalities from which a global criterion of goodness of fit
(GoF) can be estimated10 (Table II-9). In the latter technique, multiple subsamples from
within the same sample are used to build a distribution for each parameter and derive a
standard estimate, avoiding any distributional assumptions for the data (Sumukadas &
Sawhney, 2004). To ensure the stability of our results, we ran bootstraps using several

10

Although a global Goodness of Fit index has been suggested for PLS, (Tenenhaus et al., 2004), valued at 48.16% in
our model, this has been found to be mainly a diagnostic tool, not a formal testing technique and not very suitable for
model validation (Henseler and Sarstedt, 2013; Wetzels et al., 2009).
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sub-sample sizes (500, 700, 1000), finding estimates to be very stable. We, therefore,
only report results of the 1000 sub-samples. As shown in Figure II-4 and Table II-9, the
model accounts for 36.4% and 35% of the variance in radical and incremental innovation
capabilities, respectively. R square values exceed the recommended cutoff of 0.2511 (Hair
et al., 2014). Lying above 33%, both R square values are considered moderate effect sizes
(Chin, 1998b). The software converged after 10 iterations only (out of the maximum of
300 allowed), signaling a good estimation (Wong, 2013).
Support for our developed hypotheses is assessed by examining path coefficients
from the PLS run and their significance levels obtained from t-values resulting from the
bootstrap as in Figure II-5 (Sawhney, 2013). Because of the novelty of the concepts
developed in this research, we examine two-tailed results of the t-test to consider both
directions of each effect, and we follow the liberal rule describing p values < 0.01 to be
very strongly significant, < 0.05 as strongly significant and < 0.1 as significant (Ahmad
& Schroeder, 2003; Jayaram, Ahire, & Dreyfus, 2010; Lo, Wiengarten, Humphreys,
Yeung, & Cheng, 2013; Srinivasan, 1985).
Results indicate that the relationship between HRD and supply chain radical
innovative capability (H2) is negative and significant at the p<0.05 level. The path
coefficient indicates that a standard deviation increase in HC related diversity is
associated with a 0.188 standard deviation decrease in radical innovation capability,
statistically controlling for the effect of other explanatory variables. Similarly, the
relationship between power exercise and radical innovative capability is confirmed at the
p<0.05 level, showing support for hypothesis H4a. The corresponding path coefficient
indicates that a standard deviation increase in power exercise is associated with a 0.184
standard deviation decrease in radical innovation capability, statistically controlling for
the effect of other explanatory variables. The result for the interaction between power
exercise and HRD demonstrates weaker support for hypothesis H4b at p<0.1.
Hypotheses H5a and H5b are both strongly supported at the p<0.01 and p<0.05
levels, respectively. A standard deviation increase in social capital valuation is associated
with a 0.194 standard deviation increase in radical innovation capability, and a 0.287

11

Much more lenient researchers recommend cutoff of 0.1 (Falk and Miller, 1992).
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standard deviation increase in incremental innovation capability, statistically controlling
for the effect of other explanatory variables.
Nevertheless results for incremental innovative capability are less conclusive.
With the exception of social capital valuation, our hypothesized antecedents of
incremental innovative capability (dominant organizational capital, power exercise and
their interaction) are insignificant, failing to support hypotheses H1, H3a, and H3b. It is
also worth noting that from the path coefficients shown, the effects of HC related
diversity and dominant OC on radical and incremental innovative capability, respectively,
are both negative. This comes counter to our hypotheses as developed in section 3.
Results for hypothesis testing are shown in Table II-10.

6. DISCUSSION
Results regarding social capital valuation confirm our reciprocity theory. When
companies perceive higher profitability from social capital, they not only work on
building and nurturing trust, but also act in the direct and immediate benefit of the
partner. Companies do so by giving away more knowledge, and protecting the partner’s
proprietary knowledge. These actions directly cultivate and preserve social capital in a
supply chain relationship. To the extent to which such in kind actions are duplicated by
both firms in a dyad, both radical and incremental buyer-supplier innovative capabilities
are enhanced.
Similarly, the effect of power exercise on radical innovative capability comes in
line with our expectations. Active influence upon supply chain partners seems to have a
daunting effect on radical idea generation in buyer-supplier teams. Radical innovations
rely on freedom of ideas and flexibility of governance as opposed to rigid structures and
stone-set directions. This implies that supply chain teams working on the development of
radically new products must refrain from resorting to threats (e.g. of withdrawing
business), rewards, and legal right usage. This result can be viewed in line with
“brainstorming” sessions consistently used for radical idea generation, in which ideas are
not evaluated (no threats, rewards or punishments) to encourage the production of as
many new ideas as possible (Leonard & Sensiper, 1998). Royal Dutch/Shell, for example,
developed "innovation labs" with more flexible processes that circumvent the usual rigid
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processes of the company to encourage unconventional idea generation (Hamel & Getz,
2004).
Although we expected the relatedness inherent in supply chain teams to overcome
problems of increasing team diversity (i.e., a positive overall effect of HRD), results fail
to support this claim. We conducted further analysis to test a decomposed model
separating first order constructs of human capital complementarity and team size to
investigate the separate effects (Figure II-6). Results of the two-tailed t-test (Table II-11)
show weak significance of human capital size and lack of significance of human capital
complementarity, with both having negative effect sizes. This comes in line with an
existing view that argues that too diverse teams can be dysfunctional and come up with
less practical output (Taylor & Greve, 2006). According to our results, the negative effect
of diversity on inter-team conflict and lack of coordination, (De-Dreu & Weingart, 2003;
Williams & O'Reilly, 1998), seems to outweigh the exploration potential of members’
knowledge breadth. Moreover, the weak/ lack of significance of first order variables’
main effects imply the significance of HC related diversity as a higher-level abstraction
that has a strongly significant effect on radical innovative capability.
Results of HC related diversity may also be attributed to the quality of data (see
descriptive statistics in Appendix II-C). For example, the discrepancy between means and
medians of both human capital complementarity and total HC suggest the presence of
outliers, which may have affected our results. Data is positively skewed for both
variables with high positive kurtosis, implying that, for example, the range of team sizes
may have been too small to allow for the diversity required. This presents a limitation to
this analysis as PLS may not be as robust for highly skewed distributions (Wetzels et al.,
2009).
The combined effect of power exercise and HC related diversity is shown to be
positive. Larger supply chain teams may be effective, if extra control is put in place.
Increasing size and diversity with little control may lead to chaos and ineffective results.
Accordingly, power exercise may reverse the negative effect of diversity on radical
innovative capability, providing discipline and control for larger sized teams with
members of various backgrounds. Active power exercise can be particularly important to
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help diverse teams that may find higher inertia from their big size and/or from their
differences, achieve radical changes to current products/ processes.
This result comes in line with the Microsoft practice of “directing” the creativity
of people in large teams (Cusumano, 1997). In larger teams, Microsoft would exert some
degree of influence, similar to what can be done among supply chain companies, by
directing specific features for product innovation, putting pressure on projects, and
stabilizing evolving product properties incrementally (Cusumano, 1997). This can be
similarly implemented in large supply chain teams, where for instance buyers have
deeper market/user knowledge, and are therefore better able to dictate to the buyersupplier team what features to focus on developing. This approach becomes more
important in larger teams where ideas may completely diverge and processes go out of
control.
On the other hand, results fail to support the importance of power exercise for
driving incremental innovations. Our prior theorizing for power to provide direction,
lead, and control has proved to be required in extreme cases, such as ones with
excessively diverse or largely sized teams as discussed above. In less troubled
interactions, however, as in the case of incremental innovations, projects may run
smoothly, with no need to interfere with influential strategies.
This can also be attributed to the fact that incremental changes face less inertia for
their less pronounced effects, and possibly for the increasing acknowledgement of the
necessity of improvements. Managers generally resist radical changes that they perceive
as disruptive, time consuming and expensive (Orlikowski, 1993), while they tend to
accept improvements, which require less upsetting for current processes/ products,
without any need to impose forces of power exercise. Organizations may be readily open
for “convergent” changes with no need for imposing influence (Greenwood & Hinings,
1996).
Similar to the lack of effectiveness of power exercise on incremental innovation,
the concept of domination fails too with organizational knowledge. Dominant knowledge
seems to be detrimental to the effectiveness of joint innovation work. With a closer
investigation for the decomposed dominant OC construct (see Figure II-6), the effect of
size gap is negative and strongly significant. This can be attributed to the fact that small
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changes and incremental improvements may not be applicable to firms of differing sizes.
Counter to our expectation that domination by size may provide a more defined direction
for change, size discrepancy leads to diverging structures, objectives and priorities for
changes making successful incremental innovations unattainable. Therefore, the concept
of domination, by exercising power or even by knowledge tends to be detrimental to
incremental innovation.

7. CONCLUSION
This research takes a novel approach to characterize knowledge properties in a
supply chain dyad, by adopting an intellectual capital classification system. We develop a
hierarchical component model that captures properties of human and organizational
knowledge, believed to drive a supply chain’s radical and incremental innovative
capabilities. We also build on the social exchange theory, to define social capital
valuation as determinant of both innovative capabilities through actions of reciprocity.
Finally, our study acknowledges power as a key element of supply chain relationships,
being a relationship primarily based on market transactions (market power), joining
expertise (expert power), and contract settlement (legal power). Upon empirically testing
our hypotheses using a PLS two-stage approach, our results offer several significant
insights that advance our knowledge about the supply chain innovation and help
managers with more effective innovation management strategies.
On one frontier, we conclude that supply chain teams are more effective in
producing radical innovations when less diverse. Both positive and negative effects of
diversity can be spotted in literature, with the former including higher spectrum of ideas,
more breadth of knowledge, and the latter including higher chance for intra-team conflict
and less coordination effectiveness. Our results advocate the latter argument, indicating
that, even in a related supply chain context, bigger and more diverse teams are not able to
produce radically innovative ideas. Further analysis reveals that the effect can be more
attributed to team size rather than complementarity. In other words, reducing team size in
a supply chain joint innovation project minimizes clashes, conflicts and coordination
problems leading to more effective radical innovation outcomes. What supports this
claim even further, is the moderating effect of power exercise, which when present
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enables the operation of more diverse teams by facilitating coordination and providing
rigid discipline.
Counter to our expectations, incremental innovations are not driven by
domination of knowledge or power. The idea of domination, either as a property of
knowledge or through power exercise, seems not to work with innovation teams,
including ones aimed at incremental changes. Even with incremental innovations,
flexibility is still required to make the necessary adaptations, which may still be
surrounded by uncertainties (Cooper & Zmud, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1988; Tyre &
Orlikowski, 1994). This is one reason why some scholars qualify changes as innovations
as soon as they are new to an adopting unit. Supply chain partners’ discrepancy in size
acts as a significant barrier to the development of incremental changes. Firms with
different sizes likely employ maximally different governance structures, documentation
systems, patent strategies and administrative processes, which may stand in the way of a
smooth joint process for building extensions and incremental changes.
Our study further confirms the importance of acknowledging the economic value
of social capital. Companies that highly value social capital are significantly better able to
produce both radical and incremental innovations. We attribute these results to the
reciprocity rule, borrowed from the social exchange theory, which necessitates working
for the immediate benefit of the other, reciprocating good acts, and expecting
reciprocation. Companies that perceive tangible benefits from building and preserving
social capital reciprocate by openly sharing knowledge, protecting the other’s knowledge
and refraining from opportunism, in an effort to build good reputation with the partner
and preserve relational ties.
Finally, the empirical study presented in this chapter suggests a resolution to the
opposing arguments on the effectiveness of power exercise on innovative capabilities of
supply chain firms. Power exercise fails to help innovation in supply chain teams.
Although anecdotal examples of firms, such as Wal-Mart, advocate the positive results of
exercising power in driving partners to invest in innovations, we here argue that
performance would be significantly improved with more flexibility and less influence.

8. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
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This study suffers from several limitations worth noting. Although our proxies are
highly justified, team size and firms’ size gap may not be perfect representations of the
underlying constructs. Total human capital, for instance, includes people’s skills,
qualifications and experience along with their number. Size gap is not an exact
representation of discrepancies in organizational capital, which can be captured more
effectively by differences in patent counts, difference in firm ages (history), and
difference in CMMI level (or other similar certification). Finally, higher factor loadings
(especially for human capital complementarity) would have led to better results.
Archival data can be used in future studies to characterize and operationalize skill
relatedness in supply chain teams, e.g., using secondary data about occupational
classifications and co-existence of skills across industries. The effect of such on supply
chain innovation is worth studying. Furthermore, partners’ decisions on exercising power
and sharing knowledge are also ripe for future research. This includes characterizing a
causal relationship between mediated (exercised) power and non-mediated (unexercised)
power, and possible moderators for the relationships. It also includes characterizing
strategic traits of knowledge that may affect the decision to share. Finally, a study on how
economic benefit of social capital can be calculated would be very useful.
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9. TABLES
Table II-1
Main Constructs and Their Scales’ Sources

Construct
Dominant OC
HC Related Diversity
Power Exercise
Social Capital Valuation
Incremental Innovative
Capability
Radical Innovative Capability

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Sub-constructs
Measure
OC Similarity
(Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005)
OC Gap
Firms’ size gap used as proxy
HC
(Fang, 2011; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005)
Complementarity
Total HC
Joint team Size used as proxy
Reward power
(Handley & Benton Jr, 2012a, 2012b)
Coercive Power
(Handley & Benton Jr, 2012a, 2012b)
Legal Power
(Handley & Benton Jr, 2012a, 2012b)
____
(Cousins, Handfield, Lawson, & Petersen, 2006; Lawson, Tyler, & Cousins,
2008)
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
(Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005)
____
____

(Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005)
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Table II-2
Control Variables and Justification for Inclusion

Control Variable
Support for Affecting Innovation
(Autry & Golicic, 2010; Krause, Handfield, & Tyler, 2007)
Length of Relationship
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990)
Buyer/ Supplier Absorptive Capacity
(Cefis & Marsili, 2006; Katila & Ahuja, 2002)
Firm Size
(Cefis
&
Marsili,
2006; Gumusluoğlu & Ilsev, 2009; Motohashi, 2005)
Firm Age
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Table II-3
Factor Loadings
Construct
HC Comp

Incremental
Innovative
Capability

OC
Similarity
Radical
Innovative
Capability
Relative
Coercive
Power

Legal Power

Relative
Reward
Power
Social
Capital
Valuation

Items

HC Comp

HCC2

0.4297

HCC4

0.9989

Inc. Inn

IIC1

0.6830

IIC3

0.7145

IIC4

0.8091

IIC5

0.7305

Org.
Similarity

OCS1

0.7254

OCS2

0.7865

OCS3

0.8013

Rad. Inn.
Capability

RIC1

0.8961

RIC2

0.8588

RIC3

0.8638

Rel Coe
Pow

RCP1

0.9309

RCP2

0.9006

RCP3

0.7702

Rel Leg
Pow

LP1

0.8107

LP2

0.9676

LP3

0.8410

Rel Rew
Pow

RRP1

0.7167

RRP2

0.8705

RRP3

0.6841

SC
Valuation

TSCV1

0.6636

TSCV2

0.9223

TSCV3

0.9374
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Table II-4
Latent Variables' Composite Reliability and Cronbach Alpha

Latent Variable
HC Comp
Inc. Inn
Org. Similarity
Radical Inn
Rel Coe Pow
Rel Leg Pow
Rel Rew Pow
SC Valuation

Composite
Reliability
0.7140
0.8246
0.8152
0.9058
0.9027
0.9075
0.8036
0.8847

Cronbachs
Alpha
0.5590
0.7189
0.6995
0.8445
0.8452
0.8692
0.6439
0.8079
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Table II-5
Average Variance Extracted Scores

Latent Variable
HC Comp
Inc. Inn
Org. Similarity
Radical Inn
Rel Coe Pow
Rel Leg Pow
Rel Rew Pow
SC Valuation

AVE
0.5913
0.5413
0.5956
0.7622
0.7569
0.7669
0.5798
0.7233
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Table II-6
Discriminant Validity (Diagonal Items are Square Root of AVE)

HC Comp
Inc. Inn
Org. Similarity
Radical Inn
Rel Coe Pow
Rel Leg Pow
Rel Rew Pow
SC Valuation

HC
Comp
0.7690
-0.1959
-0.2371
-0.171
-0.0488
0.0407
0.0464
-0.0042

Inc.
Inn
0
0.7357
0.0768
0.4223
-0.0812
0.1123
-0.1603
0.3335

Org.
Similarity
0
0
0.7718
0.1851
-0.0801
-0.0874
-0.0659
0.0858

Radical
Inn
0
0
0
0.8730
-0.2515
0.0011
-0.2177
0.1257

Rel Coe
Pow
0
0
0
0
0.8700
0.1441
0.0983
0.0039

Rel Leg
Pow
0
0
0
0
0
0.8757
-0.1547
0.1275

Rel Rew
Pow
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.7614
0.0478

SC
Valuation
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.8505
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Table II-7
Discriminant Validity: Cross Loadings

HCC2
HCC4
IIC1
IIC3
IIC4
IIC5
OCS1
OCS2
OCS3
RCP1
RCP2
RCP3
RIC1
RIC2
RIC3
LP1
LP2
LP3
RRP1
RRP2
RRP3
TSCV1
TSCV2
TSCV3

HC Comp
0.4297
0.9989
-0.1367
-0.0862
-0.1280
-0.2080
-0.2014
-0.1938
-0.1750
-0.0915
0.0277
-0.0666
-0.2375
-0.0836
-0.1344
0.0344
0.0215
0.0850
-0.0329
0.0411
0.0986
0.0955
-0.0658
0.0015

Inc. Inn Org. Similarity Rel Coe Pow Radical Inn Rel Leg Pow Rel Rew Pow SC Valuation
0.0414
-0.1100
-0.0482
-0.0088
0.1197
-0.0125
-0.0093
-0.2021
-0.2364
-0.0474
-0.1741
0.0355
0.0480
-0.0038
0.6830
0.1712
-0.0561
0.3328
0.0756
-0.1715
0.2532
0.7145
0.0319
-0.0565
0.1216
0.0615
-0.0897
0.2750
0.8091
0.0404
-0.0751
0.3206
0.0832
-0.0681
0.3739
0.7305
0.0030
-0.0514
0.4247
0.1034
-0.1449
0.1017
0.0219
0.7254
-0.0257
0.0326
0.0580
-0.1263
0.0316
0.0596
0.7865
-0.0166
0.0389
0.1164
-0.1414
-0.0215
0.0724
0.8013
-0.1121
0.2667
-0.2589
0.0446
0.1511
-0.0586
-0.1107
0.9309
-0.2781
0.1326
0.0639
0.0244
-0.1112
-0.0143
0.9006
-0.2105
0.1982
0.1184
0.0172
-0.0309
-0.0873
0.7702
-0.1270
-0.0088
0.0817
-0.0670
0.3818
0.2081
-0.1878
0.8961
-0.0005
-0.1561
0.1335
0.3984
0.0976
-0.2652
0.8588
-0.0061
-0.1315
0.0979
0.3188
0.1884
-0.1982
0.8638
0.0108
-0.2947
0.0985
0.0435
-0.1281
0.1318
-0.0365
0.8107
-0.0699
0.1290
0.1395
-0.0617
0.1368
-0.0071
0.9676
-0.1911
0.1035
0.0475
-0.0881
0.1152
0.0581
0.8410
-0.0596
0.1419
-0.0935
-0.0362
-0.0715
-0.1371
-0.1714
0.7167
-0.0518
-0.1320
-0.1287
0.1520
-0.2343
-0.1002
0.8705
0.0446
-0.1440
0.0616
0.1032
-0.0942
-0.1005
0.6841
0.1161
0.1691
0.2125
-0.0174
0.0549
0.0234
0.1241
0.6636
0.3047
0.0518
0.0241
0.0827
0.1281
0.0317
0.9223
0.3399
0.0295
-0.0042
0.1592
0.1398
0.0113
0.9374
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Table II-8
Reliability and Validity Summary

Indicator
Reliability
Internal
Consistency
Reliability
Convergent
Validity
Discriminant
Validity

12

Reliability
Outer loadings
All above 0.65
(except HCC)
Composite
All above acceptable
Reliability
cutoff 0.7
Cronbach alpha
All above 0.6
cutoff12
Validity
AVE numbers
All above the cutoff
of 0.5 or higher
(Bagozzi and Yi,
1988)
AVE and latent
Fornell and Larcker
variables
(1981) suggest that
correlations
the “square root” of
AVE of each latent
variable should be
greater than the
correlations among
the latent variables
Cross loadings
No major cross
loadings (< 0.2 from
main loading)

Table II-3
Table II-4
Table II-4
Table II-5

Table II-6

Table II-7

With the exception of Human Capital Complementarity as discussed in-text
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Table II-9
R squared, Communalities and GoF

Endogenous Variable
Incremental Inn.
Capability
Radical Inn. Capability
Goodness of Fit

R2
0.3495

Communality
0.5384

0.3639

0.7623
48.1%
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Table II-10
Hypotheses Testing Results

Hypothesis
H1
H2
H3a
H3b
H4a
H4b
H5a
H5b

Path
Dominant Organizational Capital -> Incremental
Innovativeness
Human Capital Related Diversity -> Radical
Innovativeness
Power Exercise -> Incremental Innovativeness
Dominant Organizational Capital * Power
Exercise -> Incremental Innovativeness
Power Exercise -> Radical Inn
HRD * Power Exercise -> Radical Inn
SC Valuation -> Inc. Inn
SC Valuation -> Radical Inn

Path
Coefficient

T
Statistics

2 Tailed p
Value

1 Tailed p
Value

-0.236

1.392

0.1642

0.0821 *

-0.188

2.2458

0.0249 **

0.0125 **

-0.060

0.5711

0.5681

0.2840

-0.243

0.8427

0.3996

0.1998

-0.184
0.175
0.287
0.194

1.963
1.8625
3.6384
2.3635

0.0499 **
0.0628 *
0.0003 ***
0.0183 **

0.0250 **
0.0314 **
0.0001 ***
0.0091 ***

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table II-11
Results for the Decomposed Model

Path
Total HC ->
Radical Inn
HC Comp ->
Radical Inn
Org Similarity ->
Inc. Inn
OC Gap -> Inc. Inn

Path Coefficients

T
Statistics

2 Tailed p
Value

1 Tailed p
Value

-0.102

1.679

0.0935 *

0.0467 **

-0.17

1.308

0.1912

0.0956 *

0.061
-0.239

0.435
2.819

0.6637
0.0049 ***

0.3318
0.0024 ***

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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FIGURES
Figure II-1
Model Summary
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Figure II-2
The Two-Step Approach (Ciavolino & Nitti, 2009)
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Figure II-3
PLS Analysis Stage I
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Figure II-4
Stage II: Path Coefficients
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Figure II-5
Stage II: Bootstrap Results
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Figure II-6
Decomposed Model Bootstrap Results
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APPENDICES
Appendix II-A
Invitation Letter
How can firms in a supply chain partnership increase their innovation capabilities
through managing their knowledge? This is the focus of a research project being conducted at
Wilfrid Laurier University, and we invite you to participate in a survey on this topic. It is hoped
that the results of this study will help you identify the knowledge and power properties necessary
in your supply chain partners to increase innovation. This survey is part of a more comprehensive
study that examines the types of knowledge that supply chain partners should have to jointly
make innovative products and processes. This research is carried out by doctoral student Eman
Nasr at Wilfrid Laurier University, under the supervision of Dr. Kalyani Menon and Dr. Hamid
Noori and is supported by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC).
The survey should take around 15 minutes. It will ask questions regarding your
relationships with a supplier that you are knowledgeable about and with whom there has been
some recent joint work (or attempt for joint work) on product or process improvements.
Questions will ask about knowledge issues related to your company and your supplier’s company
(ex. similarity of knowledge, processes and patents), discrepancy in power that may exist between
the two of the companies, and joint abilities to innovate. You will not be required to identify your
supplier. Response to survey questions will be taken as your consent that your response be used
in this research. If you do not know the answer to an item, please leave this item blank. If you
think you do not have the kind of information asked in this survey, please feel free to pass the
survey along to the appropriate person in your company. If you choose to participate in this study,
you will be sent a certificate of appreciation for contributing to academic research, signed by the
director of PhD and Research-based programs in Wilfrid Laurier University. Upon completion of
the study, you will also be provided a summary of results.
Your responses will be totally anonymous. Upon submitting your responses, you will be
redirected to provide identification information required to customize and send the letter of
appreciation. This identification will be kept completely separate from responses. Responses will
only be used in aggregation (i.e. to compute statistics like average), with a total of around 200 full
responses expected. Moreover, the data will be stored indefinitely on a password-protected
computer. You have the right to decline to participate, withdraw from the study at any time, omit
any question(s)/ procedure(s) you choose without penalty and without loss of benefits to which
you are otherwise entitled. Please also note that the data will be collected using an online survey,
the confidentiality and privacy of data cannot be guaranteed during web transmission. However,
the survey provider is very well secured through Application-level, Network-level, and their
Physical facilities. Because the survey provider is a U.S.-based company, data may be subject to
the Patriot Act.
For any questions about the study, please contact the researcher, Eman Nasr, Wilfrid
Laurier University, at phone: (519) 884-0710 extension 2846, or at nasr7080@mylaurier.ca; or
one of her supervisors: Dr. Kalyani Menon (kmenon@wlu.ca), and, Dr. Hamid Noori
(hnoori@wlu.ca). This research has been approved by the Research Ethics Board at Wilfrid
Laurier University, approval number #3606. If you feel your rights as a participant in research
have been violated during the course of this project, you may contact Dr. Robert Basso, Chair,
University Research Ethics Board, Wilfrid Laurier University, (519) 884-1970 extension 5225, or
rbasso@wlu.ca. For your records, please print a copy of the information provided herein.
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Appendix II-B
Measurement Items
Human Capital Complementarity:
Please indicate the extent to which employees of the two companies (yours and your supplier's)
have complementary expertise and skills by expressing your agreement with the following
statements. Complementary skills are different, supplement one another, do not overlap, and coexist in producing multiple products (1=Strongly Disagree, 3= Neither Agree Nor Disagree,
5=Strongly Agree)
 Employees of the two companies have complementary types of skills.


Employees of the two companies are bright and creative in the same areas.



Our employees have expertise in jobs and functions that complement those of supplier's
employees.



Employees of the two companies can develop new ideas and knowledge in exactly the same
areas.

Organizational Capital Similarity
How do you compare your firm with the supplier on the following items? (1=Extremely different,
2=Moderately different, 3=slightly different, 4=slightly similar, 5= Moderately similar,
6=Extremely Similar)
 Organizational culture.


Managerial structure and decision making process.



Fields where we patent and license.



Documentation style in manuals and databases.

Total Social Capital Valuation
Company Social Capital Valuation
My company perceives higher profitability when: (1=Strongly Disagree, 3= Neither Agree Nor
Disagree, 5=Strongly Agree)
 The relationship with the supplier is characterized by close, personal interaction.


The relationship with the supplier is characterized by mutual respect.



The relationship with the supplier is characterized by mutual trust.

Supplier Social Capital Valuation
The supplier perceives higher profitability when: (1=Strongly Disagree, 3= Neither Agree Nor
Disagree, 5=Strongly Agree)
 The relationship with our company is characterized by close, personal interaction.


The relationship with our company is characterized by mutual respect.



The relationship with our company is characterized by mutual trust.

Incremental Innovative Capability
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The following items address small changes and refinements from joint projects with your supplier
(incremental innovations). How would you rate your joint ability with the supplier to produce the
following? (1=Very Low, 5=Very High)
 Improvements to prevailing product/ service lines.


Small improvements on the current processes.



Extensions to your existing expertise in prevailing products/services.



Changes that enrich the way you currently compete.



Extensions to technologies in scope or type of usage.

Radical Innovative Capability
The following items address highly pronounced changes from joint projects with your supplier
(radical innovations). How would you rate your joint ability with the supplier to produce the
following? (1=Very Low, 5=Very High)
 Significant changes that make your prevailing product/service lines obsolete.


Innovations that fundamentally change your prevailing products/services.



Innovations that make your existing expertise in prevailing products/services obsolete.

Supplier Reward and Coercive Power
Supplier Reward Power
How far would the supplier do the following to encourage your company to implement ideas
suggested? (0=N/A, 1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree)
 Supplier offers incentives to our firm when we are reluctant to cooperate with a new
program.


Supplier will favor us on other occasions if we go along with their requests.



Supplier offers us rewards so we will go along with their wishes.

Supplier Coercive Power
 If we do not do as they ask, we will not receive very good treatment from the supplier.


If we do not agree with the supplier's suggestions, they could make things difficult for us.



The supplier makes it clear that failing to comply with their requests will result in
penalties against us.

Company Reward and Coercive Power
Company Reward Power
How far would your company do the following to encourage the supplier to implement ideas
suggested? (0=N/A, 1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree)
 Our company offers incentives to the supplier when they are initially reluctant to
cooperate with a new program.


Our company will favor the supplier on other occasions if they go along with our
requests.
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Our company offers the supplier rewards so they go along with our wishes.

Company Coercive Power
 If the supplier does not do as we ask, they will not receive very good treatment from us.


If the supplier does not agree with our suggestions, we can make things difficult for them.



Our company makes it clear that failing to comply with our requests will result in
penalties against the supplier.

Legal Power
Please indicate to what extent you or your supplier refer to legal agreements by answering the
following: (-2=Done much more by supplier; -1= Done slightly more by supplier; 0= Not done by
any of us, Done by us and supplier equally; 1=Done slightly more by our firm; 2=Done much
more by our firm)
 Referring to the terms of our contract to gain compliance on particular requests.


Making a point to refer to our legal agreement when attempting to influence the other.



Using sections of our formal agreement as a “tool” to get one to agree to the other's
demands.
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Appendix II-C: Descriptive Statistics
Count
Mean
Mean LCL
Mean UCL
Variance
Standard Deviation
Mean Standard Error
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Sum
Sum Standard Error
Total Sum Squares
Adjusted Sum Squares
Geometric Mean
Harmonic Mean
Mode
Count
Mean
Mean LCL
Mean UCL
Variance
Standard Deviation
Mean Standard Error
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Sum
Sum Standard Error
Total Sum Squares
Adjusted Sum Squares
Geometric Mean
Harmonic Mean
Mode
Count
Mean
Mean LCL
Mean UCL
Variance
Standard Deviation
Mean Standard Error
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Sum
Sum Standard Error
Total Sum Squares
Adjusted Sum Squares
Geometric Mean
Harmonic Mean
Mode

Variable #1 (Respondent Tenure)
105 Skewness
2.58095 Skewness Standard Error
2.30444 Kurtosis
2.85747 Kurtosis Standard Error
1.4381 Alternative Skewness (Fisher's)
1.19921 Alternative Kurtosis (Fisher's)
0.11703 Coefficient of Variation
1. Mean Deviation
4. Second Moment
3. Third Moment
271. Fourth Moment
12.28821 Median
849. Median Error
149.5619 Percentile 25% (Q1)
2.25658 Percentile 75% (Q2)
1.92661 IQR
4. MAD
Variable #2 (Company Size)
105 Skewness
4.5619 Skewness Standard Error
4.35735 Kurtosis
4.76646 Kurtosis Standard Error
0.787 Alternative Skewness (Fisher's)
0.88713 Alternative Kurtosis (Fisher's)
0.08657 Coefficient of Variation
1. Mean Deviation
5. Second Moment
4. Third Moment
479. Fourth Moment
9.09036 Median
2,267. Median Error
81.84762 Percentile 25% (Q1)
4.43175 Percentile 75% (Q2)
4.21969 IQR
5. MAD
Variable #3 (Company Age)
105 Skewness
4.15238 Skewness Standard Error
3.87587 Kurtosis
4.42889 Kurtosis Standard Error
1.4381 Alternative Skewness (Fisher's)
1.19921 Alternative Kurtosis (Fisher's)
0.11703 Coefficient of Variation
1. Mean Deviation
5. Second Moment
4. Third Moment
436. Fourth Moment
12.28821 Median
1,960. Median Error
149.5619 Percentile 25% (Q1)
3.90987 Percentile 75% (Q2)
3.56335 IQR
5. MAD

-0.09105
0.23347
1.48304
0.45392
-0.09238
-1.53236
0.46464
1.08662
1.4244
-0.15479
3.00895
3.
0.01431
1.
4.
3.
1.
-2.0979
0.23347
6.61781
0.45392
-2.12843
3.85558
0.19446
0.65923
0.7795
-1.44381
4.02112
5.
0.01059
5.
5.
0.E+0
0.E+0
-1.06859
0.23347
2.79469
0.45392
-1.08414
-0.15604
0.2888
1.03329
1.4244
-1.8166
5.67018
5.
0.01431
3.
5.
2.
0.E+0
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Appendix II-C (continued): Descriptive Statistics: Industry Distribution13
Industry Code Industry Name
What it includes
Number of Points Percentage
Construction contractors
CON
Construction
(238), industrial building
5
4.76%
construction (236210)
Computer and electronic
Electrical and
product manufacturing
EEM
Electronics
(334), Electrical equipment,
13
12.38%
Manufacturing
appliance and component
manufacturing (335)
Food
Manufacturing

Food (311), consumer
packaged goods (one point)

8

7.62%

HM

Healthcare
Manufacturing

Pharmaceutical and
medicine manufacturing
(325410), medical
equipment manufacturing
(339)

12

11.43%

IE

Information and
Entertainment

Telecom (517), Gaming,
tourism, restaurants

7

6.67%

11

10.48%

10

9.52%

15

14.29%

FM

MMM

Metal
Manufacturing

OGM

Oil and Gas
Manufacturing

OTH

Other

TM

Transportation
Manufacturing

Transportation
manufacturing (336)

11

10.48%

Wood and
Plastics

Plastic product
manufacturing (3261),
wood product
manufacturing (321), textile
manufacturing (313), paper
manufacturing (322)

13

12.38%

WP

13

Metal recycling, machinery
manufacturing (333),
primary metal
manufacturing (331),
fabricated metal
manufacturing (332)
Mining, quarrying, and oil
and gas extraction (21),
Power generation (221111)
Financial services, airline,
maintenance, plumbing,
aquaculture, transportation
& warehousing,
(professional, scientific and
technical services (541),
Shoe repair and retail,
wholesale

NAICS codes shown to the best of their availability
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CHAPTER III. Strategizing Niceness in Co-opetition: The
Case of Knowledge Exchange in Supply Chain Innovation
Projects
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we take a novel approach to address the dilemma of innovation
sharing versus protection among supply chain partners. The paper conducts an
exploratory study that introduces factors affecting a firm’s optimum supply chain
innovation strategy. We go beyond the conventional Prisoners’ Dilemma, with its
limiting assumptions of players’ preferences and symmetry, to explore a larger pool of
2X2 games that may effectively model the problem. After classifying firm types
according to collaboration motive and relative power, we use simulation to explore the
effects of firm type, opponent type, and payoff structure on repeated innovation
interactions (or, equivalently, long-term relations) and optimality of ‘niceness’.
Surprisingly, we find that opponent type is essentially irrelevant in long-term innovation
interactions, and focal firm type is only conditionally relevant. The paper contributes
further by introducing reciprocation of strategy type (nice versus mean), showing that
reciprocation is recommended, while identifying and explaining the exceptions to this
conclusion.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Inter-firm knowledge sharing14 is now an integral part of organizational strategy.
Firms pursue opportunities to increase their stock of corporate knowledge (Samaddar &
Kadiyala, 2006) while sharing the costs and risks of knowledge creation (Tether, 2002).
Nevertheless, the threat that unintended knowledge spillovers will diminish competitive
advantage still persists (Ding & Huang, 2010). In particular, when “fine-grained tacit
knowledge” is to be shared, the increasing preference for informal, as opposed to legal,
safeguards elevates this risk (Lee & Johnson, 2010; Nair, Narasimhan, & Bendoly, 2011).
We take the case of supply chain knowledge sharing between the participative members
as a particular case to further discuss this dilemma.
As supply chain knowledge exchanges have become increasingly indispensible
(Eng, Chew, & Lee, 2014), a firm’s decision to share part of its internal knowledge with
other members of the chain may be encouraged, but nonetheless partners must be trusted
not to leak the shared knowledge to the competition. Thus, the risk of horizontal leakage
of knowledge (to competition) is inherent in vertical sharing (with supply chain partners).
In this context, the unintended knowledge spillover problem becomes each firm’s
deliberate choice whether or not to leak its partner’s knowledge to that partner’s
competition (e.g., a shared supplier may pass a manufacturer’s development plans to
competing manufacturers). Because the outcome depends on the decisions of all parties,
this multi-decision-maker problem can be effectively modeled as a game (Nagarajan &
Sošić, 2008). We, therefore, adopt a game-theoretic perspective in an exploratory study
of supply chain knowledge exchanges, to address whether a firm should:
(1) readily share its knowledge with a partner; and/or
(2) use partner’s knowledge in other linkages.
For the most part, the literature on knowledge sharing has dichotomized this
challenge as the choice to be a “good partner” or not (Hamel, 1991), or, more pointedly,
as the choice to cooperate or defect (Nair, Narasimhan, & Choi, 2009). This knowledgesharing dilemma is also known as the “boundary paradox” (Quintas, Lefrere, & Jones,
1997).

14

Knowledge sharing and knowledge exchange are used interchangeably.
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We focus on a knowledge-sharing problem involving two firms (or players) in a
supply chain. In our model, the firms have shared knowledge (e.g., innovation projects
such as new product development), and each has the option of sharing it without the
partner’s consent or keeping it within the partnership. Because each player must choose
one of two alternatives, the relationship between the two players can be modeled as a 2×2
game, in which each player chooses (simultaneously) whether to cooperate or defect. The
best known of these games is Prisoners’ Dilemma, but there are many others in which the
players’ values are different (Kilgour & Fraser, 1988; Rapoport & Guyer, 1978;
Robinson & Goforth, 2005). In our view, the assumption of symmetric player
motivations inherent in the Prisoners’ Dilemma payoff structure limits the applicability of
the model, and does not facilitate an understanding of the relationship of partners’
preferences and actions.
Our aim in this paper is to highlight a broader class of symmetric and asymmetric
2×2 games that can model the knowledge-sharing dilemma among supply chain partners,
in the context of joint innovation projects. Firms strive to involve supply chain partners in
innovation activities in multiple ways including strategic commitment to price (Gilbert &
Cvsa, 2003), subsidies provision (Kim, 2000), or direct exchanges of knowledge. We
here focus on the latter to study decisions regarding incoming and outgoing knowledge
flows, shedding light on how the different types of players (firms) interact by relaxing
several of the assumptions of Prisoners’ Dilemma. For this purpose, we consider the six
player types suggested by Perlo-Freeman (2006: 5). Cooperate-Defect (CD) Games are
2×2 games in which
“… for each player X, there exists a strategy of the other player, which we call ‘Cooperate’, such that for each strategy for player X, he prefers the other player to choose
Co-operate. We call the other strategy for each player ‘Defect’.”

In other words, whatever X chooses, he/she prefers that partner Cooperate.
Restricting attention to CD games enables us to classify firms along two dimensions:
(1) Collaboration motive: What is the firm’s most preferred outcome?
(2) Relative power: Which outcome does the firm prefer to avoid the most?
The answers to these questions determine the player type. For example, a prisoner
is a firm that prefers to defect (while partner cooperates, of course) and least prefers to
cooperate (while partner defects). Thus we think of a prisoner as an aggressively
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exploitative firm that most prefers to defect and least prefers to be suckered. The
interaction of two prisoners is a Prisoners’ Dilemma. The other five types are fully
opportunistic, fearfully exploitative, fair, good and moral.
We see CD games as particularly relevant to the supply chain knowledge-sharing
dilemma in the short term, as each firm always prefers that its partner cooperate
(maintain secrecy) rather than defect (expose secrets). We build on Perlo-Freeman’s
definitions to characterize firms of different types and study their behaviors in one-time
joint innovation projects.
To address long-term relationships, we investigate the effect of repetition of the
game on firms’ choices and outcomes using MATLAB simulation. We adopt Axelrod’s
(1984) classification of long-term strategies as ‘nice’ or ‘mean’ according to their
approach to supply chain relations, trustful or distrustful. A ‘nice’ firm never defects,
except when provoked (defected against), whereas a ‘mean’ firm may defect without
provocation. In particular, we are interested in conditions when sequences of cooperation
might occur, and when they are vulnerable to unprovoked defection.
The issue of provoked versus unprovoked defection carries a particular relevance
to the supply chain, where communicating a policy of defection only when provoked
would seem to signal fairness and trustworthiness, while the threat of unprovoked
defection signals untrustworthiness. Managers tend to consider inter-firm relationships as
polar opposites, either entirely cooperative or entirely competitive (Klein, Rai, & Straub,
2007). In this study, we explore the conditions under which being trustful (nice) versus
distrustful (mean) is advisable (see Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer (1998) for a
review of inter-firm trust).
This paper provides a relevant and timely expansion of the horizon of supply
chain innovation games beyond Prisoners’ Dilemma. We introduce a pool of possible
knowledge interactions by firms showing how they could be strategized in a supply
chain. We also build on Axelrod’s (1984) findings on direct reciprocation (the famous
TIT FOR TAT strategy) by introducing reciprocation of strategy type. One interesting
finding is that the superiority of TIT FOR TAT is not universal, but depends on the
relative gain from changing the opponent’s action versus the cost of changing one’s own.
We identify seven payoff categories that help us explore the effect of different
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motivations – gaining the greatest reward versus avoiding the worst punishment in
exchange of knowledge between two firms in a supply chain.

2. BACKGROUND/ LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 The Joint Innovation Dilemma
The joint innovation process (e.g., in supply chain) is a collaborative relationship
in which organizations collectively implement a knowledge creation endeavor, sharing
the expenses and the benefits of the newly created knowledge according to a mutually
agreed rule (Samaddar & Kadiyala, 2006). In this process, participating firms contribute
useful knowledge to this pool, building up a “knowledge repository” retrievable by all
members (Cress & Martin, 2006). For the endeavor to succeed, participating firms must
allocate and share adequate resources (Samaddar & Kadiyala, 2006).
The conventional wisdom regarding collaborative knowledge creation generally
directs firms to be “good partners” by being open and contributing knowledge to the
shared pool. Hamel (1991) was the first to question this advice, suggesting that inter-firm
collaboration can develop into a “race to learn”, in which a firm intends to “acquire” its
partner’s skills as opposed to merely accessing them. The idea was that “good partners”
with high transparency and collaborative intent tend to be exploited by opportunistic
partners with lower transparency and competitive intent (Hamel, 1991). Larsson,
Bengtsson, Henriksson, and Sparks (1998) build on this analysis, using a game-theoretic
perspective, by developing a collective learning framework that explains both negative
and positive learning processes. The authors highlight the distributive dimension and its
effect on the appropriation of joint learning by individual organizations.
Consequently, there is a trade-off between the integrative and distributive
dimensions of collaborative knowledge creation (Larsson et al., 1998). Quintas et al.
(1997) referred to this problem as “the boundary paradox”; where borders must be open
for knowledge to flow, but core strategic knowledge, upon which survival depends, must
be preserved. On similar grounds, Das and Teng (1998) define relational risk in terms of
the probability that a partner does not cooperate, instead acting opportunistically and
misusing the acquired knowledge.
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Given the existence of both collaborative and competitive dimensions, joint
innovation projects have often evolved into “mixed-motive” relations (Parkhe, 1993). In
some cases, abundance of access to a firm’s knowledge has created new competitors
(Arruñada & Vázquez, 2006). In others, leakage effects allowed the imitators to profit
more from innovations than the original commercializers (Teece, 1986). Once a firm
shares valuable and strategic knowledge externally, its ability to control access to this
knowledge is severely compromised (Anand & Goyal, 2009). There is an obvious
imperative to manage organizational knowledge strategically in order to optimize its
flow.
The literature suggests few ways to deal with the tension between sharing and
protecting knowledge. Trust is one of the most significant ways of reducing partners’
opportunistic behavior (Das & Teng, 1998; Norman, 2004; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone,
1998). Empirically, it has been shown that when firms build relational capital in
conjunction with an integrative approach to managing conflict, they are able to
simultaneously learn and protect (Kale & Singh, 2000). Other protection mechanisms
include: (1) making company personnel aware of the need to protect certain knowledge
and identifying the knowledge that needs protecting; (2) walling off critical knowledge
from the joint project; and, (3) using contractual mechanisms that specifically identify
proprietary data, as opposed to information that can be shared (Norman, 2001).

2.2 Prisoners’ Dilemma: Knowledge Exchange, Co-opetition and Social
Dilemmas
The simultaneous motivation to cooperate and compete with the same business
partner has been labeled as “co-opetition” (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995, 1996).
Even though the literature has mostly, if not exclusively, referred to horizontal coopetition (with direct competitors), we here acknowledge the presence of competitive
forces with supply chain partners, who typically work also with competitors, and may
leak strategic knowledge. Heide and Miner (1992) see buyer-supplier interactions as
competitive and best represented by Prisoners’ Dilemma, but they take an operational
perspective (they define competition in terms of pricing decisions, inventory costs, and
delivery terms) as opposed to the knowledge-based perspective we adopt here. The
opportunity to create rents through simultaneous competition and cooperation has been
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conceptually examined using a game-theoretic lens (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995;
Heide & Miner, 1992; Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997; Parkhe, 1993).
More specifically, co-opetitive knowledge sharing interactions have been seen as
instances of social dilemmas (Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002; Quigley, Tesluk, Locke, &
Bartol, 2007). “Social dilemmas are situations in which each member of a group has a
clear and unambiguous incentive to make a choice that -- when made by all members -provides poorer outcomes for all than they would have received if none had made the
choice” (Dawes & Messick, 2000). In such collaborative interactions, a better-for-all
outcome may not be fully attainable because of individual temptations to pursue “selfish”
goals while free riding on others’ contributions (Y. Wu, Loch, & Ahmad, 2011). The
dilemma, therefore, represents a tension between individual and collective rationality,
where individual rationality leads to collective irrationality (Kollock, 1998; Wang,
Gwebu, Shanker, & Troutt, 2009). Unfortunately, the solution to games involving social
dilemmas includes at least one deficient equilibrium, i.e., there is always another outcome
that is better for everyone (Kollock, 1998).
Prisoners’ dilemma is the two-person social dilemma that has received the most
attention in the context of knowledge sharing (Kollock, 1998). “The essence of the
dilemma is that each individual actor has an incentive to act according to competitive,
narrow self-interest even though all actors are collectively better off (i.e., receive higher
rewards) if they cooperate” (Cable & Shane, 1997). Prisoners’ Dilemma neatly illustrates
the rationale of innovation-related co-opetition from a game-theoretic perspective (Ritala
& Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). In most, if not all, co-opetitive situations, it is
advantageous for each partner to “defect” and pursue individual interests at the expense
of others (Hennart, 1991; Kogut, 1989). Firms may defect by withholding knowledge, not
fulfilling promises, stealing a partner’s proprietary technology, or hiring the partner’s key
personnel (Parkhe, 1993). The complexity of the problem is exacerbated by the further
difficulty to observe defections, i.e., partner deciding to withhold rather than share
knowledge (Gächter, von Krogh, & Haefliger, 2010).

2.3 Repeated/ Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma
Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma represents multiple firm interactions on joint
innovation projects. The main significance of the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma is the fact
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that repeated interaction exposes one’s strategy, which may overcome the dominance of
defection, producing mutual cooperation. Players are mindful of the fact that observed
actions will be reciprocated and are therefore motivated to signal cooperative behavior
(Z. Wu, Choi, & Rungtusanatham, 2010). In an iterated prisoners’ dilemma, decisions in
one round affect decisions (and outcomes) of subsequent rounds, altering the utility of
each cooperation/ defection decision (Rokkan, Heide, & Wathne, 2003). The most
influential work on the iterated prisoners’ dilemma is Axelrod’s The Evolution of
Cooperation (1984). In this work, Axelrod reports on two tournaments, in which subject
matter experts were invited to submit strategies for an iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma
tournament. The winning strategy, TIT-FOR-TAT, carries the main message of his work:
It is beneficial to be seen to reciprocate the actions of the partner, be they cooperation or
defection.
Furthermore, Axelrod delivers three more suggestions on how to do well in an
iterated prisoners’ dilemma, namely: (1) Realize that the aim is not to destroy the
opponent, and therefore refrain from comparing payoffs or being envious, (2) Be mindful
of opponent’s adaptation by refraining from overly complex strategies that cannot be
distinguished from randomness, and finally, (3) Be “nice.” Axelrod made the striking
claim that the single best predictor of the performance of a strategy is its “niceness”, i.e.,
whether it could ever defect first. This result will be challenged and further investigated
in this chapter.
Although Axelrod’s work was “far and away the most influential study of
strategic solutions to social dilemmas” (Kollock, 1998), it did receive a number of
criticisms. The reciprocal altruism represented by TIT-FOR-TAT was found to perform
very badly in noisy environments and to be extremely vulnerable to disturbances
(Molander, 1985). Even though Axelrod never claimed TIT-FOR-TAT to be a
universally superior strategy regardless of opponent or conditions, critics still argued that
other strategies, including those that allow for mutations, forgiveness, and different kinds
of reciprocity, frequently work better (Brams & Kilgour, 2012; Molander, 1985; Nowak,
2006; Sigmund, 2010). Below we confirm that TIT-FOR-TAT performs well, but not
necessarily best, in an iterated context. As will be shown later, our simulation results
confirm that other strategies score higher on average.
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2.4 A Gap in the Literature: Beyond Prisoners’ Dilemma
Very few studies have gone beyond Prisoners’ Dilemma to acknowledge the
representativeness of other 2X2 games (e.g., Chicken and Stag Hunt games) to the
knowledge-sharing dilemma. Scholars have sometimes recognized the potential of these
other games but there has been little further analysis (Parkhe, 1993; Ritala &
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). Kollock (1998), for instance, states that the three games
of: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken and Assurance (Stag Hunt) are the key two-person
social dilemma games, and even argues that the latter is a more accurate model of some
social dilemmas. The dynamics of these games have been less explored; here we take a
step toward filling this void by applying them in the context of joint innovation practices
in supply chains.
The most notable work on a wider pool of relevant games that apply to the
context of collective action (including knowledge-sharing relations) is a working paper
by Perlo-Freeman (2006) on what he calls the ‘Co-operate-Defect’ games, as defined in
the introduction. In such games, a player always prefers that the opponent Cooperate
rather than Defect.
The attractiveness of the aforementioned games lies in their relevance to several
contexts including supply chain joint innovations, in which firms always prefer their
partner to ‘cooperate’. Perlo-Freeman finds that players in ‘cooperate-defect’ games can
be classified into six types based on their preference orderings: prisoner, chicken,
deterrer, appeaser, warrior and pacifist. The author further argues that there is no
particular reason to assume that players in a game face identical priorities and constraints
(i.e., players are not necessarily the same type), so asymmetric games are equally worthy
of attention. In our study, we follow Perlo-Freeman’s recommendations and consider the
whole pool of ‘cooperate-defect’ games (symmetric and asymmetric) when two firms in a
supply chain opt to practice joint innovation.

3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
3.1 Player Types Framework
Our notation for a cooperate-defect game is shown in Table III-1. The focal player
(focal firm for which optimum decisions are studied) is the row chooser. The focal player
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decides whether to cooperate or defect. In the context of joint supply chain innovation,
cooperation may be viewed as sharing knowledge readily with the project partner and
protecting partner’s knowledge from reaching its competitors, while defecting is the
opposite. The focal player’s utilities (payoffs) are as follows:
R: reward (payoff from mutual cooperation)
S: sucker’s payoff (from unilateral cooperation)
T: temptation (payoff from unilateral defection)
P: punishment (from mutual defection)
The focal player’s opponent is the column chooser. Each player must choose
either to cooperate (C) or defect (D). Payoffs must satisfy two conditions (1) S < R, and,
(2) P < T; i.e., focal player prefers opponent cooperation regardless of focal player’s
choice. This gives rise to six preference orderings, introduced by Perlo-Freeman (2006):
1. Prisoner: T > R > P > S
2. Chicken: T > R > S > P
3. Appeaser: R > T > P > S
4. Deterrer: R > T > S > P
5. Warrior: T > P > R > S
6. Pacifist: R > S > T > P
We think of Perlo-Freeman’s six preference orderings as defining six player types
with the descriptive names given above. In the context of joint supply chain, they can be
classified along the two dimensions of collaboration motive and power. The first
dimension, collaboration motive, refers to the preferred outcome from the interaction
with a supply chain partner. Three motives are identified:
(1) Race to learn: (T > R > S & P) (orderings 1 and 2), where the focal player’s
main goal is to induce the opponent to cooperate, yielding either the temptation payoff,
which it prefers, or the mutual reward. Such firms are exploitative in the short term. That
is, if they do not perceive/ plan for future projects with the partner, they tend to defect in
a current knowledge exchange.
(2) Mutual cooperation: (R > T > S & P) (orderings 3 and 4), where the focal
player’s main goal is truly looking for a two-way cooperation, and if not that then the
temptation payoff. Such firms are cooperative in the short term. That is, if they do not
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perceive/ plan for future projects with the partner, they tend to cooperate in a current
knowledge exchange.
(3) Extreme motives: (either P > R or S > T) (orderings 5 and 6), where one of the
less preferred outcomes, with payoff S or P, is second in the preference ordering. Such a
firm’s behavior is determined, even in the long term, regardless of the opponent’s
choices. That is, the motivation (to cooperate in case of S > T, or to defect in case S > T)
is strong enough to dictate the same decision in both short-term and long-term knowledge
exchanges.
The second dimension relates to a firm’s relative power between the two supply
chain partners. Power is a key concept that introduces new motivations to a game (Wolf
& Shubik, 1974). It can be defined in terms of several aspects including, the ability to
reward or punish an opponent, the cost of exercising rewards or punishments (Wolf &
Shubik, 1974), or in terms of opponent replaceability (Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp,
1995, 1998). We adopt the latter definition, which is most appropriate to supply chains,
where power can be seen as inversely proportional to switching cost (ease and cost of
replacing a partner) (Kumar et al., 1998). This is indicated by what a firm would mostly
avoid from an interaction, which by assumption must be S or P. If a firm’s least possible
utility is P, it cannot afford to lose a deal and would rather be suckered, it signals low
power, or a high need for its partner. On the other hand, if a firm’s least possible utility is
S, it would rather lose the deal than be suckered, signaling higher power and less need for
its partner. A framework for firm types is shown in Figure III-1.
It is worth emphasizing that the firm types explained above are commonly
encountered in supply chain innovation projects. A prisoner, or an aggressively
exploitative partner, can be viewed as a jointly innovating firm in a race-to-patent. Such
a firm benefits from developing a new product with a partner, but gets even greater return
for exclusive patent privileges, and drives away its partner’s rights (T > R). A twoprisoner interaction (i.e., prisoners’ dilemma) represents a two-way race for patent on a
jointly developed technology or product, where the greatest payoff is for exclusive rights,
followed by shared rights, with total loss of patent rights to partner coming as the worst
outcome. An example is Sears Inc., which was benefiting well (by getting reward R)
from the exclusive right to sell its supplier’s shared product innovation, the “Bionic
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Wrench” of “LoggerHead Tools”. The company, yet, sought higher temptation payoff (T)
from defecting by giving the idea to its offshore tool manufacturer, Craftsman (Collins,
2012).
A chicken, or aggressively exploitative partner, has the same motivations, except
that it has much higher dependence on its opponent, making loss of the deal more
destructive than giving up patent privilege altogether. In the above example, LoggerHead
Tools illustrates a chicken being unable to replace Sears’ large orders and missing
resources to drag out the lawsuit, leading it to tolerate a defecting partner rather than lose
the deal and suffer bankruptcy (Collins, 2012).
Both appeaser and deterrer, equally good and fair partners, enter into a joint
project looking for the expanded pool of knowledge and expanded rewards. The
difference is that the former’s low power means that it nonetheless benefits by
contributing more knowledge to the partnership, even if the opponent misuses it (S > P).
The latter, however, places higher proprietorship value on its knowledge, that it would
rather lose the partnership than find that its knowledge has been leaked away (P > S).
On the other hand, a warrior, or a fully opportunistic partner, is a very powerful
firm that can never be defeated. It wants only deals in which it can suck away partner’s
knowledge. An example is the largest turbine manufacturer in China, Sinovel Wind
Group Co. Ltd., which stopped doing business with one of its suppliers, American
Superconductor Corp. (AMSC) after “stealing” intellectually protected technology
related to wind turbines (Ailworth, 2011). This signals the extreme preference for
temptation, followed by ending the deal (T and P are the greatest payoffs) as opposed to
any cooperative outcome. Finally, a Pacifist, or moral partner, always benefits from
cooperating. This could be a company that prefers losing patent privilege to facing
infringement penalties (S > T). Such a scenario is common when opponents are well
protected legally by intellectual property rights such as the series of lawsuits between
Samsung and Apple Inc. (Carare, 2013; Duhigg & Lohr, 2012).

3.2 One Shot Game
How do the player types above behave in a one-shot interaction (equivalently onetime innovation project or at least one in which there is no intent of a future interaction)?
Nash equilibrium analysis produces Figure III-2. Only 5 games end up with mutual
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cooperation (indicated by the green squares). As expected, a Warrior always defects, and
a Pacifist always cooperates, because of their unconditional preference for defection and
cooperation, respectively. Similarly, a Prisoner will always defect and an Appeaser will
always cooperate in a one-time interaction, as their dominant strategies dictate. As we
will show, however, there is a great difference between dominant and unconditionally
preferred strategies in the repeated game context. In 16 games there is defection at least
from one side, or as part of a mixed strategy. This motivates our subsequent study on the
effect of repeated interaction on the one-shot equilibria.

3.3 Repeated Interactions
In a repeated game, a player can be induced to avoid an otherwise dominant
strategy. For example, Axelrod (1981, 1984) suggested that in repeated Prisoners’
Dilemma players (whom we call prisoners) can be induced to cooperate, despite their
one-shot dominant strategy of defection.
Similar to the logic behind a prisoner’s behavior, a chicken would prefer to signal
cooperative intent in a repeated interaction to induce its partner to cooperate, to avoid the
worst outcome. A deterrer can be easily induced by partner’s actions, as it prefers to
mimic them. Therefore, it is expected that a deterrer will tend to match its partner’s
actions. Although an appeaser has a dominant strategy of cooperation, still finds T > S, so
it may try to take advantage. Finally, as suggested by Perlo-Freeman (2006), the
unconditionally preferred behaviors of warrior and pacifist cannot be overcome, even in a
repeated game. This makes the behavior of the first four types more compelling to test,
with the latter pair representing a null hypothesis.
In the pool of 10 games among the four inducible players, prisoner, chicken,
deterrer, and appeaser, we are particularly interested in whether repetition of the games
would stimulate cooperative behavior, especially as, in 8 of these games, equilibrium
involves defection (Figure III-2). As a first step, we would like to characterize long-term
“cooperative behavior” in testable terms, namely as “niceness”. Nice strategies are
defined by Axelrod (1984) as strategies that never defect first. In a repeated (long-term)
interaction, a firm that is pursuing a “nice” strategy defects only in response to
opponent’s defection. Alternatively, a firm that employs unprovoked defection, even if it
is only occasional, is pursuing a “mean” strategy.
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Under what conditions is niceness advisable in repeated innovation interactions?
The answer may involve several factors, including player type, opponent type, opponent
strategy, payoff structure and length of relationship (number of game iterations). In the
next section, we will test these factors to assess when nice strategies are superior to their
mean counterparts. Simulating the different player types, strategies, and payoff structures
will enable us to reach several managerial recommendations regarding cooperative
behavior in repeated innovation projects.

4. THE SIMULATION STUDY
Simulation is widely recognized as an “effective pragmatic” research
methodology for studying supply chain management issues, especially for problems that
are more complex, require detailed analysis, or involve random elements (Nair et al.,
2009; Swaminathan, Smith, & Sadeh, 1998). Given the infinitely many possibilities for
long-term interaction strategies, as well as the fact that randomness is involved in some
of those strategies, simulation is a reasonable and feasible platform for this study. Our
aim is to determine what behaviors of prisoner, chicken, appeaser, and deterrer maximize
their returns in a repeated-game environment, in games that may or may not be
symmetric (i.e., players of the same type). These four player types seem to be most
realistic, interesting, and relevant to the supply chain context. Extreme motive relations
where firms are completely unadaptable to partner’s actions are far from being common,
especially in long-term relations. In addition, their lack of adaptability makes them less
appealing for long-term analysis.
In particular, we are interested in whether player prospects are affected by
repetition of interaction. We use MATLAB to code the playing of the games, and twenty
strategies chosen to be as representative as possible. The selection of strategies was
informed by a general search on the terms ‘Iterated Prisoners Dilemma’ and ‘Repeated
Prisoners Dilemma’. The criteria for selection included that the strategy has been clearly
explained in the literature, that it can be classified as ‘nice’ or ‘mean’, that it can be
matched with an essentially identical strategy of the other classification, and that if is not
too complex to code. Although whether a behavior is successful in a game depends on the
payoffs, it is yet zero-independent and scale-independent (adding a constant to every
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payoff or multiplying all payoffs by the same positive number should not change the
results). However, it may well depend on the relative gaps between the payoffs, which we
call the payoff structure.
We simulated several payoff structures according to the magnitude of differences
among the focal player’s payoffs: S, P, R and T. The structure is described in terms of the
differences between consecutive payoffs, starting with the lowest. Gaps can be either
‘small’, S, or ‘big’, B, giving rise to seven broad categories of payoff patterns, SSS or
BBB, where differences are equal (we call this one EQUI), SBB, BSB, BBS, BSS, SBS,
and SSB. We carried out several simulations in which the ratio of B to S ranged from 2 to
400. Although in some cases, our results depended on the payoff pattern, the specific
value of the ratio of B to S did not seem to affect our results significantly.
The main game adapts each set of payoffs to each of the four player types:
prisoner, chicken, deterrer and appeaser, according to the player’s preference ordering.
Each player then plays a sequence of games with every player type, using each of the 20
strategies defined in Table III-2. The result is shown in terms of the ranking of the 20
strategies for each player, from best to worst. For each player, three rankings are shown:
(1) rankings of all strategies against the 10 nice opponents only; (2) rankings of strategies
against the 10 mean strategies only; and, (3) ranking of strategies against all 20 opponent
strategies. Modules are subsequently programmed to assess the following:
(1) Which factors, firm type, opponent type, and/or payoff structure, determine
the optimum innovation strategy for firms in long-term interactions?
(2) In what way can determinants from (1) dictate niceness in innovation
strategies?
Results of the above questions are discussed in section 5.

4.1 Exploring Determinants of Optimum Strategy
To assess whether opponent type affects advisability of strategies, we simulated
the 10 games allowing each player type to play 600 iterations with each opponent type.
This simulation was carried out for each of the seven payoff structures. Note that exact
values for each payoff structure were chosen arbitrarily, as is typical in studies on iterated
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prisoner dilemma -- see Axelrod (1984) 15 . Further analysis also proved that within a
payoff structure, differences are insignificant (see sub-section 4.2). Kendall’s τ (Kendall
rank correlation coefficient) was then calculated to make 24 comparisons. Kendall’s τ
was used as it is a non-parametric, easily calculable, and a fair measure of rank
correlation (Kendall, 1938). For example, a prisoner is ranked when playing against the
following: another prisoner (PP ranking), chicken (PC ranking), deterrer (PD ranking)
and appeaser (PA ranking). Six comparisons are performed to compare each pair of the
four prisoner rankings. The same test was performed for the other three players, resulting
in 24 comparisons. For all 24 comparisons, rankings are highly correlated with no
statistically significant differences. We, therefore, conclude that, all other things being
equal, opponent type does not matter in strategy rankings across all player types and all
payoff structures.
The same procedure was repeated across payoff structures to compare how player
types perform using different strategies against the same opponent type. For example, the
four player types were ranked when playing against a prisoner providing: PP ranking, CP
ranking, DP ranking, and AP ranking. Six comparisons are performed to compare each
two of the four prisoner rankings. The same procedure was applied to the other three
players, resulting in 24 comparisons.

4.2 Exploring Determinants of Niceness
This module of the simulation investigates whether nice strategies are superior to
their mean counterparts, and what the conditions for their superiority are. The module
plays three games to capture rankings for each player across the seven categories of
payoff structures (Note that from 4.1 opponent type does not cause any significant
difference in rankings so only three games as opposed to ten were simulated). Two
payoff structures were simulated within each of the categories to determine whether exact
payoff values matter within a category. Rankings are then recorded for each player,
throughout several iterations, 300, 400, 500 and 600, to ensure robustness of findings.
Firstly, a test was carried out to compare rankings of each pair of payoff values within a

15

A similar argument applies to the choice of number of iterations. This is commonly arbitrary in the literature. In the
context of long term innovation endeavors, 600 interactions readily cover what companies consider to be ‘long-term’.
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category of payoffs. Kendall’s τ was used to make the comparison. No difference was
significant (see Table III-A1 in Appendix).
The lack of significant difference between payoff values within a category of
payoffs justifies restricting our analysis to one set of payoffs in each category. Therefore,
the nice versus mean comparison was carried out for one set of payoffs within each
payoff category (and across player types) to test for the superiority of nice strategies over
their mean counterparts, when playing against (1) only nice strategies, (2) only mean
strategies, and (3) a mix of nice and mean strategies. To do so, we performed a Mann–
Whitney–Wilcoxon test (a non-parametric two-sided rank sum test) to compare whether
nice strategies tend to achieve greater payoffs than their mean counterparts.

5. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
There is no evidence that the rankings of a player’s strategies depend on the type
of the opponent. In other words, all else being equal, a prisoner (i.e., an aggressively
exploitative partner), for instance, has essentially the same strategy rankings whether it
plays against another prisoner, a chicken, a deterrer or an appeaser, as long as comparison
is made over the same set of strategies (see Table III-A2 in Appendix). This implies that,
although in a one-shot interaction actions and outcome are sensitive to opponent type
(Figure III-2), in a repeated interaction, advisable actions for a player do not depend on
opponent type.
Secondly, by taking a close look at the comparison results among player types
(see Table III-A3 in Appendix), it is evident that different player types perform
essentially the same in all payoffs except three: SSB, BSS, or BSB. These three payoff
structures share the property of having a (relative) middle S, which means that there is a
relatively small difference between T and R on one side (outcomes from opponent
cooperating), and, S and P on the other (outcomes from opponent defecting). This means
that within these payoff structures a player gains relatively little by ‘training’ the
opponent to be cooperative. In this case, correlations among rankings of different players
(when playing with same opponent) are negative and/or not significant. This implies that,
when there is relatively little value in inducing the opponent to cooperate, each player
type will be advised differently. Otherwise, the high value from inducing cooperation
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unifies advisable strategies across different player preferences. These results suggest that
both player type and payoff structure are determinants for optimum innovation strategy.
Moreover, we notice from test results on player type that negative correlations
and/or lack of significance are consistent along all three middle S payoff structures when
comparison is made between prisoner and appeaser, or between chicken and deterrer.
This result is quite intuitive, given that these are the two maximally different pairs, in
terms of payoff preference (see Figure III-3). On one hand, a prisoner has high power and
a Race to Learn motivation, whereas an appeaser has low power and a Mutual
Cooperation motivation. On another hand, a chicken has low power and a Race to Learn
motivation, while a deterrer has high power and a Mutual Cooperation motivation. It is
not surprising that rankings are maximally different across each of these two pairs. Below
we discuss the results of the module, which investigates whether nice strategies are
superior to mean ones.

5.1 General Results: Reciprocation of Strategy Type
Testing the hypothesis that nice strategies are superior to their mean counterparts
(at the 0.05 level), we made the following general observations:
1. Nice strategies yield a significantly greater expected payoff compared to their
mean counterparts against a nice opponent, regardless of opponent type.
2. Nice strategies do not yield significantly greater expected payoff compared to
their mean counterparts against mean opponents, regardless of opponent type.
3. Nice strategies yield a significantly greater expected payoff compared to their
mean counterparts against a (balanced) combination of nice and mean
strategies, regardless of opponent type.
According to these results, inasmuch as it can be perceived, a player should
reciprocate his/ her opponent’s strategy type as opposed to actions (see Axelrod (1984)
on TIT FOR TAT). Even though this reciprocation result contrasts with the underlying
assumption of several economic models, conventional game-theoretic models in
particular, stating that agents are self-interested, it extends results of action fairness or
fair play. Experiments suggest that cooperative behavior in Sequential Prisoners’
Dilemma reflects what is known as “positive reciprocation” (Clark & Sefton, 2001).
Moreover, in models of “reciprocal altruism”, where cooperation is a best response to
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cooperation, and defection a best response to defection, the one-shot equilibrium involves
matching (Andreoni & Miller, 1993). Our findings extend results from the literature
about reciprocation of partner’s action in both repeated and sequential prisoners’
dilemma (Axelrod, 1984; Clark & Sefton, 2001; Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, & Ross,
1996; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Fehr & Gächter, 1998) by suggesting reciprocation of
strategy type (niceness) as a generalized result not applying solely for prisoners but
extended to the four player types studied herein. In other words, a firm observing a nice
strategy from its innovation partner should also adopt a nice strategy to maximize return.
Table III-3 shows samples of typical results for the general reciprocation rule.

5.2 Exception: Relative Versus Absolute Gains from Inducement
The reciprocation results, discussed above, have two main exceptions, depending
on the payoff structure. In these two exceptions, a player may abuse nice opponents by
pursuing a mean strategy, or may pursue a nice strategy against mean opponents. Table
III-4 shows these exceptions, in which previously significant results (at the 0.05 level) are
replaced by weakly significant or insignificant p-values; previously non-significant
results are replaced by either strongly or weakly significant values of p (p < 0.1).
These exceptions can be attributed to the relative gain from inducing opponent’s
cooperation, that is, the benefit of changing one’s opponent’s actions relative to changing
one’s own. In the three payoff structures of SSB, BSB, and BSS, it makes relatively little
difference whether the opponent cooperates or defects. In this case, the player cares less
to induce the opponent to cooperate and may, therefore, pursue a mean strategy even with
nice opponents. However, in other payoff structures where it makes a relatively large
difference whether the opponent cooperates or defects (namely BBS, SBB and SBS), a
player may accommodate its (mean) opponent by pursuing nice strategies.
For the former exception, results that originally showed nice strategies to be
significantly better than their mean counterparts now show either weak significance (0.05
< p < 0.1) or insignificance. And for the latter exception, results that originally showed
that nice strategies are not significantly superior to their mean counterparts now show
either strong or weak significance (p < 0.1). Table III-4 shows the details of exceptions.
If we take a closer look at Table III-4, we observe a pattern in the (first) “Nice
Abuse Exception” regarding player types. A prisoner will always be advised to abuse its
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mean opponent when the relative gain rule applies, while an appeaser is never advised to
follow such a strategy. This result seems quite intuitive, given the fact that a prisoner is
both exploitative and powerful, and may therefore be abusive, while an appeaser is
cooperative and powerless, and is not expected to be abusive (see Framework in Figure
III-1). As for the other two players, deterrer and chicken, each is either exploitative or
powerful, and may be well advised to abuse nice opponents in a single payoff structure.
In the SSB payoff, a chicken’s biggest (relative) gain is from obtaining T by defecting
against a cooperative strategy. While in the BSS payoff, a deterrer gains relatively little
by moving from unilateral defection (T) to mutual cooperation (R), and would, therefore,
not be advised to make the move.
In the second exception, the gain from inducing a change in opponent’s behavior
is substantial (SBB, SBS, and BBS). The substantial middle jump of payoffs from S and
P on one side to R and T on the other side motivates niceness, even against mean
strategies, hoping to prompt cooperation. A player would try hard to induce cooperation
by defecting opponents, ending up with either R or T. In this case, we say that a player’s
payoff may depend more on the opponent’s action than the player’s own action. In the
BBS payoff, however, players can still achieve relatively high gains with mean
(defective) opponents through changing their own actions and moving between S and P.

5.3 The Prisoner Base-Case Exception
According to the above conclusions, the base case in which payoffs are
equidistant (SSS) should support the general result on strategy reciprocation (5.1).
However, we still observe some (weak) evidence that nice strategies are superior to
mean, and only for prisoner types. Although this observation is not in line with the
relative gains rule, it does confirm the findings of Axelrod (1984), who used equidistant
payoffs and concluded that nice strategies perform better than mean ones. We here
contend, however, that this is a specific conclusion applicable to prisoners, and does not
necessarily apply to other firm types.

6. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The results presented in this paper provide several insights regarding strategies of
managing joint innovations in supply chains, under several conditions including: (1)
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intent of each firm from the joint innovation relation, (2) relative power of each firm, in
terms of partner replaceability, and, (3) relative motivations of gaining most reward
versus avoiding worst punishment (payoff structure). Together, (1) and (2) define what
we call firm “type”, which may play a key role in determining the best strategies to
pursue in supply chain innovation relations. In these risky venues, where firms’ strategic
knowledge is at stake, firms may be aggressively exploitative, fearfully exploitative,
good, fair, moral or fully opportunistic.
Exploring advisable long-term strategies for a focal firm, one surprising result
was the fact that partner’s intent and power (i.e., partner type) does not affect the focal
firm’s advisable strategies. In contrast to one-shot interactions, in long-term interactions,
opponent innovation strategy is what matters, regardless of its type or preferences from
collaboration (Table III-5 summarizes results). On the other hand, the importance of
intent and power of the focal firm itself in driving its decisions of what strategy to adopt,
is contingent on its motivation to signal cooperative behavior and induce it in its partner.
When there is relatively high gain from signaling cooperative behavior, firm type is less
important and the different firm types are similarly advised as to what strategies to adopt.
However, when the gain from signaling cooperativeness is relatively low, firm types are
advised differently and may pursue diverse strategies. This latter conclusion of diversity
in advisable strategies is most pronounced among maximally different types of firms, i.e.,
ones that are different in both power (high versus low) and collaboration intent (mutual
cooperation versus race to learn).
Firms that engage in repetition of innovation interactions can induce cooperative
behavior, or niceness, in four “inducible” partner types: the fearfully exploitative, the
aggressively exploitative, the fair, and the good partners. Our results support the
conventional wisdom regarding action reciprocation (by, for example, TIT FOR TAT)
and reciprocal altruism by introducing reciprocation of strategies. Companies are advised
to pursue cooperative strategies that never defect first, i.e., nice strategies, only when
opponents pursue similarly cooperative strategies. Otherwise, companies may be well
advised to consider defecting.
The above recommendation, however, is subject to conditions related to relative
gains from attempting to change partner’s actions (See Figure III-4). A firm may abuse a
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“good partner” when the relative gain from inducement is insignificant, and it may be
nice to be a “bad partner” when the relative gain from inducement is significant. The
generalizability of abuse, however, is still subject to the firm’s power and the nature of its
collaboration motive. Finally, it is worth noting that relative gains from different
combinations of actions can be placed into seven broad categories, where differences in
behavior within each category are not significant, but differences in behavior across
categories are significant.

7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This paper presents an exploratory study that highlights a pool of symmetric and
asymmetric 2X2 games that can effectively model the knowledge-sharing dilemma
among supply chain partners that jointly innovate. We study how the different types of
players (firms) interact by classifying them along two dimensions: collaboration motive
and relative power. We then proceed using a simulation to study repeated innovation
interactions (equivalently long-term relations), exploring the effects of firm type,
opponent type, and strategy type (nice versus mean). Our results show the complete
irrelevance of opponent type, and the contingent relevance of focal firm type on advisable
strategies in long-term innovation interactions. We also extend the literature on action
reciprocation (e.g., TIT-FOR-TAT) by promoting reciprocation of strategy type (nice
versus mean), naming and explaining three conditions as exceptions to this reciprocation.
While this research provides some interesting results, our work provides
opportunities for further future extension. Firstly, information about opponent’s real
motive from collaboration may be unavailable or at least not accurate. In other words,
companies may not know about their partner’s preferences, their real gains or losses from
losing deals, losing knowledge, or abusing knowledge, or from mutual cooperation.
Secondly, dichotomizing cooperation decisions may be unrealistic in cases where it is
difficult to define cooperation as a yes or no question (Larsson et al., 1998). Moreover,
we recognize that we considered only 20 strategies in an infinite universe -- considering
more may lead to more robust conclusions. Finally, real supply chains involve multiple
actors, as opposed to dyads, and other motivations such as reputation building and
altruism may figure into decisions.
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Our study can, therefore, be extended along several dimensions. One extension is
to consider the “shadow of the future” or the probability of the game ending at any
iteration. In a supply chain, this can represent the value of dealing with the same partner
again, or the likelihood of repeated projects. Moreover, we characterized cooperative
behavior using only niceness, but other features, such as forgiveness, can be studied as
another dimension of cooperation. Furthermore, the fact that some interactions may
involve elements of negotiation and can be represented as cooperative games also applies
to supply chains, in which payoff division from joint projects are agreed upon and use of
partner’s knowledge can be negotiated (for example, in an intellectual property
agreement).
Another extension may expand the level of analysis to the network,
acknowledging both the presence of several partners in a supply chain and the possible
evolution of strategies in the determination of which one survives as the fittest. Finally,
supply chain decisions involve several relational elements, such as care for the other, or
‘warm glow altruism’ (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, & Wilson, 1982). Altruism is
particularly relevant to the supply chain context as payoffs are likely interdependent.
Further experiments can study the effect of social capital and length of previous
relationships with partners on supply chain cooperation.
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8. TABLES
Table III-1
Payoff Matrix For Focal (row) Player

Focal
Player

Opponent
Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

R

S

Defect

T

P
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Table III-2
Strategy Definitions
Strategy
Name
TIT-FORTAT
ALLC

Cooperate in the first round, then mimic
opponent’s action in previous round.
Always cooperate.

REVISED
DOWNING

Same as DOWNING, but starts with two rounds
of cooperation.

SOFT
MAJORITY
PAVLOV

WILLIAM
ADAMS

CCD
JOSS

Explanation

Strategy Name
MISTRUST
ALLD

DOWNING

Starts with cooperate. Plays the way the opponent
HARD
has played in the majority of the previous rounds.
MAJORITY
A tie goes to cooperate.
Starts with cooperation. Then cooperates if both
MEAN
players made the same move previously, defects
PAVLOV
otherwise.
It starts with a threshold of four defections. Once
the threshold is crossed, it defects and then
MEAN
adjusts the threshold by cutting it in half. It
WILLIAM
continues calculating the threshold after it is less
ADAMS
than one because it then becomes the probability
this rule cooperates after a defection.
Alternates
cooperate,
cooperate,
defect,
DDC
regardless of what the opponent does.
Starts with cooperation. If defected against,
respond with a defect. Otherwise, cooperate 90%
MISTRUST 10
of the time, i.e., TFT plus 10% unprovoked
defect.

Explanation
Starts with defection. If defected against, it responds with a defect.
Otherwise, it cooperates.
Always defect.
The DOWNING player defects on the first two rounds, then decides which
move to make on the basis of the opponent's track record: It reviews the
game record, determining how often in the past the opponent has responded
to defection with defection and how often it has responded to cooperation
with defection. It then assumes that the opponent will continue to respond
to future acts of cooperation and defection with cooperation and defection
in the same proportions. Finally, DOWNING computes whether it is more
profitable to cooperate or to defect, given the opponent's response policy,
and makes the appropriate move. (In cases where the strategy would be
cooperating for the first time, it assumes that the probability that an
opponent will respond to cooperation with cooperation is fifty percent.)
Starts with defect. Plays the way the opponent has played in the majority of
the previous rounds. A tie goes to defect.
Starts with defection. Then cooperates if both players made the same move
previously, defects otherwise.

Same like WILLIAM ADAMS but this one starts with 4 unprovoked
defections

Alternates defect, defect, cooperate, regardless of what the opponent does
Starts with defection. If defected against, respond with a defect. Otherwise,
cooperate 90% of the time, i.e., MISTRUST plus 10% unprovoked defect.
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Table III-2 (continued)
Strategy Definitions
Strategy
Name

Explanation

Cooperates during the first ten rounds, uses the
TFT strategy during the next fifteen rounds, and
subsequently switches to a more complicated
strategy: It cooperates if the other player
cooperated in the preceding round, but otherwise
computes a ``cooperation rate'' -- the number of
CHAMPION rounds in which the other player cooperated,
divided by the current round number. If this
cooperation rate is 3/5 or more, CHAMPION
continues to cooperate; otherwise, it selects a
random number in the range from 0 to 1 and
defects unless this number is less than or equal to
the cooperation rate.

Strategy Name

Explanation

MEAN
CHAMPION

Defects during the first ten rounds, uses the TFT strategy during the next
fifteen rounds, and subsequently switches to a more complicated strategy: It
cooperates if the other player cooperated in the preceding round, but
otherwise computes a ``cooperation rate'' -- the number of rounds in which
the other player cooperated, divided by the current round number. If this
cooperation rate is 3/5 or more, CHAMPION continues to cooperate;
otherwise, it selects a random number in the range from 0 to 1 and defects
unless this number is less than or equal to the cooperation rate.

Plays cooperatively for the first thirty-six iterations, then defects without
provocation. If its opponent makes its first defection on the same move, this
strategy assumes it is playing itself unless the opponent defects again. If it
Starts with cooperation and stays with it until
GRIM
thinks it is playing a strategy identical to itself, it cooperates. However, if it
defected against once, it then defects for the rest HARRINGTON
(FRIEDMAN)
is not playing itself, it attempts to take advantage of the opponent. It
of the (iterations).
decides randomly when it should probe the other strategy for weakness. If
the opponent appears to be a consistent defector (more than 70% defects),
Harrington's strategy will respond with continual defection.
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EQUI

SSB

SBS

Table III-3
Typical Results: Reciprocation Rule
Opponent
Player Type
MWW
Strategy
Nice
0.0022
Mean
Prisoner
0.1405
Overall
0.0022
Nice
0.0013
Mean
Chicken
0.1212
Overall
0.0013
Nice
0.0028
Mean
Deterrer
0.1405
Overall
0.0028
Nice
0.0017
Mean
Appeaser
0.2123
Overall
0.0017
Nice
0.1405
Mean
Prisoner
1.0000
Overall
0.1405
Nice
0.0640
Mean
Chicken
0.7913
Overall
0.0640
Nice
0.0028
Mean
Deterrer
0.1620
Overall
0.0028
Nice
0.0028
Mean
Appeaser
0.2123
Overall
0.0028
Nice
0.0013
Mean
Prisoner
0.1041
Overall
0.0013
Nice
0.0022
Mean
Chicken
0.0757
Overall
0.0022
Nice
0.0022
Mean
Deterrer
0.1212
Overall
0.0022
Nice
0.0028
Mean
Appeaser
0.0757
Overall
0.0028

EMAN NASR

Rule
General Rule 1
General Rule 2
General Rule 3
General Rule 1
General Rule 2
General Rule 3
General Rule 1
General Rule 2
General Rule 3
General Rule 1
General Rule 2
General Rule 3
Nice Abuse Exc.
General Rule 2
Nice Abuse Exc.
Nice Abuse Exc.
General Rule 2
Nice Abuse Exc.
General Rule 1
General Rule 2
General Rule 3
General Rule 1
General Rule 2
General Rule 3
General Rule 1
General Rule 2
General Rule 3
General Rule 1
Mean Treat Exc.
General Rule 3
General Rule 1
Mean Treat Exc.
General Rule 3
General Rule 1
Mean Treat Exc.
General Rule 3
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Table III-4
Exceptions
Exception

Payoff
Structure
SSB

Nice Abuse
Exception

BSS
BSB
SBB

Mean Treat
Exception

SBS

300
P, C ** N&O
P,D ** N&O
P ** N&O
P ** MEAN
P,C,D **
MEAN

Iterations
400
500
P INS N&O
P INS N&O
C ** N&O
C ** N&O
P INS N&O
P,D INS N&O
D ** N&O
P,C ** N&O
P, C ** N&O
C ** MEAN
P ** MEAN
C,A ** MEAN P,C,D **
MEAN
A ** MEAN
P ** MEAN
P ** MEAN

600
P,C INS N&O
P,D INS N&O
P, C ** N&O
P,D,A **
MEAN
C ** MEAN
P ** MEAN

BBS
SSS
P ** MEAN
Prisoner
(EQUI)
Base-Case
BBB
P ** MEAN
P ** MEAN
Exception
(EQUI)
P: prisoner, C: chicken, D: deterrer, A: appeaser
INS: p > 0.1
** weakly significant 0.05<p<0.1
N&O: results with nice strategies and overall combination of nice and mean strategies
MEAN: results with mean strategies
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Table III-5
Results Summary
Results

Partner type

Not significant

Firm type

Partner Strategy
Type (nice versus
mean)

Conditionally
significant

Factor

Significant when there is
high value in inducing
partner’s cooperation
Insignificant when there
is little value in inducing
partner’s cooperation
Significant

Implications
A firm’s long term strategy of cooperation does not
depend on short term preferences of partner firm
When there is high value in inducing partner’s
cooperation, a firm’s long term strategy of
cooperation depends on its own short term
preferences
When there is little value in inducing partner’s
cooperation, a firm’s long term strategy of
cooperation does not depend on its own short term
preferences
A firm’s long-term strategy of cooperation always
depends on partner’s niceness.
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9. FIGURES
Figure III-1
2-Dimensional Framework for Firm Types
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Figure III-2
One-Shot Equilibrium for 2X2 C-D Games
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Figure III-3
Maximally Different Player Types (Shown in Double Arrows)
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Figure III-4
Joint Effect of Partner’s Strategy Type and Cooperation Value
Partner
Strategy
Type

Nice
Mean

COOPERATION Zone
ABUSE Zone
Firm shall reciprocate
Firm may not reciprocate
Nice-Nice
Mean-Nice
TOLERANCE Zone
RIVALRY Zone
Firm shall not reciprocate
Firm may reciprocate
Nice-Mean
Mean-Mean
High
Low
Value of inducing cooperation
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APPENDICES
Table III-A1
Comparison of Rankings within Payoff Categories
SSS

kendall's τ
p value

Prisoner
Chicken
Deterrer
Appeaser
Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All
0.77573 0.66138 0.77573 0.88421 0.88421 0.88421 0.82105 0.62797 0.82105 0.91293 0.94737 0.91293
2.1E-06 5.6E-05 2.1E-06 3.7E-11 3.7E-11 3.7E-11 4.6E-09 0.00013 4.6E-09 2.4E-08 3.3E-14 2.4E-08

BBB
Prisoner
Chicken
Deterrer
Appeaser
Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All
0.67019 0.78628 0.67019 0.94459 0.83158 0.94459 0.88421 0.81053 0.88421 0.96842 0.87072 0.96842
4.3E-05 1.6E-06 4.3E-05 7.6E-09 2.3E-09 7.6E-09 3.7E-11 9.1E-09 3.7E-11 8.4E-16 1E-07 8.4E-16

kendall's τ
p value

SSB
Prisoner
Chicken
Deterrer
Appeaser
Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All
0.90526 0.97884 0.90526 0.94737 0.86316 0.94737 0.92632 0.96842 0.92632 0.94737 0.95515 0.94737
5E-12 2.3E-09 5E-12 3.3E-14 2.2E-10 3.3E-14 5E-13 8.4E-16 5E-13 3.3E-14 5.1E-09 3.3E-14

SBS
Prisoner
Chicken
Deterrer
Appeaser
Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All
0.93684 0.97895 0.93684 0.91579 0.96842 0.91579 0.91293 0.94737 0.91293 0.88127
1 0.88127
1.4E-13 -4E-16 1.4E-13 1.6E-12 8.4E-16 1.6E-12 2.4E-08 3.3E-14 2.4E-08 7.1E-08 -4E-16 7.1E-08

kendall's τ
p value

BSS
Prisoner
Chicken
Deterrer
Appeaser
Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All
0.93404 0.97884 0.93404 0.94459 0.97895 0.94459 0.9657 0.96825 0.9657 0.93404 0.96842 0.93404
1.1E-08 2.3E-09 1.1E-08 7.6E-09 -4E-16 7.6E-09 3.5E-09 3.4E-09 3.5E-09 1.1E-08 8.4E-16 1.1E-08

SBB
Prisoner
Chicken
Deterrer
Appeaser
Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All
0.73351 0.91579 0.73351 0.87368 0.95789 0.87368 0.94737 0.94737 0.94737 0.96842 0.95789 0.96842
7.5E-06 1.6E-12 7.5E-06 9.2E-11 6.7E-15 9.2E-11 3.3E-14 3.3E-14 3.3E-14 8.4E-16 6.7E-15 8.4E-16

kendall's τ
p value

BSB
Prisoner
Chicken
Deterrer
Appeaser
Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All
0.93684 0.96825 0.93684 0.95789 0.87368 0.95789 0.93684 0.97895 0.93684 0.96842 0.97895 0.96842
1.4E-13 3.4E-09 1.4E-13 6.7E-15 9.2E-11 6.7E-15 1.4E-13 -4E-16 1.4E-13 8.4E-16 -4E-16 8.4E-16

BBS
Prisoner
Chicken
Deterrer
Appeaser
Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All
0.89182 0.81794 0.89182 0.94737 0.90526 0.94737 0.89474 0.85263 0.89474 0.91293 0.90526 0.91293
4.9E-08 5.8E-07 4.9E-08 3.3E-14 5E-12 3.3E-14 1.4E-11 5E-10 1.4E-11 2.4E-08 5E-12 2.4E-08
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Table III-A2
Opponent Type Result Summary
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Table III-A2 (cont’d)
Opponent Type Result Summary
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Table III-A2 (cont’d)
Opponent Type Result Summary
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Table III-A3
Player Type Result Summary

-ve correlation
insignificant p

159

STRATEGIZING NICENESS IN CO-OPETITION

EMAN NASR

Table III-A3 (cont’d)
Player Type Result Summary

-ve correlation
insignificant p
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Table III-A3 (cont’d)
Player Type Result Summary

-ve correlation
insignificant p
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Dissertation Conclusion
This dissertation addresses hopes of promising opportunities and fears from
substantial risks of supply chain innovation, utilizing three methodological approaches in
three distinct papers. The first paper synthesizes the literature to develop the theory of
Process Innovation Propagation (PIP). PIP creates a new profitability channel as a novel
innovation appropriation mechanism that capitalizes on supply chain partnerships and
positive tuning of expert and market power advantages. The second paper uses a survey
technique to empirically test supply chain knowledge properties hypothesized to drive
radical and incremental innovative capabilities, with moderating roles of reward,
punishment and legal influences. Lastly, paper three conducts a simulation, designed
within a game theoretic framework, to explore the effects of firm and partner preferences,
strategy type (defective versus cooperative), and payoff structure on the optimum strategy
for repeated innovation interactions. The dissertation carries significant implications and
managerial insights in four supply chain directions: partner selection, decision making,
reciprocal exchanges, and power tuning.
Partner Selection
Supply chain partners should be selected according to the type of joint innovation
activity, be it transfer (propagation) or creation. PIP partners, for instance, must enjoy a
high degree of strategic fit for the propagation to be successful. A propagator assesses
potential receivers based on the similarity of organizational strategies to that of its
business, the degree of interdependence, and the extent of incentive alignment between
the companies. Process innovations aim at enhancing one or more competitive priorities,
whose similarity across firms, increases the innovation’s relevance to the receiving firm.
Moreover, a higher degree of interdependence places more stake for each firm with the
other, making the exchange more beneficial for the propagator, and more appealing for
the receiver. Incentive alignment translates into higher synergies from collaboration, and
more protection against opportunism.
On the other hand, partners for joint projects aimed at the creation of radical and
incremental innovations should be assessed based on the properties of their
organizations’ intellectual capital. Firstly, managers should avoid partners with large size
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discrepancy when developing incremental ideas. Such partners are expected to employ
maximally different organizational procedures, patenting strategies and innovation
processes. Disparity in size leads to high gaps in institutionalized knowledge properties,
which is the basis of incremental innovations, impeding the applicability of the change to
parties involved. When cooperating in radical innovation projects, managers should avoid
excessive skill diversity and largely sized teams, which may entail conflicts and
coordination problems.
Decision Making
Results of this dissertation research help managers take better decisions regarding
their long term supply chain innovation strategies, innovation selection for propagation,
and tuning governance structure for more effective knowledge exchanges. A firm’s
decision of whether to defect or not in long term innovation relations necessitates
knowledge about partner’s power stance and intent from the collaboration. Companies
are advised to pursue cooperative strategies that never defect first, i.e., nice strategies,
only when opponents pursue similarly cooperative strategies. Otherwise, companies may
be well advised to consider defecting. This advice, however, is subject to conditions
related to relative gains from attempting to change partner’s actions. A firm may abuse a
cooperative partner when the relative gain from inducement is insignificant, and it may
be nice to a defective partner when the relative gain from inducement is significant.
The PIP theory developed herein guides the decision on the right innovations to
share with supply chain partners for better performance. The theory characterizes
specificity and tacitness as elements of vertical transferability, which have opposite
effects on the effectiveness of propagation. Managers are advised to share less specific,
but more tacit innovations along the supply chain. Innovations that are less bound to the
type of business are easier to transfer vertically, without affecting imitation. The
challenge of transferring tacit innovations, on the other hand, can be solved within the
supply chain by increasing and enhancing interactions among people of the two
organizations, while keeping competitors away from imitation. Managers are furthermore
advised to decrease formality of governance with the degree of radicalness of the
propagated change.
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Reciprocity
This dissertation highlights reciprocity as a very important exchange rule that is
increasingly driving outcomes from innovation relationships. Companies are advised to
reciprocate and expect reciprocation from partners. The decision to pursue a cooperative
or a defective innovation strategy is, at least partially, determined according to the
partner’s strategy type. This suggests that, in extension to (short-term) reciprocation of
actions, such as the famous game theory’s TIT-FOR-TAT, long term strategies may also
be reciprocated.
Moreover, managers are advised to acknowledge the economic value behind
social ties and relationship quality with supply chain partners. Managers who recognize
the tangible value of cultivating supply chain social capital plant the seed of open sharing
and partner knowledge protection, expecting reciprocation. As partners reciprocate
actions, the wheel goes on and the supply chain’s repository of shared knowledge is
maximized and protected from competing chains.
Power Tuning
Power is an inevitable pillar of the inherently interdependent supply chain
relationships. Despite its perceived negativity, power can be tuned in positive ways that
can help otherwise passive companies to adopt successful innovations passed by PIP.
Innovation owners are recommended to make every attempt to persuade supply chain
members to adopt their innovations, capitalizing on their advantage as experts in the field
when propagating downstream, or on their market power advantage when propagating
upstream.
Active power exercise, on the other hand, harms the generation of radically new
ideas, and does not help incremental ones. Supply chain joint endeavors aimed at the
creation of ideas must not employ any influential strategies. New idea development
requires a fair degree of freedom and flexibility to match the uncertainty of the creation
process, even for small improvements/ changes. Organizations with power advantage that
are inclined to use it are advised to refrain from doing so, realizing the losses in joint
innovative capabilities that will result.
This work is not claimed to comprehensively capture supply chain innovation
hopes and fears. As the innovation process continues to evolve, more threats and
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opportunities will arise, raising different research questions and opening up new venues
for research on the subject. It did, however, highlight several concerns in the area
including: capitalizing on supply chain partners’ capabilities and knowledge,
appropriating maximum returns on successful innovations, devising innovation strategies
with supply chain partners, power tuning for optimum innovation performance, and,
finally, dealing with the knowledge sharing dilemma and risk of compromising
competitive knowledge.
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